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Abstract
A puzzle is generated by two intuitions about artworks: 1. There is no prima fade reason to 
take artworks to be niind-independent objects; 2. Aesthetic judgments are objective. These 
intuitions seem to be in tension, for if artworks or their aesthetic properties are mind- 
dependent, how can aesthetic judgments be objective? The common solution to the puzzle 
lies in rejecting or revising one o f the two intuitions. Typically, realists reject 1, and many 
antirealists reject 2. I develop an antirealist aesthetic dieory that accommodates both 
intuitions, focusing on critical disagreement between epistemically optimal judges, realist 
difficulties with supervenience and response-dependence, the role o f imagination in the 
experience o f artworks, and the metaphorical quality o f aesthetic discourse. The hallmark o f 
realism, namely the mind-independence o f aesthetic qualities, is an untenable commitment 
that yields an impoverished view o f artworks. A cognitivist anti-realism is available which 
preserves the objectivity o f aesthetic discourse and yields a richer conception o f artworks 
and our interaction with them.
vin
Chapter 1
The present enquiry starts with a puzzle generated by two intuitions:
1. Our experience o f artworks is bound up with the particular thoughts we have o f 
them.
2, Aestlietic judgments are objective.
The two intuitions seem to be in conflict. If artworks or theit distinctive aestlietic properties 
are mind-dependent, then the discourse o f aesthetic judgment would more plausibly be 
understood as subjective. If, on the other hand, aestlietic judgments really are objective, 
then the objects o f those judgments had better be independent o f one’s thoughts about 
them.
The various positions in the realism-antirealism debate concerning aesthetics are usefully, if 
crudely, characterized by the various solutions they propose to the puzzle. Broadly, any 
realist position will accept some version o f the objectivity claim, while rejecting or at least 
distancing itself from the mind-dependence claim. Some antkealist positions, arguably the 
majority o f the better-developed ones, accept the mind-dependence o f artworks, or at least 
o f aesthetic properties, and reject or modify the objectivity claim. Those modifications 
typically involve the claim that aesthetic judgments in fact do not function as they seem to, 
but rather merely express a preference. This option does not exhaust tlie collection of 
aesthetic antirealisms; indeed, the aesthetic antirealism I will develop here accommodates 
both intuitions.
Whke the intuitions are talcen as an entrée to the debate, they are o f course not above 
scrutiny themselves. Here I provide only a rough and preliminary motivation. Artworks are 
artifacts or events, the products o f human intentional activity. A rock cut away by a miner 
might be classed as an artifact, especially one cut by a miner who was momentarily bored 
with his work and focused his attention on cutting away die rock just so. But still, tliat rock 
would not strike anyone as a mind-dependent object. The intuition about artworks involves 
more than this Itind o f claim. Artworks are objects that admit o f interprétation and 
questions o f significance o f a certain sort. The features o f the miner’s rock might be
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significant in one sense, because its being laced with veins o f gold means that the mine wiU 
be profitable. But the significance o f artworks is not o f this sort. Artworks qua art invite a 
certain sort or regard, one that involves the attribution o f qualities like intensity, grace, balance, 
sensuality, ^namism, triteness and melancholy. A set o f sounds that doesn’t plausibly support 
qualities like these is just noise; where qualities like these are plausibly attributed we seem to 
fulfill a necessary condition for calling something an artwork. A complete physical and 
chemical description o f the properties o f the miner’s rock would arguably omit any 
properties like the ones just listed. To attribute those, we need a necessary connection to 
intentionality o f a certain sort, one aimed at imbuing or foregrounding these properties. But 
then the miner’s rock, taken now as an artwork and so inviting a certain kind o f regard, is a 
candidate mind-dependent object.
Arthur Danto’s Gallery o f Indkcernibles^ makes this point nicely. Imagine a gallery 
displaying eight identical red square canvases on its walls. What differentiates these from the 
other are their title-indicated interpretations: The Israelites Crossing the Red Sea, Kierkegaard s^ 
Mood, Red Squate, etc. The eighth is a mere object, not offered for any interpretative regard. 
The various interpretations differentiate the physically indiscernible canvases from each 
other, and provide a demarcation between artifacts that are artworks and those that are not. 
Following Danto, the first intuition incorporates the idea that interpretations are “functions 
which transform material objects into works o f art.”^
Why would a discourse about such objects be objective? There is a strong opposing intuition 
holding de gustihus non est disputandum. Is it not more plausible to think that the essential 
iacorporation o f interpretations into the very ontological fabric o f artworks renders them 
radically sensitive to interpreters? Are there not other reasons, independent o f fh^ 
consideration, to think that aesthetic judgments are mere expressions o f preference? This 
view quickly comes into conflict with the apparent character o f aesthetic discourse. That 
discourse appears to be a normative one— to offer an aesthetic judgment invites a demand 
for supporting reasons. If a judgment is objective, it admits o f reasoned improvement. This 
feature is at least a necessary condition for a discourse’s being objective. Whether there are 
other conditions to be satisfied is part o f the present enquiry. Further, aesthetic judgments 
also appear to aim at truth. The expressivist, who holds that aesthetic judgments are no
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m ote tlian expressions o f preference, owes us an account o f what we are really doing when 
malting tliese claims, and why we think tliey hold objectively. This view, I shall argue, 
ultimately proves incoherent.
The phenomenal character o f our aesthetic experience is as o f external objects or events 
with certain qualitative characteristics. Paradigmatically, these tilings are artworks, but 
landscapes, persons, and even abstract entities lilte theories and proofs are often taken as 
legitimate foci o f aesthetic experience. That phenomenology, together with the normativity 
o f aestlietic discourse, lends considerable intuitive appeal to realism as an underlying 
metaphysical framework in aestlietics. Realism centers on a thesis o f mind-independence: 
the truth or falsity o f assertions in a discourse is a matter independent o f the beliefs o f 
participants in the discourse. If a discourse is properly characterized as a realist one then 
when a weU-foitned assertion p is true, it is not because the associated belief that p is held, 
but rather, because some independent state o f affairs obtains. This position promises to 
yield a direct route to objectivity in aesthetics. The familiarity and apparent ease o f the route 
explain its overwhelming dominance within aesthetics. But furdier considerations o f the 
subjective contribution to aesthetic experience lead one to reconsider those realist intuitions. 
Ultimately, a considered antirealist aesthetics can be demonstrated to preserve the 
normativity o f the discourse while making better sense o f our experience o f artworks and at 
the same time generating less conceptual tension in our metaphysical commitments.
It is a striking and frustrating feature o f the wider realism-antirealism debate that the 
meanings o f the definitive claims o f those positions are themselves in dispute. Realism 
comprises a wide range o f positions tiiat differently unpack and augment the core claim o f 
mind-independence. Antirealism, most broadly defined^ as the denial o f that core claim, 
includes an even wider, if less well-developed, range o f theory. Thus, an essential first task is 
to set out the various theoretical positions with the aim o f drawing a workable border 
between realism and anthealism. There are a number o f ways in which this might proceed, 
including (largely) semantic distinctions, (largely) ontological distinctions, global arguments 
o f the Itind found in historical debates between realists and idealists, and so on. Some o f 
these projects lose sight o f the aesthetic, resolving its status as a consequence o f a stronger 
categorical conclusion. It is also questionable whether semantic and ontological issues can
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always be neatly separated. The strategy here wiU instead largely parallel the realism debate in 
metaethics and ignore global arguments altogether. The primary motivations for this 
approach are first, that domain-specific antirealisms might be compatible with a wider, 
subsuming realism, and second, that the aesthetic and ethical domains as domains o f value 
are often taken to be amenable to the same conceptual inquiry, and in a sense demand 
similar metaphysical explanations. There are two important disanalogies. Questions about 
will and motivation, though not eliminable, do not have the same crucial status in aesthetics 
as they do in ethics, and so will not be examined."  ^ On the other hand, questions about the 
role o f metaphor and art theory and criticism play a much more prominent role in aesthetics 
than in ethics, and so will constitute a major point o f departure from the metaethics-tracking 
approach.
At this point I should say more about the notions o f ‘aesthetic quaUty* and o f ‘aesthetic 
judgment’ I shall be using. I follow Currie’s characterization^ o f an aesthetic quahty as any 
property that can be cited as a reason for a judgment o f aesthetic value. That said, many o f 
the utterances I consider as aesthetic judgments are not judgments o f value in any obvious 
sense. So we should understand an aesthetic quality to be the sort o f thing that could in 
principle play a role in supporting a judgment o f aesthetic value, even if it does not in actual 
fact. In some sense, I depart firom much philosophical writing which takes judgments to be 
simple evaluations or predications. Examples o f these include “Rachmaninoffs late works 
are tough and concise”, “Shakespeare’s sonnets are indisputably great”, and “This Puccini 
aria is dreadfully saccharine”. O f course these are examples o f aesthetic judgments, but 
judgments o f the “X is F” form do not exhaust the category. I believe that the discussion o f 
aesthetic judgment has suffered for taking this paradigm to be the model o f an aesthetic 
judgment. Art critical writing is typically much more sophisticated than this. I include as 
aesthetic judgments remarks like: “That Miro’s imagination is ignited by its contact with the 
anatomy o f sex takes nothing away from the purity o f his painting”  ^and “[A Rothko 
painting) is almost a blank façade, an expanse o f perhaps two or three colors which seem to 
have materialized ftom nowhere, like a mirage, instilling them into our sight”.^  Both say 
something about artworks. In the first case, qualities are attributed to works partly through 
attributing qualities to the artist, and in the second, a vivid characterization is given which is
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at best only indirectly predicative. An adequate theory o f aesthetic judgment needs to 
provide an account o f what is happening with these judgments as well as die simpler ones.
Hume argues that “a litde reflection suffices” to show that aesthetic qualities do not lie m the 
objects themselves, but depend on the “fabric or structure o f the mind.”*^ The antireaHsm I 
win advocate shares diis thought. The central task I shall undertake is two-fold: the negative 
project examines the motivations for realism and exposes two critical shortcomings, wliile 
the positive project shows that one species o f antirealism is not vulnerable to these 
shortcomings, and possesses other theoretical virtues. The latter project is more daunting 
than die former, as the antirealist seems to have a weaker grip on objectivity. Though I will 
examine diis assumption, I take it as a starting point that objectivity is a feature o f aesthetic 
discourse that must be preserved, though in the course o f the investi^tion the notion o f 
objectivity may well requite some qualification and adjustment.
It is possible to clarify the various “meta-aesthetic” positions by developing a taxonomic 
structure with definitive yes-no questions at each o f its nodes. The yes-no questions bear 
both on the semantics and ontology o f the domain, and die positions can then be 
understood in terms o f theit respective answers to these questions. O f course, there are 
other ways o f distinguishing the positions involved, but the taxonomy here will be 
employed to make the distinctions salient to the present inquiry.
The default for all o f the arrowed paths is that they are open. It is important to recognize 
that negative arguments against particular routes do not in every case constitute impenetrable 
barriers, but rather resistances o f varying strengths. Conversely, positive arguments for 
odier routes are not to be seen as raü tracks, making the conceptual path obligatory, but as 
conductors, agaiu in varying strengths, which make those paths more easily traversed. 
Understanding the project in this way is meant to forestall the thought that some position in 
the debate can be eliminated via disproof, tiiough the strength o f resistance in moving to it 
will show the high conceptual stress involved in the series o f moves. On the other hand, 
positive arguments will not establish a position reached by a highly “conductive” route to be 
true (and the others false), but only abductively strong or weak. High conductivity does 
correspond to a liigh degree o f cognitive virtue that warrants accepting a position until the
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taxonomie network itself becomes a candidate for revision or until furtber arguments can 
show that tlie various resistances and conductivities in the offered network should be 
revalued. These principles give the acceptability conditions for theories in the present 
inquiry.
Taxonomy of Meta-Aesthetic Theory
1. Are aesthetic judgments truth-evaluable and fallible? 
Yes N o
Subjectivism/Emotivism
2. Is aesthetic semantics descriptivist? 
Yes N o
Expressivism/ Quasi-Realism
Are any aesthetic judgments true? 
Yes N o
Error Theory
4. Are aesthetic judgments extension-reflecting? 
Yes N o
Cognitivist AntireaHsm
Are aesthetic properties reducible? 
Yes N o ^
6. Are aesthetic properties supervenient? 
Yes N o
Reductivist ReaHsm
Platonic ReaHsm
7. Are aesthetic properties response-dependent? 
Yes N o
Modest ReaHsm Robust ReaHsm
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In giving arguments that develop the resistances and conductivities o f the different branches 
o f the network, three positions wiU emerge as tlie most plausible ‘‘meta-aesthetic” contender 
tlieories, two o f which are realist and one which is antkealist. The two realist positions share 
the claim that aesthetic properties are real (in other words, that aesthetic predicates are to be 
taken literaUy in the sense that the aesthetic predicate has a corresponding property) and are 
noii-reductively supervenient on non-aesthetdc properties. They differ in thek understanding 
o f the core realist mind-independence claim: foUowing Gaut, mbmt aesthetic realism holds that 
the truth o f aesthetic judgments is independent o f the judge's counterfactual mental states; 
modest aesthetic nalism that they are merely independent o f her actual mental states. In terms 
o f properties, the modest realist takes aesthetic properties to be response-dependent, while 
the robust realist claims they are response-independent. The antkealist position tliat 
emerges and wiU be developed as die most plausible one is cognitivist antireaHsm. Aesthetic 
judgments are truth-apt and enjoy some degree o f objectivity. True aesthetic judgments are 
extension-deterrnining, and not extension-reflecting. In otlier words, truth in aesthetics is 
constituted by best judgments. Best judgments are those which satisfy a large body o f 
norms, which themselves are open to revision and rejection for any particular judgment. 
Many o f those norms Hcense particular warranted imaginings o f artworks, imagining which 
are recorded in judgments. So it is crucial to distinguish the sophisticated view that truth is 
constituted by best judgments from any simple performative model o f truth being stipulated. 
The positive arguments I shall adduce for this claim include consideration o f the language o f 
art criticism and art tlieory. I argue that an examination o f these sub-species o f aesthetic 
discourse shows that the distinctively aesthetic quaHties named ki our judgments are mind- 
dependent; that is, that they are quaHties o f objects and events subject to imaginative 
construal.
It is a common objection against antireaHsm that it inevitably sHdes into a strong relativism 
or worse, skepticism. Relativism seems to be a Hlcely consequence o f the definitive antkeaHst 
claim that there are propositions o f indeterminate truth value; it seems a necessary 
consequence o f a modified antireaHsm that admits true contradictions. Under classical logic, 
a true contradiction entails the truth o f any assertion at all. This is the principle o f 
explosion: from a contradiction, anyflikig foUows. Explosion is a serious problem, as it 
seems to leave Httle room for notions o f normativity or, indeed, rationaHty. One remedy for
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this situation is to relativize the truth predicate or evaluative predicates, to critical 
communities, speakers o f the same language, or to individuals, which is the position o f 
subjectivism. I shall argue that while there may be a case for relativism, it is not mandated by 
antirealism, as there are alternatives to conceptual modifications o f truth. Skepticism 
threatens because o f the antireaMst's metaphysical modesty—if we are at best agnostic about 
aesthetic properties, what anchor could there be for the truth o f aesthetic judgments? If we 
cannot know whether our judgments are true, we are mked in the skeptical tar-pit. But in 
fact the realist is in no better position here, because it is an essential feature o f realism that 
truth may outrun our capacity to know at any time. N o matter how high we stand on the 
epistemic slope, there is always the possibility that the key fact remains out o f our Hne o f 
sight. And so skepticism lurks close at hand for the realist, because she can never assume 
that she has all the facts in, and so must take her judgments as provisional. It is possible to 
introduce skepticism at any point in the taxonomy by posing the question, “Is the truth (or 
status, in the case o f subjectivism) o f aesthetic judgments knowable?”, to which the skeptic 
of course replies in the negative. Since the skeptical worry is equally one for the realist and 
the antirealist, it wül not help decide the argument either way, and so I wiH say little about it. 
I begin the investigation with shorter arguments against the more implausible realist and 
antirealist positions, leaving the bulk o f my discussion to a comparative assessment o f the 
three contender positions. The negative program consists o f a set o f arguments a^inst 
realism that raise worries about supervenience and the realist proposals for diagnosing cases 
o f kresolvable critical disagreements, and about realist ontology, with a focus on the thesis 
o f mind-independence. ReaHsm generaHy can be understood as the denial that truth is 
dependent on our epistemic capacities. In other words, there are mind-independent facts, 
and our thoughts and assertions are true in vktue o f thek correspondence with these facts. 
Truth can come apart fcom ideally justified beHef. Statements we make about the quaHtative 
character o f our aesthetic experience aim at truth and thus carry an impHcit demand o f 
agreement, and it is always legitimate to ask for reasons in support o f those statements. 
Tliose reasons often have the form o f a pointing out o f other, typically non-evaluative, 
quaHties o f the work, such as loudness, voicing, and tempo in the case o f a musical work. 
This feature o f aesthetic discourse has led to the adoption o f supervenience as the formal 
relation tliat gives content to that justificatory practice. Supervenience is often expressed in 
the formula: “N o aesthetic difference without a non-aesthetic difference.” Parsing this
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formula yields two claims: (i) a metaphysical claim o f property relation, that aesthetic properties 
are dependent on and emergent from non-aesthetic properties, and (ii) an epistemological claim 
o f constraint on judgments, that two experientially indiscernible objects must be attributed 
the same aesthetic properties and hence the same aesthetic value. Supervenience is 
standardly taken as an ^priori principle. How might the realistpstijy  that principle if 
challenged? One candidate valid argument for supervenience can only be given if an 
antkealist conception o f truth is adopted. This raises a dkemma for the aesthetic realist: 
either give up supervenience to maintain realism, or give up realism. Additionally, I give 
independent arguments that the notion o f supervenience is deeply troubled and quite 
possibly incoherent. Without a viable and coherent expression o f the supervenience claim, 
the realist project is deeply threatened.
Problems with supervenience independent o f its alliance with realism suggest that aesthetic 
antkealism is better o ff without it. The antkealist then must give an account o f tlie ground 
o f our aesthetic judgments that makes sense o f the normativity o f the discourse. Such an 
account is available, by applying Crispin Wright's minimalist framework to aesthetic 
discourse. Minimalism denies that truth is “intrisically a metaphysically heavyweight 
notion— the mark o f some specially profound foi*m o f engagement between language, or 
thought, and reality— for which certain areas o f assertoric discourse, whatever internal 
discipline they manifest, may simply not be in the market.''^  According to Wright, assertions 
in a discourse are apt for truth when they have the right sort o f syntax and discipline. I show 
that aesthetic discourse has these needed features. But the applicability o f the rninknalist 
theory o f truth does not yet show that truth is constituted by best judgments, or to put it in 
metaphysical terms, that aesthetic qualities are mind-dependent. That point is established by 
examining the function o f art theoretical and critical discourse. This claim may look 
suspiciously like an equivocation between aestlietic predicates and aesthetic qualities or 
properties. But although it has the hollow ring o f an analytic philosophical slogan, it remains 
true that the character o f aesthetic discourse is going to be our best indicator o f the nature o f 
the substance o f aesthetics. That discourse comprises the language used, if never quite 
effectively, to capture the phenomenology o f our interaction with artworks. And to the 
extent that the language we manifest corresponds to our imier experience in the concert hall 
or gallery, the language-based investigation aims to shed light on that experience as well.
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The realist must accept this strategy, as it is an implication o f the correspondence theory o f 
truth to which she is committed. Even the antirealist who claims truth-aptness for a 
particular discourse must accommodate at least the platitude (q.v. Wright) that in some sense to 
be made explicit truth is correspondence with facts.
It may seem obvious that much o f the language used to describe non-representational art—  
abstract painting and absolute music especially—is necessarily metaphorical. Without 
representational content, we are left with only the critical language o f formalism, but our 
pervasive use o f expressive predicates hke sad, troubled, lusty, triumphant, and so on, outruns 
the attempt to restrict discourse to those terms sanctioned by the formalist. This is not 
merely a feature o f the language used to describe our experience; the phenomenology o f 
artworks includes palpable affective qualities. And here a simple-minded but truly 
challengiag question emerges: how can a non-minded object bear such expressive 
properties? When the question is raised in this way, it is easy to see that representational 
artworks are open to it as well. The realist must be able to explain away the presence o f 
metaphor if she is easily to traverse the arrowed path ftom 4. to 5. in the taxonomy. 
Predicates must correspond to properties, and any weakening o f that correspondence 
weakens the case for any kind o f realism. I argue that the correspondence is weakened by 
the fact that many aesthetic predicates do not directly refer to real properties, but are instead 
to be interpreted as metaphorical ascriptions. The modest realist seeks to accommodate the 
contribution o f the experiencing mind to artworks by tagging aesthetic properties as 
response-dependent, and this move might look like a substitute for the metaphor claim. But 
if this is part o f the motivation for the claim, then it really amounts to pointing away and 
then putting the coin in the other hand. Response-dependence and metaphoricity are not at 
all incompatible. In fact, there had better be some sense in which aesthetic qualities are 
response-dependent if normativity is going to be preserved. Furthermore, the response- 
dependence thesis rests on an analogy drawn between aesthetic qualities and secondary 
qualities like color, which I shall argue is a rather strained one. The realist, modest, robust, 
or otherwise, must engage with the issue o f metaphor directly. I shall further argue that 
modest realist attempts to admit metaphorical predicates as the correspondents o f 
“ineffable” properties is a disingenuous move, and one that is incompatible with realism.
10
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Thus, the argument for metaphor is meant to increase the resistance to any realism while 
simultaneously providing a core o f the argument for antirealist cognitiHsm.
The realist who concedes that many aesthetic predicates are metaphorical may object that 
this situation is just as bad for the antirealist who wishes to preserve objectivity. For if  
metaphors are understood as open-textured conceptual structures, it would seem that any 
judgment could in principle be justified, and so the antkealist aspking to some notion of 
objectivity is pushed back to subjectivism. Indeed, this seems to be the happy conclusion o f 
many postmodern theorists. I take that Itind o f cynical, anything-goes subjectivism to be no 
more defensible or deskable than what Hume calls tlie “vulgar” subjectivism o f de gustihus 
non est disputandum. Both species are in considerable tension with the strongly normative 
quality o f aesthetic discourse, and so I take it to be a prime task for the antkealist who 
pushes the metaphor line to show how subjectivism is to be avoided. To that end, 
understanding what norms discipline the practice o f aesthetic judgment is a requkement for 
the development o f a complete antkealist cognitivism.
Thus far my introductory remarks have concerned the predicates corresponding to aesthetic 
qualities like gracefulness, vibrancy, joyfukiess, and balance. I have said little or nothing 
about “overall” predicates o f aesthetic merit or demerit, such as “good”, “bad”, and so on. 
Some philosophers mark the difference between these two as one o f descriptive versus 
normative predication, though this distinction seems indefensible. Others have labeled these 
two categories as “thick” and “thin” concepts, noting the evaluative aspect o f predicates in 
the former list. I will not devote much space to arguing that tliis latter conception is the 
better one, and I wiU focus mainly on thick concepts in what follows. My reasons for doing 
so include the fact that any overall predication o f good or bad demands a defense given in 
terms o f other predicates fiom  the former list, and so it stands to reason that an 
investigation into those concepts is the more fruitful one. Also, while “good” and “bad” 
seem to be straightforwardly thin in thek apparent lack o f descriptive content, other 
predicates wliich might be offered as subspecies or variants, lilœ “bold”, “powerful”, 
“sublime”, “derivative”, “insincere”, and “bland” betray thek more descriptive commitments 
rather quickly. So it seems that the first category is more fundamental, more interesting, and 
vastly larger than the thki language o f approbation and its opposite.
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What is at stake in the contest between realism and antirealism? First, antirealism o f the 
cognitivist variety leaves room for principled critical disagreements without recourse to 
relativism. It is a commonplace in the artworld that critics and artists, each with strong 
claims to optimal judge status, disagree. On the realist view, at least one o f the parties to 
such a dispute must be wrong, as there is a determinate, if inaccessible, fact o f the matter. 
Many o f these disputes, however, do not suggest any eventual resolution, and so many 
realists are drawn into a pluralist relativism. The disputants are not reaify in disagreement, 
because the critical vocabulary in which they make and defend their judgments is 
incommensurable. The harshly negative judgment o f the Marxist critic is true-for-Marxist- 
critics and the mildly positive judgment o f the formalist critic is true-for-formalist-critics.
But this seems too high a price to pay for the sake o f truth-apmess. What happens when 
critical schools have internal divergences? Such splitting o f opinion makes both subjectivism 
and a kind o f despairing skepticism real threats, because as long as we are willing to chalk up 
disagreements to incommensurable critical schools, or whatever other relativizing parameter 
we like, it will always be an open question whether we should make such an attribution or just 
declare someone wrong. The cognitivist antirealism I shall argue for aims to accommodate 
the practice o f reasoned disqualification o f some aesthetic judgments, while at the same time 
preserving a logical space for contradictory and true judgments in very specific 
circumstances.
What is at the root o f the realism debate is a question about which o f two conceptions o f art 
to adopt. The aesthetic realist commits herself to a conception o f artworks as akin to the 
objects o f scientific enquiry. The experience o f art, under this conception, is one o f 
detection, discovery, or investi^tion. We engage with an artwork, immediately experiencing 
many o f its qualities as the artwork is presented to us, and strive to discern those features 
that are not immediately apparent. Once we have done these things with the artwork at 
hand, we have discovered the work’s properties. This process may take a long time—  
indeed, it may never be completed. But the properties o f the work are no less determinate 
than those investigated by physical science, and this gives aesthetic discourse its objective 
character. The role o f imagination in the experience o f art is limited, for the realist, to 
discovery and appreciation, but plays no constitutive role.
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The aesthetic antirealist conception o f artworks, on the other hand, takes them to be foci o f 
imaginative activity. The artwork serves simultaneously to invite and constrain imaginative 
activity. Some o f those imaginings can be properly said to be right, and some to be wrong. 
And those imaginings that are licensed are properly talcen as partially constitutive o f the 
artwork’s ontological character. Specifically, imagination results in the imposition or 
projection o f a foreign conceptual structure onto the art object. Qualities not inherent to the 
artwork are, through imagination, experienced as such, and come to form a proper part o f 
the artwork. This conception straightforwardly accommodates tlie two puzzle-generating 
intuitions o f tlie mind dependence o f aesthetic qualities and the objectivity o f aesthetic 
judgments.
It also takes leave from the majority philosophical view but returns philosophical theory to 
the commonsense artistic view. A typical source o f frustration with artists is that tliey seem 
to be infuriatingly evasive or maliciously enthymemetic with explanations o f their own 
works. But more often than not, a simple explanation fails good art. In opening up the 
space for the constructions o f the imagination, art is returned a great deal o f complexity and 
subtlety that many realist views seem to take away. In identifying a vast range o f the content 
o f art as metaphorical, cognitivist antkealism supplies a set o f criteria for the value o f art. 
Rich metaphorical structures in artworks, in vktue o f thek openness and suggestiveness, 
reward continued and repeated contemplation; simple, pat metaphors wiU not, and the 
artworks instantiating those will not stand the test o f time. It has long become a cliché that 
each successive experience o f a particular good artwork is slightly different than the last.
Still, there is trutii in flie cliché, and a mind-dependent status for aesthetic qualities yields a 
straightforward solution to the wonder o f how this is so. On the realist view, the experience 
o f individual artworks might well resemble a dull marriage, over time becoming an easily 
predictable experiential traffic with a fixed set o f independent properties. But die same 
Homer who pleased in Athens and Rome, and in the Paris and London o f Hume’s day, 
pleases still, though in a sense he is very much a changed and changing man. And whke 
realism is the dominant phkosophical position in aesthetics, antkealism seems to be the 
intuitive view o f arts practitioners and thus merits some consideration. If those practitioners
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operate with a better model, there are still many difficulties to resolve, some o f which 
concern the positive project o f the present enquiry.
‘ Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981) 1.
2 ibid, 39.
 ^The broad charactedzation here misses at least one theory (f .L. Mackie’s error theory) which, for other 
reasons, I wish to include under the antirealist banner.
• Note, however, that not aU ethical judgments are motivating, and conversely, some aesthetic judgments are. 
For example, judgments about other’s poor character seem not to motivate the ju(%e, except in a negative 
sense. The judgment that something is aesthetically good or beautiful may motivate us to seek it out or to 
preserve it from destruction.
5 Gregory Cm ne, A n  Ontology of A rt (London: Macmillan, 1989).
 ^ Clement Greenberg, “Miro and Masson” (20 May 1944), in Meyer, Peter, ed. 'Brushes With History: Writing on 
Artfrom Ths. Nation, 1865 — 2001 (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2001) 205.
2 David Anfam, Mark Bothko: Catalog Raisonné (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) 11.
® David Hume, “The Skeptic”, in his Esscys Moral, Political, and Literary, ed, Eugene F. MUler (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund: 1985) 164-165.
 ^Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) 24-25.
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Chapter 2 ____________________________________________________
Having mapped out the various positions that model the metaphysics o f aesthetic judgment,
I will in tliis chapter present arguments against a number o f positions inadequate to tliat 
practice. After clearing the ground o f the debate in this way, I shall move on to consider the 
more promking theories in the following chapters.
1. A ntkealist N on-contenders: Subjectivism
Three o f the non-contender theories are antirealist: subjectivism (emotivism), expressivism 
or quasi-realism (the terms shall be used interchangeably), and John Maclde’s error tlieory. 
The first two positions are non-cognitivist, and share a number o f serious, well-known 
difficulties.
As a pre-theoretical view, subjectivism enjoys a healthy, widespread existence. Though 
common-sense thinking is by no means unified in its conception o f the claims o f value 
judgments, the idea that aesthetic judgments obey only tlie law o f é  gustihus non disputandum is 
widespread. While philosopliical work certainly goes beyond a mere recording o f intuitions, 
this common-sense view has been endorsed and given theoretical reinforcement by much 
philosophy. Mary Motherskl claims that “...a ll attempts to force aesthetics into the mold o f 
ethical theory must end in paradox and confusion. The two have, as it were, different 
centers o f gravity.”  ^While ethics is lawlike in nature, even in its pre-fiieoretical, practical 
form, aesthetics is a domain taken by what Hume calls “the vulgar” to be radically subjective. 
What I find aesthetically satisfying, and what you find aesthetically satisfying, depends 
heavily on our individual malce-up. In tlie end, on this view, aesthetic judgments are no 
more tlian mere expressions o f preference, and as such, it is meaningless to ask whose 
judgment is the right (or better) one. But this picture misses much o f tlie story. “Common 
sense is content with its de gustihus motto until the moment it is challenged by some 
outrageous claim, and tlien[in Hume’s words,] ‘the natural equality o f tastes is quite forgot.’”  ^
At that moment, the common-sense approach betrays its inconsistencies.
I
However, whke pre-theoretical subjectivism appears inconsistent, it remains to be seen 
whether a revisionist phkosophical subjectivism might not be defended. Such a project
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would be revisionist at least in respect o f Hume's observation o f the reaction to the 
outrageous critical claim. The subjectivist at least carries the burden o f explaining why we 
deliver such responses when, if  subjectivism is true, all judgments stand on equal footing. 
This practice also brings out a more subtle problem, namely, the problem o f explaining the 
seeming truth-aptness and meaningfulness o f critical claims as merely an appearance.
Subjectivism holds that aesthetic judgments are not truth-apt; that is, they are not the kind o f 
sentences that can bear truth values. Truth-aptness might be seen as the bare minimum 
condition that must be satisfied in order for a sentence to bear a truth value. ‘^Truth 
conditions” can be parsed as that state o f affairs in the world in virtue o f which a sentence is 
true or false. The notion o f truth conditions represents a greater metaphysical commitment 
than truth-aptness. Minimally, though, a truth-apt sentence *‘p” will satisfy the equivalence 
schema: “p” is true iff p.
The label ‘^ subjectivism” applies to two distinguishable theoretical species. The first is a kind
o f relativism to the individual. Statements like “this melody ^  playful” are to be understood
as an abbreviated way o f saying “this melody to playful to me*\ Any statement predicating a
quality to an artwork implies a relativisation o f the predicate to the speaker, if subjectivism is
true. The second species o f subjectivism holds that aesthetic judgments, despite their
predicative appearance, only serve to express an attitude toward the grammatical subject o f
the judgment claim. This is the emotivist position, advocated by the logical positivists. The
motivation for such a view is the notorious claim that only sentences meeting the criterion o f
the verification principle are meaningful. O f moral sentences, A.J. Ayer writes:
The presence o f an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual 
content. Thus if  I am to say to someone, 5^ou acted wrongly in stealing that 
money', I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, ‘You stole 
that money'. In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further 
statement about it. 1 am simply evincing my moral disapproval o f it. It is if  1 
had said ‘You stole that money,' in a peculiar tone o f horror, or written it 
with the addition o f some special exclamation marks.^
Similarly, an “aesthetic symbol” adds nothing to the meaning o f a sentence in which it 
occurs, but rather serves only to flag a pro or con attitude— typically, toward the referent o f 
the grammatical subject o f a declarative sentence. And so a claim such as “This melody is
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playful” in fact expresses tlie drought “I lilte this melody,” but does not assert die content 
that the melody is playful.
What is strüdng about this view is the tight connection it creates between truth and 
meaningfulness. Aesthetic sentences are meaningless, and so neither true nor false. There is 
a thin, derivative sense in which such sentences are meaningfol, as reports o f attitudes that 
are held and may result in observable behavior. But the emotivist project is concerned widi 
holding a contrast between stating and expressing. If we agree with the critic who says a 
certain melody is playful, we are not agreeing that a particular state o f affairs obtains; rather, 
we are signaling our having the same pro attitude toward that melody and nothing more.
Why do aesthetic judgments fail to be fallible if  the radical relativist species o f subjectivism is 
true? On the plausible assumption diat we cannot be mistalcen about our own preferences, 
as long as we speak sincerely, we can never be wrong when we offer an aesthetic judgment, 
because we are merely reporting our individual preferences. So all sincere aesthetic 
judgments are true, malting for a very trivial discourse indeed. Disagreements on tins view  
are such only in appearance.
The motivations for adopting a philosophical subjectivism about aesthetic discourse arise 
from both epistemic and metaphysical considerations.'^ The epistemic concern that lends 
support to subjectivism is more sophisticated than the mere fact that more people prefer the 
mawldsh landscapes o f Thomas Kinlcade (Figure 1^ ) to the more nuanced scenes painted by 
Edward Hopper (Figure 2). Rather, it gains credibility from the observation that preferences 
in art and critical predilections seem highly dependent on individual sensibilities. The 
metaphysical worry is that no set o f aesthetic properties ever seems sufficient to guarantee 
the aesthetic value o f a work, nor does any set o f non-evaluative properties seem sufficient 
to determine some particular aesthetic property. So in a sense, subjectivism affirms both the 
impossibility o f specifying in some neutral way when an artwork does warrant a certain 
evaluation, as well as the inappropriateness o f disqualifying a simple preference.
There are several considerations that show subjectivism in aesthetics to be utterly 
indefensible. The subjectivist must deliver satisfactory answers to at least five questions; I 
win argue that she cannot adequately do so.
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i. Is feeling necessarily connected with evaluation?
ii. Can aesthetic feelings be distinguished from non-aesthetic feelings? 
iii- How finely grained can non-aesthetic feehngs be?
iv. Why does preference expression exhaust the use o f aesthetic judgments?
V. How are ostensibly assertoric aesthetic sentences distinguished from truly 
assertoric ones?
I shall examine these questions in turn.
(i.) Feeling is not necessarily connected with evaluation in the direct way that the subjectivist
claims. There is no difficulty in my asserting on the one hand, the striking aesthetic demerits
o f 1950's science fiction B-movies, while non-ironically expressing my enjoyment o f the very
same. Conversely, I can acknowledge the artistic greatness o f Mozart's orchestral works,
while at the same time displaying my apathy toward or even mdd dislike o f them. Still other
clear examples o f aesthetic judgment do not obviously manifest any expression o f
preference. Take for example a remark on Barnett Newman's pictures (see Fierce 3):
the stripe in Newman's works functions as a ‘two-edged line, pushing or 
splitting apart the areas on either side o f it, yet simultaneously or conversely 
holding them together.'.. .if we read Newman's pictures while looking 
upward, ‘the bands bond the adjacent areas together'; but when our eyes 
travel downward, ‘the bands divide or push them apart.
This critical assessment is unquestionably a judgment as opposed to a mere report o f 
presentational features. The lines o f Newman's paintings do not literally push, pull, hold, or 
split— this passage is an instance o f interpretation, not just description. Yet it is unclear 
what pragmatic role— expressing either like or dislike for the work or the specific pictorial 
element—is to be assigned to it as the correct translation.
These examples show that it is possible to maintain a preferential attitude in opposition to 
the valence o f an evaluation, as well as to offer an evaluation without manifesting any 
obvious preference. The subjectivist might essay the following explanation o f the former 
case: while I may profess a general aversion to Mozart’s symphonies, my acknowledgement 
o f their greatness amounts to the manifestation o f a pro-attitude toward them. It just so
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happens that I maintain conflicting attitudes toward the music in question. This is a 
plausible response, as it is no failure o f rationality to hold conflicting attitudes. This 
explanation, however, becomes strained if we imagine that my aversion to Mozart is 
extremely strong but I maintain my reasonableness. Then, no matter how much I dislike 
Mozart, if  I am musically literate, suitably informed about the musical genre at hand, and 
sincere, I should have to concede the artistic merits o f his work. If I say only o f a particular 
movement that it has a restrained playfulness, and a high degree o f formal unity, I may not 
be teUing the whole story o f my attitude toward the music, but the direct connection 
between utterance and preference that the subjectivist asserts seems to be lacldng.
In the latter case, where a judgment is made but no preference is easily discerned, the 
utterance-preference connection seems even more tenuous. The subjectivist might claim 
that although it is open to argument just what preferential attitude the critic has towards 
Barnett Newman’s paintings, there is a preference aU the same. It is true that the critic might 
have some preference, but the claim that the judgment amounts to a preference assertion 
when there is no clue as to how we might determine even the valence o f that preference 
begs the question.
The question-begging is more sharply marked out when we consider what other function the 
critic’s utterance appears to serve: o f offering a meaningful claim that we can assess as right 
or wrong, simply by going to the paintings ourselves and seeing how the critic’s remarks 
accord with our own eiq)erience. We have no such court o f appeal in the case o f preference 
expressions— in other words, if the critic is merely expressing a like or dislike o f the 
paintings, there is nothing to be gained by confronting the artwork itself. The subjectivist 
now owes an explanation o f why we engage in such misguided practices
(ii.) Wittgenstein writes in the Philosophical Investigations: “Won’t it become a hopeless task 
to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred one? .. .And this is the position you are 
in if you look for definitions corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics.”  ^ But a 
blurred picture is something different still from an empty one. While we may not be capable 
o f drawing a boundary around aesthetic discourse, we recognize paradigmatic concepts and 
sentences in the discourse: those invoking notions o f beauty and ugliness, expressiveness.
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profundity, unity, and so on. The subjectivist claims that aesthetic sentences are mere 
expressions o f feeling or preference. Either those feelings are o f the same sort as non- 
aesthetic feelings or they are not. If not, then in engaging in aesthetic discourse we make use 
o f a great deal o f empty though apparently differentiable concepts. This picture is consistent 
with the subjectivist view, though it merely postpones the explanatory task to questions (iv) 
and (v)—why the role o f aesthetic judgments is solely the e2q>ression o f preference, and this 
despite the appearance o f being properly assertoric.
On the other hand, if they are held to be the same sort, the subjectivist faces a different 
problem. Feelings— understood as occurrent emotional states— are individuated in part by 
their intentional objects. And in order to identify the intentional object o f an emotion, a 
reference is necessarily made to the concomitant beliefs about the object. A dog evokes fear, 
and is that feeling’s intentional object, paradigmatically (in part) because the dog is believed to 
be dangerous. Beliefs are susceptible o f truth or falsity, and so there are legitimate 
considerations o f appropriateness in a wide range o f feelings. Because “mere” feelings 
themselves involve beliefs, the unadulterated non-cognitivism that would neatly separate 
affect from cognition is not available even in these basic emotional responses. If aesthetic 
feelings are indistinguishable ftom non-aesthetic ones, the former whl share this cognitive 
aspect o f the latter. The subjectivist might further limit the functional role o f aesthetic 
sentences to the expression only o f preference— o f signaling like or dislike o f varying 
degrees, but nothing more. This move, however, also shifts the burden to questions (iv) and 
(v), and, if aesthetic feelings are o f a type with non-aesthetic ones, calls for a revisionist 
account for the full range o f belief-involving expressions o f feeling generally.
(iii.) Much ink is spilled over whether a certain passage is funereal or starkly melancholy, or 
whether a poem is revelatory or “merely” profound. On the preference e3q>ression 
interpretation o f subjectivism, it is difficult to understand how such finely grained concept 
words are to be translated. A poem might be better artistically for being funereal, so the 
(presumably) negative valence o f that predicate is no reliable indicator o f the valence o f the 
preference e^qpressed. More to the point, there is no principled way to establish relative 
preferences between predicates such as “funereal” and “starkly melancholy” independent o f 
context. Either could be a greater contributor to the overall merit o f the artwork. The
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judgment (say, by the artist at the time o f creation) as to which quality will be more effective 
is highly dependent on the other features o f the artwork. So too tlie judgment by the critic 
as to which predicate better captures the feel o f the finished product. In other words, the 
practice o f malting such fine distinctions between aesthetic qualities is subject to assertibility 
constraints. Should the subjectivist reply that a relative preference is implicit in the different 
applications o f two such predicates, she again runs into the question-beg^g counter­
objection to question (i).
If subjectivism is to be interpreted as a thesis about feeling rather than mere preferences, a 
different set o f problems arises. Aesthetic judgments here are understood as expressions o f 
feelings. A natural way to take this claim for judgments employing expression predicates is 
to understand these as announcing one’s affective response to tlie artwork. To pronounce a 
scherzo as “mischievous” is to announce the arousal o f a feeling o f mischievousness in 
oneself.
This is the basic idea o f the arousal theory o f expression. That theory has a number o f well- 
rehearsed objections; for present purposes it is enough to mention two related ones that aim 
at the primary subjectivist thesis. In the discussion o f question (i), I argued that feeling does 
not have a direct, necessary connection to evaluation. So, a fotiion, tlie deployment o f an 
expressive predicate need not signal the occurrence o f the same emotion in the critic.
Indeed, it is a common experience to mark out an emotional quality in a work without 
feeling the same emotion— the hallmark o f Bouwsma’s “dry-eyed critics” .^ The second, 
related objection is that such an account misrepresents the phenomenology. Particularly 
with the dry-eyed critic, it is the artwork that is experienced as having some emotional 
quality, and not oneself in the presence o f the artwork.
But even these objections concede too much to the subjectivist by talting the battle to her 
turf. Whatever plausibility is gained for subjectivism by examining the use o f expressive 
language in single instances vanishes when we ask for subtle distinctions between two closely 
related predicates. Consider the difference between maudlin and maivkish. Both are species 
o f sentimentality, and both typically generate responses ranging from mdd irritation to 
contempt or disgust. Part o f the way in which the differences in these concepts are marked
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out, however, is belief-based. Paradigmatically, to be maudlin involves some measure o f 
blamelessness— a person’s sentimentality is often said to be maudlin when he is drunk. 
Mawkishness is simply a sickening sentimentality. To assign “maudlin” rather than 
“mawkish” requires the possession o f a belief about some mitigating factor. Even more 
dkectly belief-dependent is the judgment whether to label an artwork “profound” or 
“revelatory”. As Gaut expresses it, “to say that a work is profound involves claiming that it 
tells us something non-obvious and explanatorily important about matters which we believe 
are o f central significance to our lives.”  ^ And though it should be granted that “revelatory” 
is often applied too generously, its careful use signifies something stronger than 
profundity— o f revealing something deeply important and surprising that was previously 
secret or hidden. To use one o f these rather than another is partly to assert a belief about 
the status o f the particular idea expressed. In general, if  fine-grained aesthetic predicates are 
legitimate constituents o f the discourse, viewing them as mere expressions o f feeling will be 
inadequate for thek differentiation. For that, it is necessary to appeal to the varying beliefs 
implicit in thek use.
(iv.) N o one would deny that many aesthetic predicates do carry ülocutionary force.
Wliatever else they might do, the predicates “strident”, “shrill”, and “impotent” typically 
serve to express an aversion to thek (grammatical) subject. The subjectivist, o f course, holds 
that this is the only function o f aesthetic judgments. Wright contends that “if the positive 
account offered by an expressive theory nowhere goes beyond what an opponent would 
acknowledge as aspects o f the ‘pragmatics’ o f the relevant class o f utterances, then that 
theoretical obligation remains to explain why it is that these pragmatic aspects actually 
exhaust the use o f the relevant sentences and are not merely consequences o f thek possession 
o f a genuinely assertoric role. Historically, this obligation has not, by and large, been met.” ®^ 
The subjectivist cannot merely be a naysayer. What, then, are some o f the motivations for 
holding that the pragmatic function is exhaustive?
The root motivations for this view come ftom Logjlcal Positivism, but that set o f views can 
be considered to be decisively defeated. More recently, Blackburn offers two related 
considerations for the view. Blackburn’s arguments feature in a somewhat different context, 
in defense o f a thesis, quasi-realism, that holds that aesthetic (and moral) sentences are
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merely expressive, but still truth-apt. Blackburn’s quasi-reaUsm shares with subjectivism tlie 
view tliat the pragmatic function o f aesthetic sentences is exhaustive, so I shall consider his 
arguments in this context—if they help the case for quasi-reaUsm they would do so for 
subjectivism as well, on this issue. The first consideration is an appeal to explanatory power: 
^ven that aesthetic sentences express attitudes, “if we see tire remark[s] as having no trutli- 
conditions the philosophy improves; so let us see the remark[s] as expressive rather than 
descriptive.”^^ The trouble with this appeal is, again, that many unquestionably aesthetic 
sentences do not obviously express an attitude— recall, for example, the passage on the 
dynamic effects o f the vertical lines in Barnett Newman’s paintings. If that passage is to be 
taken as a purely expressive remark, it is not at all clear what attitude it should be understood 
as expressing. Putting aside the larger questions o f truth-conditionality versus truth-aptness, 
it just seems false that the Newman passage is merely an expression o f feeling, since we can 
go to Newman’s paintings and judge whether the remark accords with our own experience 
or not. In other words, we can see if the remark describes our experience as well as that o f the 
critic’s. This, however, is just the function that non-cognitivist accounts deny to aesthetic 
language. Blackburn’s second thought is that “it does not matter at all if an utterance is 
descriptive as well as expressive, providing that its distinctive meaning.. .is expressive. [....] It 
is tlie extra impo7t mSkmg the term evaluative as well as descriptive, which must be given an 
expressive role.”^^ But again, as I argued above, even if we restrict our interest to clearly 
preference-expressing sentences, it is clear that the identification o f the distinctive content 
will involve truth-evaluable beliefs. An affect/belief gap cannot be maintained in the way 
required by subjectivism.
(v.) The task o f demarcating merely apparent assertoric sentences fiom  actual ones looks to 
be a deeply prejudicial one. The sentences under suspicion are identifiable only by their 
subject matter; the syntax o f the suspects, like that o f innocent assertions, allows “for 
instance, a full range o f tenses, appraisal as “true”, “false”, “exaggerated”, “justified,” and so 
on; they may feature embedded in the ascription o f propositional attitudes; and they admit o f 
compounding under the full range o f logical operations.”^^ It may be open to the 
subjectivist to apply a revisionist interpretation to the everyday use o f truth predicates and 
thek Idn for tliese sentences. What is more problematic is the necessity o f banning certain 
classes o f sentences if the revisionist project is to be carried through.
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To start with, while statements such as “The canvas surges with primordial energy” must 
certainly be admissible as paradigmatic aesthetic sentences, second-order sentences o f the 
form “It is true that the canvas surges with primordial energy” cannot be. Nor can belief 
ascriptions such as “Her critical naivete leads her to believe that the canvas surges with 
primordial energy.” The first order sentence, remember, is not true or false (except perhaps 
in some thin sense), but merely eîqpressive o f an attitude. The first problematic sentence 
explicitly presents the same thought as true, and the second one explicitly asserts that 
someone holds a belief, and implies that said belief is false. Either the sentential operators 
attributing belief and indicating truth, as well as the principles o f conversational impHcature, 
work differently in aesthetic discourse or not. If they work differently, then the subjectivist 
owes a revisionist account o f these features. If one cannot be given, then the subjectivist is 
forced to ban the offending sentences from proper aesthetic language.
This problem is brought into sharp focus by Peter Geach’s article “Assertion” %^ the kernel 
of which has become known alternatively as the Frege Point or the embedding problem. 
Geach’s target is moral expressivism, but an aesthetic analog can be drawn. The Frege Point 
is tliat “a thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a 
proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably 
the same proposition.”^^ So any account that disallows the use o f sentences to mean in 
unasserted contexts is to be avoided. Geach argues that if  moral sentences serve only to 
express a non-truth evaluable attitude, there is no way to explain their role in the antecedent 
o f conditionals.
An aesthetic example can be extracted from Addison’s satirical remarks on the faddishly
celebrated opera seiia.
...an established rule, which is receiv’d as such to this day, that nothing is 
capable o f being well set to Musick that is not Nonsense. This Maxim was 
no sooner receiv’d, but we irnmediately fell to translating the Italian operas; 
and as there was no great Danger o f hurting the Sense o f those extraordinary 
Pieces, our Authors would often make Words o f their own, entirely foreign 
to tlie Meaning o f the Passages they pretended to translate.^
And from these, the following inference^^ can be constructed:
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1. The use o f coloratura on nonsense words is an artistic defect.
2. If tlie use o f coloratura on nonsense words is an artistic defect, tlien The Te^aTs 
Opera is in this respect artistically better than Giulio Cesme.
3. Therefore, The Be^aTs Opera is in this respect artistically better than Giulio Cesare.
The antecedent o f (2), ‘the use o f coloratura on nonsense words is an artistic defect’, is 
unasserted, and therefore expresses no attitude. But if the modus ponens inference here is 
to be truth-preserving, the constituent propositions must preserve their meanings in all the 
premises o f the argument. On the subjectivist account, this plainly fails to happen, as ‘the 
use o f coloratura on nonsense words is an artistic defect’ in (1) menly expresses a con- 
attitude toward a certain musical style, and so the argument above equivocates.
For an emotivist o f Ayer’s ük, the worry raised here is really not one at aU—if aesthetic 
sentences are meaningless anyway by virtue o f their use o f aesthetic concept words, then 
tliey certainly would not play any proper role in inferences. But for a subjectivist who grants 
some thin meaning to aesthetic sentences, this worry is a real one. At die very least it 
su^ests that the sentences cannot figure in unasserted contexts, and thus subjectivism rules 
out even simple deductive patterns o f reasoning. So the purely expressive use o f aesthetic 
sentences trumps the seeming propriety o f dieir assertoric application. Moreover, we often 
deliberate over, for example, whether or not a composition is lively or chaotic. But this 
practice implicidy involves us in truth-taUî by way o f what Bob Hale calls die tfWîsparemy 
ptvpery: to think, wonder, etc. whether p is the same thing as thinking, wondering, etc., 
whether it is true that p.^ * The subjectivist not only cannot accommodate the Frege point, 
but also needs to supply a revisionist account o f the transparency property.
Simple subjectivism, then, is an inadequate theory. Feeling and evaluation are not tightiy 
connected in the way required by subjectivism. Any feelings evinced by aesthetic judgments 
are distinguishable in part by dieir cognitive content, and so the sharp affect/belief 
dichotomy invoked by the subjectivist is untenable. Many judgments do not, or at least do 
not obviously, express an attitude or feeling. And the claim that aesthetic sentences have 
only a pragmatic role is unsupported and belied by a wide range o f truth-bearing uses.
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Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism is the most sophisticated and contemporary version o f  
expressivism, and so I shall confine my discussion o f expressivism to his theory. Quasi­
realism is a semantic project tied to a particular metaphysical view, which Blackburn calls 
projectivism, after Hume. In his Snquiry  ^Hume writes:
[Reason] conveys the knowledge o f truth and falsehood: [Taste] gives the sentiment 
o f beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects as they really 
stand in nature, without addition or diminution: the other has a productive faculty, 
and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal 
sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation.^ ®
Blackburn develops Hume’s metaphors into a distinct metaphysical conception o f value 
properties (even if Hume would not share that conception). “Genuine, observed” properties 
impinge on our senses, and on that basis we project other properties back onto our 
representation o f the world. In so doing, we manifest “habits, emotions, sentiments, and 
attitudes”, about which we can theorize; we also construct value concepts, which adds to our 
description o f die world, and we take the world to contain these projected properties or 
states o f affairs.^ *^  Blackburn’s projectivism holds, contra Mackie, that projection does not 
involve error. If true, it need not entail that our evaluative practice is illegitimate. Quasi­
realism is the semantic theory that centrally holds that even if projectivism is true o f a 
domain, there is nothing improper in the ostensibly realist language o f its corresponding 
discourse. In other words, grant that there are no objective aesthetic properties. The quasi­
realist aspires to hold onto the assertoric character o f aesthetic discourse all the same.
Blackburn offers three considerations in favor o f the projective theory: its ontological 
economy, its better explanation o f supervenience (compared with realist views), and its 
better explanation o f the connection between judgment and action (compared with 
cognitivist views). For all its metaphysical attractions, however, Blackburn’s metaphysics is 
too underequipped a theory to do the work he wishes it to do. Independently, quasi-realism 
fails to live up to its promise because o f its inadequate response to the Frege Point, and 
because it involves an unwarranted assumption about attitude convergence.
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The metaphysical issues first. Blackburn’s theory is an improvement over subjectivism in 
that values are not explanatorily dependent on attitudes. That is, a poem is not profound 
merely in vktue o f my feeling or exclaiming it so. Blackburn distances himself from idealists 
and anti-realists who place mind-dependence at the center o f their respective theories. He 
states: . .when a commitment is . . .independent o f our minds and thek properties, the
projectivist can conform to ordinary claims that it is. He does not need to deny any o f the 
common-sense commitments or views about the way in which thek truth arises.”^^ It seems, 
then, that the projectivist follows the common-sense categorization o f facts under mind- 
dependent and mind-independent headings. Certainly it is the ambition o f quasi-realism to 
preserve the familiar second-order talk o f an evaluative discourse. What grounds an 
internalist discourse like aesthetics or ethics is a realm o f natural facts or states o f affaks on 
which the evaluative supervenes. So the metaphor o f projection, Blackburn writes, “needs a 
little care.”^^  Only natural properties and our responses to them figure in the reason-giving 
practice o f defending judgments o f value. Blackburn e2q)licitly denies that value judgments 
are statements about the judge. “We should not say or thkik that were our sentiments to 
alter or disappear, moral facts would do so as well.”^^ The point can be applied, mutatis 
mutandis, to aesthetic judgment. This account, however, makes it unclear just what the 
unique claims o f quasi-reahsm are. Blackburn wants at once to give a theory o f value 
judgment that gives roles both to natural properties and our responses to them, and at the 
same time to hold that should our particular responses change en masse, there would still be 
the same set o f moral and aesthetic facts attached to the objects o f our experience.
There are two possibilities here. Fkst, that whatever our sensibilities, we can somehow find 
our way to the aesthetic facts. In this case a theoretical account o f our responses to natural 
properties is superfluous. But persons or groups with diminished sensibility— say, an island 
o f colorblind persons—will not be able to find thek way to a great number o f aesthetically 
relevant facts. It also seems true that a sufficiently different, though non-diminished, 
sensibility bars access as well, as in the case o f Western readers o f Japanese literature who do 
not typically experience amae. That feeling o f dependence on group membership for one’s 
well-being and identity is often positively valenced in Japanese literature, and indeed is 
characterized as ‘sweet’ in its manifestations outside literature. But that same concept is 
quite opposed to the individualism o f Western literature, and Western readers commonly
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find the group dynamic stifling. In cases like this, the judgments we render are highly 
sensitive to the responses we bring to bear, and so a theory o f judgment requites some 
account o f the sensibilities involved.
The second possibility is that a shift in our sensibilities disables us, preventing us from 
getting at the fixed aesthetic facts. If aesthetic facts were fixed, then such a shift would be a 
disability, in the same way that a perceptual defect causing us consistently to misrepresent 
some aspect o f the world would be. But what evidence is available for the claim that there is 
or could be a beauty no one could ever properly appreciate? There is no good reason to 
postulate qualities or objects to which we have in principle no direct or indirect experiential 
access within aesthetics as much as anywhere else. Ultimately, it is difficult to see just how  
the projectivist/quasi-realist view is a position distinct either from realism or subjectivism. 
The claim that value judgments encode a response to experienced features o f the world does 
not, ultimately, fit with the claim that should the pattern o f responses shift or dkappear, the 
aesthetic facts would remain the same.
Blackburn’s exposition o f quasi-realism '^^  centers on the expressivist rejoinder to Geach’s 
challenge. Blackburn argues that in forming a conditional statement with an evaluative 
proposition as its antecedent, we are working out the implications o f a certain 
commitment.^^ A priority o f any evaluative discourse that denies subjectivism is the 
endorsement o f some viewpoints and the rejection o f others. In moral language, we call 
endorsed views ‘admicable’ or ‘virtuous’, and reject others with ‘crude’, ‘moralistic’, or 
‘misguided’. So too with aesthetic views: ‘sensitive’, ‘refined’, ‘philistine’, ‘crude’, or 
‘curmudgeonly’. What is expressed in the conditional, according to Blackburn, is an attitude 
toward a pair o f attitudes, and that complex attitude is itself evaluable as admirable or not.
So a sensibility that pairs ‘the use o f coloratura on nonsense words is an artistic defect’ with 
^Giulio Cesare is artistically better than The Be^aCs Operd does not signal a logical 
inconsistency but an attitudinal one, one that licenses our denouncing it. Quasi-realism, 
tlien, responds to the Frege Point by holding that the validity o f the inference lies in the 
constraint on the sets o f attitudes that may be held consistently.
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There are two significant difficulties with this strategy. Fkst, it makes it obscure how the 
conditional is to be interpreted. “It is clearly crucial that we should be able to understand 
attitudinal inconsistency independently, without falling back on ‘descriptive’ inconsistency 
(impossibility o f joint truth) After aU, quasi-reahsm denies a descriptivist semantics for
the discourse to which it appHes. There is, then, some interest in tlie proper interpretation 
of the conditional. Blackburn sketches a semantic tlieoiy which features attitude operators 
Hl(x) and B!(x) which express pro- and con- attitudes respectively, and have non-expressive 
descriptions as thek scope. The expressive conditional is taken to have the structure 
HI([B!(p); [B!(q)]). In odier words, we applaud the compound o f disvaluing nonsense 
coloratura together with a disvaluing o f an artwork that features it. Blackburn wants to read 
the relationship o f the two attitudes as ‘q follows upon p’. This interpretation, however, is 
not available to the quasi-reaHst. Hale objects that “tlie problem was, inter alia, to explain 
how we come to speak conditionally o f our commitments— the theory loses all interest if it 
merely sneaks in conditionality in an unfamiliar guise.”^^ An alternative interpretation is thus 
called for. Should the expressive conditional be read as ‘p combined witli q’, then “tlie 
trouble.. .is that it is unclear in what way precisely the combination o f attitudes in question is 
supposed to be inconsistent.” ®^ For agaki, there is no option o f taldng p and q to be truth- 
apt propositions, so there is no dkect way o f showing them to be incompatible. The quasi- 
reaHst requkes a further set o f inferential principles for that task, and any such introduction 
would be alarmingly ad hoc jury-rigging.
The quasi-reaHst has here a second serious problem. The quasi-reaHst, recaH, wishes to 
retain legitimate taHc o f truth. To caH a judgment true would be to signal its being a member 
o f some ‘“best possible set o f attitudes’, thought o f as the limiting set wliich would result 
from taldng aU possible opportunities for improvement o f attitude.”^^ The trouble here is 
that Blackburn is not entitled to the premise that there is, for a given object o f judgment, a 
unique limit on which attitudes converge. Though he argues that “we are constrained to 
argue and practice as though the truth is single” ®^, it does not foUow from this there is a 
unique best possible set. Indeed, it is often the case that art-critical judgments cite 
convincing reasons in support and yet conflict with one another. It is possible to see both 
judgments as divergent but equally defensible, and then the invocation o f a unique limiting
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set is question-be^;ing, even under a constructivist account o f truth. Ultimately, the worry 
still remains that the expressivist rejoinder to Geach’s argument is inadequate.
3. Antitealist Non-contenders: Error Theory
It is not obvious, based on semantic considerations, that the error theory (taken in isolation) 
proposed by John Mackie is an antirealist one.^  ^ Realism involves two central claims; 
assertions in the discourse are determinately true or false, and are so in virtue o f some mind- 
independent entities. Mackie argues that the second condition is simply unfulfilled— that 
there are no truth-makers for aesthetic (and moral) discourse. Statements in that discourse, 
then, are truth-apt but always false by default.
Mackie claims that values are not objective, not “part o f the fabric o f the world”, and means 
to include not only moral values but also “aesthetic ones, beauty and various kinds o f artistic 
m e r i t . H e  refers to his position as a kind o f value “skepticism”, but it is really an atheistic, 
and not an agnostic, view o f value properties generally. His arguments treat moral value 
dkectly, but, he writes, “clearly much the same considerations apply to aesthetic and to 
moral values, and there would be some initial implausibkity in a view that gave the one a 
different status ftom the other.”^^ Grant the analogy. Mackie’s arguments for his error 
theory are basically two in number; the argument ftom relativity and the argument from 
queerness.
The argument ftom relativity is really just a slightly more careftdly expressed version o f  
common subjectivism or cultural relativism. “The argument ftom relativity has as its 
premiss the well-known variation in moral codes ftom one society to another and from one 
period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and 
classes within a complex community .M ackie  goes on to argue that while there are also 
divergences in scientific opinion, these can be explained by insufficient evidence one way or 
another; there is no need to countenance scientific relativism. But in the moral (and in the 
aesthetic) domain, “it is hardly plausible to interpret.. .disagreement in the same way. 
Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people’s adherence to and participation in 
different ways o f life.”^^ Presumably disagreement over aesthetic questions wiH reflect
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allegiances to different cultural traditions or critical schools, Mackie sees the causal 
connection between evaluation and object to be the reverse o f the scientific claim — object 
connection. For example, “people approve o f monogamy because they participate in a 
monogamous way o f life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way o f life 
because they approve o f m o n o g a m y .T h i s  o f course is the Euthyphro contrast, but 
Maclde simply offers no argument for reading it with Euthyphro ratlier than with Socrates. 
There is no reason to accept the skeptical conclusion based on the mere basis o f diversity. 
What is needed is a “domain-specific account o f why diversity o f opinion impeaches all 
opinion”^^ ; without it, the skeptical conclusion is unwarranted. Maclde’s argument 
(charitably so dubbed) is paradoxically self-refuting if true, for there is considerable diversity 
o f philosophical views on the very topic o f Maclde’s enquiry. But, “since we do not think 
that philosophical opinions are caused by philosophical facts, we do not conclude from the 
diversity o f philosophical vdews.. .that no positive philosophical thesis is sound.” ®^
This way o f identifying the failure o f the argument firom relativity moves right into Maclde’s 
second argument, the argument firom queemess. “If there were objective values, then they 
would be entities o f a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. 
Correspondingly, if we were aware o f them, it would have to be by some special faculty of 
moral [or generally, value] perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways 
o f Imowing everything else.”^^ His further arguments for this picture rely on the alleged 
implausibdity o f tlie inclusion o f inlierently motivating moral facts or properties in a 
physicalist ontology. The connection between judgment and action is less clear in the 
aesthetic case, but the issues about motivation need not be broached to see the flaws with 
tliis argument. The argument from queerness, shifted to a metaphilosophical thesis, is 
patently self-refuting as well. Maclde implicitly holds to an austere physicalism, such that 
only those things that stand in causal relations to other things can be admitted to the 
ontology. But this quite obviously does not apply to philosophical claims, nor to logical or 
mathematical ones. If the argument from queemess were true, then we could admit no 
proposition from any o f these domains as true, a conclusion that Mackie would doubtless 
wish to avoid.
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Consider a (provisional) distinction between the raw object and the art object. The raw object is 
tlie mere sequence o f sounds, paint on canvas, print on paper, in other words, the mere 
physical object or event corresponding to the art object. The art object is the object o f 
aesthetic experience, differentiated by interpretation, contextual knowledge, and so on. The 
raw object is a merely physical instantiation o f the abstract art object, though at least some 
such physical instantiation is o f course necessary if we are to experience the artwork.
Mackie’s conception allows only for true propositions at the raw object level, the level o f 
empirical explanation. But if the argument from queemess is to be rejected on the grounds 
that it prohibits too much, then there is no reason to suppose that it shows that truth-apt 
aesthetic discourse should be limited to the raw object level, either.
4. Realist Non-contenders: Platonic Realism
Mackie’s view represents a kind o f antkeaHst counterpart to platonic realism in its insistence 
that if judgments are objective, they could only be so in vktue o f some strongly mind- 
independent facts or properties which were somehow part o f the fabric o f the world.
Indeed, he claims that ‘Tlato’s Forms give a dramatic picture o f what objective values would 
have to be.”'*° Mackie denies truth to all aesthetic judgments on the ground that nothing 
akin to platonic forms is available to secure thek truth. Are there any positive arguments to 
be given in favor o f platonic realism?'^ ^
It should be noted here that the conception o f platonism investigated here is a modem one, 
where the properties in question are strongly mind-independent and do not supervene on 
other properties. If aesthetic values or qualities were platonic forms, then objectivity o f 
judgment is easily accounted for: judgments are true just when they correctly represent an 
artwork’s participation in one or more forms. Since the forms are completely mind- 
independent, such a judgment represents not a state o f the judge’s mind, for instance, but a 
strongly objective state o f affaks. Such a metaphysical picture is too implausible despite the 
easy route it offers to objectivity, however. The forms are “most naturally characterized in 
negative terms. They are non-spatial, non-temporal, non-sensible, non-relational, non- 
perspectivai, and invariant.”'^  ^ As such they are also both causally and conceptually
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independent o f any features o f the spatio-temporal world. But tliis radical independence is
not at all reflected in the practice o f rendering, defending, and questioning aesthetic
judgments. Talce the following example, this passage on Cezanne’s Paihvcy Cutting (Figure 4):
Bounded below by two horizontal strips o f land, which permit no entry into 
the scene, the picture is rigorously divided into three equal sections centred 
around the prominent railway cutting and signal-box. The strict, ternary 
design is reinforced by the heavy application o f bold, localized hues and the 
rhyming curves o f the hiU, cutting, and mountain, which mark the broad 
divisions o f the landscape. [...] Cézanne appears here.. .to transcend the 
furious passions o f his youth and suddenly gain a measure o f his future 
strength. It is hard to think o f an earlier landscape o f comparable size and 
ambition that is so unburdened o f pictorial fact or so condensed in
43expression.
If the platonic metaphysical conception were the correct one, any appeal to descriptive 
features o f the painting, such as its division into three well-defined spatial planes, or to the 
depth and placement o f color, would be quite out o f place in defending its strength or 
density o f expression. The painting would have those strictly through its participation in the 
forms o f Pictorial Strength and Pictorial Expression. Such a status is altogether independent 
o f whether we might so identify it, but our doing so cannot depend on our being sensitive to 
composition or color, or for that matter, to the picture’s place in Cezanne’s oetwre. Aesthetic 
discourse, then, would consist largely o f noting the presence o f certain qualities, without 
appeal to other considerations, and critical disputes would be little more than gainsaying.
The platonist, then, owes us a different Idnd o f error theory, one that accounts for the 
peculiar practice o f noting features itrelevant to the real aesthetic properties o f the work. 
Why do these features seem relevant when in fact tliey are not? Why do we take ourselves 
to be providing reasons for our judgments when we really have changed the subject? 
Platonism gives too little regard to the actual practices surrounding the production and 
experience o f art, and so should be rejected as bad metaphysics. Any interesting metaphysics 
will be both revisionary o f some and conservative o f other intuitions we hold. Platonism, 
though, errs in interposing too great a distance between our actual practices (including our 
thoughts about those practices) and the way things really are (according to platonism). 
Mackie’s assertion that only platonic values could deliver objectivity amounts to a 
philosophical scare tactic. It remains open to consideration that whatever is objective must 
be mind-independent in such a strong sense.
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Rediictiomst realism is a substantial improvement on the platonic conception, ditecdy 
acknowledging the role o f citing other facts in defense o f proffered aesthetic judgments. It 
also shares the discomfort with aesthetic tallr that motivates both emotivism and Mackie’s 
error theory.
Reductionism, like these, is an Archimedean project, seeking to make talk o f aesthetic 
qualities respectable by going outside aesthetics. In general, reductionism involves some 
problematic domain, a second domain to which it can be reduced, and a set o f bridge laws 
that specify the translation o f sentences between the two. Aesthetics, to someone 
sympathetic to Vienna Circle positivism, seems problematic because its properties would 
either be ontologically queer or require a special faculty for thek detection. Because 
artworks are standardly instantiated by a material object or a (reasonably) well-defined event, 
tlie obvious reductive domain to choose is the domain o f natural properties. Such an 
aesthetic naturalism, including the necessary bridge laws, would secure objectivity for 
aesthetic discourse via the objectivity o f natural, scientifically observable properties. Classing 
reductionism as a realist position may seem mistaken, as the historical variations—  
verificationism, phenomenalism, and formalism, to name a few—were staunchly anti-realist. 
Its classification one way or the other requkes some further theoretical commitments. Since 
strong reductionism claims there are identity relationships across the two domains involved, 
and since the common-sense view o f one o f those domains (here, natural properties) is 
realist, the position may well be labeled a realist one. Very little o f what follows turns on the 
difference in any case.
Propositions about natural properties, those that figure in scientific investigation, can be 
justified “ultimately by thek role in explaining observations. ...”^ Natural properties ace 
admitted to the ontology just when they figure in the best possible explanation o f observable 
phenomena. Naturalistic discourse is an ostensibly neutral one, since the status o f its entities 
is open to empirical investigation, and this neutrality is a great part o f the appeal o f aesthetic 
reductionism. So the distinctive claim o f naturalism is that facts about aesthetic qualities can 
be construed to be facts about natural properties. The appeal o f this claim is its removal o f
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an ontological discomfort and its provision o f an easy route to objectivity. And if principles 
o f craft are in use (e.g. to express melancholy, use a melody with sustained notes in a minor 
key and a slow tempo), some obvious candidate bridge laws are at hand. Aesthetic 
reductionism, however, shares many o f the same critical difficulties with its parallels in ethics 
and the philosophy o f mind.
If reductionism is true, then suspicion o f aesthetic discourse is unfounded. Grant for the 
sake o f argument that M (the aesthetic property o f melancholy) consists in the natural 
property set NS: {slow tempo, simultaneous pitches in a particular array, . ..}.  This is a 
substantive identity claim. There would be no difference, then, in what two people assert if 
one claims that only these natural properties produce M or warrant the judgment that 
something has M, and the other says that M is identical with NS. The first o f these looks 
Hire a critical claim within aesthetics, while the second one aspkes to a neutral stance. But 
the first assertion is no more suspicious than the second, since they have the same meaning. 
If aU along aesthetic taHr was translatable into natural property discourse, then there should 
be no special worry about the use o f aesthetic language.
Furthermore, it remains an open question whether M is identical with NS. Indeed, critical 
disputes often focus on these sorts o f matters— whether a passage expresses melancholy or 
is duU and lifeless, in vktue o f the same musical attributes. It is a remarkable feature o f 
aestlietic discourse that many predicates within it have oppositely valenced counterparts: 
bold vs. strident, vibrant vs. garish, deHcate vs. limp, restrained vs. bland. These predicate 
paks are often appHed to the same (arguably) non-evaluative sets o f properties. If the parties 
to the dispute agree on the same presentational features o f the artwork in question, then 
reductionism seems much less plausible, for apparent want o f a specific bridge law that 
would settle the dispute.
The problem o f multiple reaHzabiHty also arises here. Melancholy, or gracefulness, wHl, o f 
necessity, be realized differently in a painting than in a poem or sonata. The reductionist 
might respond that we need only identify medium-specific properties, and specify different 
bridge laws and natural property sets for each. But the problem remains, even witliin one 
narrowly-defined artistic genre. A claim that a work exhibits gracefuHiess might be
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supported by noting the delicacy o f contour, and the interplay between compositional 
elements and narrative content, such as the rounded female curves and erotically suggestive 
placement o f the hands in Picasso’s Im  Reve (Figure 5). Alternatively, the unnaturally 
elongated features and static, upright posture o f one o f Modigliani’s portrait sitters (Figure 6) 
exudes a very different kind o f gracefulness, but gracefulness nevertheless. In semantic 
terms, the reductionist also owes an account o f the translation from representational 
predications (“static, upright posture”), quasi-technical predications (“delicate contours”), to 
name but two kinds, to some more basic vocabulary—and it is less than clear that such a 
translation would continue to be meaningful or useful for the purpose o f describing the 
quality o f the experience o f the artwork. Were the reductionist to propose a work-specific 
classification o f aesthetic properties, then the position becomes an entirely trivial one.^ ^
The intuitions behind naturalism are two: aesthetic judgments are defended by reasons 
invoking natural qualities, and the set o f all natural properties is both ontologically and 
explanatorily exhaustive. The first alone does not entail naturalism; it is consistent wilh 
otlier realist and indeed more than one antirealist position. Alone, it does not entail 
naturalism because explanations o f aesthetic judgments do not invoke oni)/ natural qualities. 
The trouble is that the second intuition is never really validated. Reductionism offers to give 
a neutral-property characterization for aesthetic properties, which are multiply-reaüzable.
This means that the truth o f a single aesthetic property claim relies on the truth o f 
innumerably many sets o f (possibly) infinitely many true natural property statements. And as 
Dummett argues, “there is therefore no guarantee that there exists in the language the means 
o f expressing the infinite disjunction o f infinite conjunctions that would, if  expressible, 
render the statement o f the disputed class in terms o f the vocabulary o f the reductive 
class.”'’*^ Aesthetic sentences, for all their purported suspiciousness, are expressible. The 
inexpressibility o f a translated sentence does not falsify reductionism, but there is very little 
reason to accept a theory whose characteristic outputs are in principle inexpressible, 
especially if these outputs are the only basis for accepting the second naturalistic intuition.
The prejudice behind reductionism is the same one that motivates Mackie’s view: any 
ontologically admissible entity would have to play a role in the best causal explanation for 
our experience. But as I have argued, this stringent requitement would bar not only
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unreduced aesthetic tallt, but also mathematical, logical, and philosophical claims, to name 
tliree. There is a real puzzle about these claims, and about what makes tliem true, but the 
aspiring reductionist in practice makes assertions in each o f these domains. So reductionism 
is self-refuting in exactly tlie same way, and should be rejected.
6. Summary
I have canvassed three non-reaHst and two realist positions that seek to give an account o f 
the nature o f aesthetic judgment and found them unsatisfactory. All o f them share tlie 
suspicion that aesthetic discourse must be made respectable by metaphysical grounding in 
some neutral, less controversial, domain. For subjectivism and quasi-reahsm, the grounding 
domain is that o f human desire and feeling. For Maclde’s error theory and platonism, the 
ground is in a strongly mind-independent realm o f values. And for reductionism, the ground 
is the domain o f empirical properties. The project o f grounding aesthetics in pure 
preference makes nonsense out o f much o f the discourse, and relies on false premises, such 
as a neat spHt between belief and emotion. The other three prejudice the debate by insisting 
on a standard o f objectivity that either makes values inaccessible or responsible to a causal 
explanatory test that rules out other discourses with the same clumsy sweep.
In short, I have argued directly ftom the syntax and discipline o f aesthetic disourse, and 
indkectly by undermining alternative views, that aesthetic discourse is trutli-apt and 
desciiptivist, and that there is no in principle barrier to the truth o f some statements within 
it. Returning to the taxonomy diagrammed in Figure 1, three positions remain. If not all 
aesthetic judgments are extension-reflecting, then cognitivist antirealism gives the best 
theoretical explanation o f aestlietic judgement. If they are all extension-reflecting, then the 
properties to which they refer are non-reducible and supervenient, leaving two realist 
positions; modest and robust realism. I turn to an examination o f these latter two next.
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Chapter 3_______________________________________________________
In the previous chapter, I argued that a number o f philosophical theories o f aesthetic 
judginent were untenable, largely on the basis o f considerations o f coherence with our 
beliefs about language, artworks, and our various interactions with them. The conclusion o f 
that set o f arguments was that aesthetic judgments are truth-apt and descriptivist. In other 
words, some substantial notion o f truth applies to aesthetic judgments, whether tliat be one 
o f warranted assertibility, minimalist trutli, or o f truth conditions. At least the notions o f 
truth and falsity are not misplaced. And the content o f judgments describes something that 
is the case, rather tlian merely signaling one’s preference.
In this and the next chapter, I examine the two realist positions that meet these desiderata, 
and avoid the difficulties o f platonism and reductionism. While acloiowledging that a neat 
separation is a methodological artificiality, this chapter focuses on primarily epistemological 
difficulties witii modest and robust realism; the next on primarily ontological problems. The 
strategic claims o f this chapter are:
1. If true, the supervenience thesis is trivial and does not usefully explicate the 
practice o f giving and defending aesthetic judgments. Most Hlcely it is 
incoherent.
2. Supervenience can only be asserted by realists a priori, as an argument for its 
justification seems to require an antirealist notion o f truth.
3. Granting the supervenience claim as a priori true, it follows that there can be 
only one true comprehensive aesthetic judgment o f an artwork.
4. Pluralism is not a viable realist response to disagreements.
Before presenting arguments for these claims, it is necessary to characterize the basic 
epistemological claims o f realism, as well as the supervenience claim. I shall then address the 
four strategic claims in turn.
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1, The Trouble W ith Supervenience
Realism in general holds that assertions are true or false in virtue o f some mind-independent 
facts. The Principle o f Bivalence is defended in Dummett’s early writing  ^ as the distinctive 
and essential commitment o f realism. That view has been challenged, however, and 
bivalence is now considered to be non-committing, except in the special cases o f 
intuitionisdc logic and discourse about the past. An idealist could, with an adequate error 
theory o f how we are to interpret assertions which seem to represent conditions “in the 
world”, conceivably hold that all assertions are true or false. Realism needs bivalence, if it 
needs it, to obtain for a particular reason, Dummett. The truly essential commitment o f 
realism is the thesis o f mind-independence, which can be understood in two ways, yielding 
the two species o f realism under investigation here. Robust Aesthetic Realism (RAR) holds 
that tlie truth o f aesthetic judgments is independent o f the judge’s counterfactual mental 
states; Modest Aesthetic Realism (MAR) that they are merely independent o f her actual 
mental states. In terms o f properties, the modest realist takes aesthetic properties to be 
response-dependent, while the robust realist claims they are response-independent.
One way to understand the difference between the two is via this thought experiment: grant 
that beauty is an aesthetic property. Grant further that in the actual world, Michelangelo’s 
David is beautiful. Imagine a possible world in which Michelangelo never existed. Now  
imagine an object created through some natural process which is identical in its physical 
qualities to what we know in our world as Michelangelo’s David. If no one in that world 
found the object to be beautiful, it would be all the same, if RAR is correct. Even if  the 
object were never perceived throughout its entire history, it would still be beautiful MAR is 
somewhat more careful: the object’s beauty is marked counterfactually. So, if MAR is true, it 
is a priori that the object is beautiful if and only if  it were so judged by a certain class o f 
observers under certain conditions. The class credentials and the observation conditions are 
to be specified. But it is important to note that the judgment does not make it the case that 
the object is beautiful—in other words, the judgment does not play a constitutive role iu the 
object’s being beautiful.
In both cases, the robust and modest realisms, there is an expectation o f convergence, and 
the direction o f explanation o f that convergence is from the object to the judges. The object
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is (or would be) judged to be beautiful because it possesses the property o f beauty. Our 
judgments converge because we do or would stand in the right sort o f relation to that 
propert}^—we have the right epistemic access in virtue o f our own faculties and the 
background conditions in which we encounter the object. Indeed, the tempting metaphor to 
use is that, in the right circumstances, we are receptive to die object's beauty. In the previous 
chapter, however, certain senses o f that metaphor have been ruled out. As in the moral case, 
we want to avoid a theory that posits aesthetic properties or values as entities o f a suigeneris 
platonic sort. At best, talk o f a “sense o f beauty” should be understood as yet another 
metaphor. On the other hand, it has been argued that reductionism is a less than promising 
theoretical project. Yet, it is crucial for the realist account that aesthetic quahties be 
independent o f mental states. The now orthodox way o f satisfying these requirements is by 
invoking supervenience.
Judgments are defended, rejected, and revised by the giving o f reasons. This reason-giving 
feature o f aesthetic discourse reinforces the intuition that aesthetic discourse is objective. 
Supervenience is the orthodox formalization o f this reason-giving practice. Our claim is that 
supervenience is the wrong logical relation for describing the way judgments are supported.
Supervenience is a two-component claim tiiat, throughout the philosophical literature, has 
been formulated in a number o f different ways. Generally, it asserts a metaphysical 
dependence relation between non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties, that there can be no 
difference in aesthetic properties witliout a difference in the non-aesthetic base properties. 
The supervenience claim also has a more streamlined epistemic version: there cannot be 
different true aesthetic judgments without some corresponding difference in the non- 
aesthetic base— ‘no aesthetic difference without a non-aesthetic difference.' This constraint 
on aesthetic judgment entails that disagreements about the aestlietic value o f a particular 
object necessarily indicate that at least one o f the disputants is in error.
Much art-critical practice concerns describing artworks in ways that grant us experiential 
access beyond merely apprehending its presentational features, and this is done largely by 
indicating other features o f the artwork in question. Take, for example, Mondrian's 
Composition with B/rn 1935 (Figure 7). Jerrold Levinson writes: “The painting is an
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understated but masterly study in color and tone, line and mass, figure and ground. The 
resulting artwork has a pronounced air o f tranquility and strengthT  ^ What foEows when we 
ask for reasons in support o f such a judgment is what motivates the claim for supervenience. 
A prevailing intuition is that tranquility and strength in the Mondrian are somehow determined 
or dependent or emergent from or reali^d in or are manifest in virtue of non-aesthetic, 
presentational properties. One might object at this point that there is no principled 
distinction to be made between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic features o f an artwork. 
Granted, that is a legitimate worry, but here I want to assume that in particular cases we can 
mark out, say, elegance as an aesthetic quality and blue as a non-aesthetic (if aesthetically 
relevant) quality, even if we are unable to do so in general, or for all possible experiential 
features. Supervenience formalizes the intuitions about the etiology o f Composition with Blue’s 
tranquility and strength- Levinson adduces the following in support o f his critical 
assessment:
There is the rectüinearity o f the primary lines and their extending from 
border to border. There is the strict parallelism or perpendicularity o f all 
lines in the picture. There is the specific deep blue o f the colored square, and 
its positioning relatively low in the picture. There is the slight off- 
centeredness o f the colored square and o f the main vertical line that forms its 
western face. There is the roughly two-to-one spacing ratio between the 
three horizontal lines. There is the particular shade o f background gray on 
which the blue-black configuration rests, contrasting strongly with the black 
o f the lines and gently echoing the cerulean blue o f the square. AH these are 
crucially relevant to the painting's achievement o f tranquil strength, and to its 
avoidance, say, o f dynamic density, gentle grace, or muted melancholy. 
Confirmation o f the specific effectiveness o f these features in the present 
case can be had by imagining alterations in them and trying to envisage the 
effect at the aesthetic level. There will invariably be such an effect. It would 
not be the same painting, aesthetically speaking, if  there were minor lapses 
from rectilinearity, if  the blue square were darker in hue or less saturated, if  
the square or dominant vertical were exactly on-center, and so o n /
To offer reasons in support o f the aesthetic judgment offered, the judge must o f course 
invoke presentational features o f the artwork, otherwise the claim would appear like one 
offered by a platonist or subjectivist. On the other hand, the reasons given wiU not 
guarantee, in a lawlike way, the presence o f certain aesthetic qualities. Reductionism is a not 
a contender for an adequate theory o f judgment, as I have argued in Chapter 2, Section 4. 
The supervenience relation, then, formalizes the dependence o f one property type on 
another without holding their strict entaihnent.
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@ Let ot be an aesthetic property; be a set o f aestlietic properties containing 
particular properties otj, 0 2^ , .  
o Similarly, let p be a non-aesthetic property, be a set o f aesthetic properties 
containing particular properties P i, P 2 ,.... P n .
0 Let X and y be artworks.
If a supervenes on p, then*^
SI: o[(3x)( px A  ax) —> (Vy)( py —> ay)]
but it is not the case that^
R: n[(Vy) P y ~ > a y ]
50 necessarily, if  there is something both a and p, then anything p is also a. There may in 
fact be nothing both a and p. There may also be some possible world w l in which 
something is a and p, while in a different possible world (o2 nothing that is p is a. Denying R  
means that a and p are not linked rigidly (and so it is not analytic that anything p is a). What
51 can be talcen to express is a “ban on mixed worlds” :^ we cannot in the same possible 
world have something which is both a and p and something which is P but not a.
The Modest Realist is committed to the truth o f SI and the denial o f R. Eddy Zemach^ 
seems to argue for a stronger version o f supervenience, namely R, the strong claim that the 
holder o f SI wishes to resist. Notice that R SI, so any arguments that support the denial 
o f SI will also support the denial o f R The bulk o f the arguments in this chapter raise 
difficulties for SI, but I wish here briefly to consider why Zemach believes that R obtains, 
and what is faulty with his argument. I characterize the holder o f R a s a  robust realist, 
because Zemach, as a robust realist, holds R as well as the strong mind-independence thesis 
I examine in Chapter 4. However, it seems possible to hold the latter without holding the 
former, and vice versa. Nothing in my argument turns on these possible variations in 
commitment, though.
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Zemach writes “ *X is A because it is N ’ says that, necessarily, if  X  is N , it is also A.”*. This 
is R, stated in Zemach’s terms. He continues, “It is a meaning-rule that X  is N ' implies X  is 
A’. Such rules are the basis o f art criticism: critics cite nonaesthetic descriptions o f X  and 
derive, by these rules, statements about the aesthetic features o f X.”  ^ But this just seems 
wrong. Citing non-aesthetic features is not a first step in applying some rule that transforms 
non-aesthetic predicates into aesthetic ones. To be sure, the rhetorical function o f citing 
features is to support critical verdicts, but this does not suggest that a rule is being appHed. 
He claims that “gaudiness, for example, stands in logical relation to the nonaesthetic 
property o f showing pure, bright colors.” *^’ But if  this is true, it ako seems true that showing 
pure, bright colors also licenses the attribution o f boldness, gaiety, liveliness, and many other 
qualities. One test for the adequacy o f R is in this thought experiment: can one imagine a 
possible world in which something has features {p}^ which license the attribution o f , and 
another where they license a different attribution, « 2  ? If so, then the entaihnent relationship 
does not hold necessarily.
One easy way for the entaihnent to fail is that there is a possible world where no aesthetic 
quahties result firom the presence o f {p}„ . On an antireahst account, this could happen in a 
possible world where there are no valuers. The reahst, though, plainly will not admit this 
situation as a failure, since properties are to be mind-independent. There is however still 
another simple way the entaihnent can faü, and that is by varying either the other properties 
o f the work, or by varying the context. The color palette o f a fauvist painting (Figure 8) 
might be gaudy when employed in a more reahstic pamting, but the use o f broad patches and 
swathes o f color to foreground relationships o f form and color, somewhat unhinged from 
their representational use, seems to block the appropriateness o f the term ‘gaudy'. Similarly, 
the very features o f a Mondrian that support the judgment o f being innovative, elegant, and 
dynamic, would support a judgment o f insipidity and derivativeness were they to feature in a 
late-20*  ^century appropriation o f de Stijl. Tace Zemach, this shows that merely attending to 
a small set o f presentational features wiU be inadequate, and that context needs to be 
considered. But this concession also undermines the strict entaihnent across all possible 
worlds expressed in R
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Most proponents o f the supervenience relation hold to SI rather tlian R. As I showed 
previously, R entails SI, and so considerations against SI also argue against R (assuming that 
there may yet be reasons for holding that stronger view). One way o f interpreting tlie 
supervenience claim is as equivalent to claimdng the identity o f indiscernables. That claim is 
that if  two artworks are identical in every respect, then they have the same aesthetic 
properties. O f course this claim is trivially true, and if this is how supervenience is to be 
understood it is o f no interest. But in fact SI claims more than this triviality. Greg Currie 
maintains that “if a thesis o f aesthetic supervenience is to be o f interest it should (a) specify 
conditions the co-exemplification o f which ensures the sameness o f aesthetic value, and (b) 
specify conditions that numerically distinct works are capable o f satisfying.”” These 
conditions should give sufficient conditions for the emergence o f aesthetic properties given 
tlie presence o f a well-defined set o f non-aesthetic properties— this is what is expressed by 
the right-hand side o f the main conditional o f S. I suspect that Currie is correct in holding 
that these conditions cannot be satisfied in a non-trivial way for aesthetics.
A number o f thought experiments can ground this suspicion. A fkst attempt at specifying 
the class o f non-aesthetic subvenient properties {p}„ might give the physical properties o f an 
artwork, such as the color, size, and spatial distribution o f pigments in a painting, or give the 
physical properties o f die instantiation o f a performed artwork, such as the sequence o f 
frequencies o f a string quartet. But Danto's Gallery o f Indiscemibles shows that this 
candidate for {p}„ underdetermines the aesthetic properties o f the artworks in question. 
Perceptually identical artworks are differentiated by contextual facts, including titles, position 
in a certain cultural and art-historical context, and facts about the history o f the particular 
object. What differentiates Bed Square from Nirvana m  Danto’s example are the titles (at 
least); by hypothesis the physical objects are indistinguishable.
Borges' story “Pierre Menard, Author o f the Quixote” provides another example that refines 
the loose intuition o f supervenience. Menard is a symbolist writer at the turn o f the 20* 
century who, not by simple copying, but rather by a Idnd o f extreme method acting, sets out 
to write selections which coincided word for word with sections firom Don Quixote. The 
narrator o f the story is a literary critic who identifies the contrasts in style and meaning
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between the two Quixotes. He writes:
It is a revelation to compare Menard’s Don Quixote with Cervantes’. The 
latter, for example, wrote (part one, chapter nine):
.. .truth, whose mother is history, rival o f time, depository o f deeds, 
witness o f the past, exemplar and adviser to the present, and the 
future’s counselor.
Written in the seventeenth century, written by the “lay genius” Cervantes, 
this enumeration is a m ete rhetorical praise o f history, Menard, on the other 
hand, writes:
.. .truth, whose mother is history, rival o f time, depository o f deeds, 
witness o f the past, exemplar and adviser to the present, and the 
future’s counselor.
History, the mother o i truth: the idea is astounding. Menard, a contemporary 
o f WMam James, does not define history as an inquiry into reality but as its 
origin. Historical truth, for him, is not what happened; it is what we judge to 
have happened. The final phrases— exemplar and adviser to the present, and the 
future’s counselor—are brazenly pragmatic.
The contrast in style is also vivid. The archaic style o f Menard— quite 
foreign, after all—suffers from a certain affectation. N ot so that o f his 
forerunner, who handles with ease the current Spanish o f his time.^ ^
O f course Borges’ fantasy relies on our entertaining the possibility o f carrying o ff a project 
like Menard’s. At least, though, it doesn’t seem like a logical impossibility, even if it is quite 
likely a practical impossibility. Taken as a thought experiment, Borges’ narrator offers 
judgments that certainly accord with our intuitions about the two Quixotes. Though identical 
in title and text, they must have different aesthetic properties, which in this case arise firom 
the difference in historical context. Now to account fully for its total aesthetic property set, 
the subvenient property set must include historical facts as well, innumerably many o f them.
Borges’ story shares a moral for supervenience with the case o f the painter Hans van 
Meegeren. Van Meegeren painted a number o f fake Vermeers, including one titled Christ at 
Emmaus (Figure 9), which was sold to Hermann Goring and earlier judged by art historian 
Abraham Bredius to be Vermeer’s masterpiece. To be sure, that judgment rested on a false 
belief, but positively valenced aesthetic properties were predicated o f the painting while the 
belief held. If after the facts came to light, and those aesthetic evaluations changed 
(ostensibly becoming closer to the truth), then it must be true that aesthetic properties 
depend also on facts about origin as well. This being the case, the account o f supervenience 
in SI runs into trouble. Let pjybe the property o f being painted by Vermeer in Delft over
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time t | , and let be the property o f being painted by Van Meegeren in D elft over time tg , 
and assume that each o f these properties is satisfied uniquely or not at all. Let {a}  ^be the 
aesthetic properties attributed to the painting when it was believed to be a Vermeer, and let 
{a}^ be the aesthetic properties attributed to the painting when its true origins were known. 
The change in judgment o f Christ at Emmaus can be formalized as die change from:
Sljv n[(3x)( pjyx A  {k} x) -4^ (Vy)( pjvy {(%}y)]
to:
SIhv n[(3x)( PhvX a W^x) (Vy)( pHvT {«}%]
This account is troublesome because it represents the aesthetic properties o f the painting as 
either entirely resting on its origin by Vermeer’s hand in Delft in the 17* century, or entirely 
on that o f van Meergeren’s in Delft in the 20*. This in fact wiU also be true for any 
subvenient property which is necessarily instantiated only once if anywhere.”  Indeed, if the 
supervenience base is widened in the ways it needs to be to account for aesthetically 
significant differences in titles, historical facts, and facts about origin, to name only a few, 
supervenience moves toward being entirely trivial. If the subvenient base expands to the 
point o f uniquely specifying individual artworks, then no insight is gdned into the practice o f 
attributing gracefulness both to Modigliani’s portrait and to Picasso’s. And the only way to 
avoid tins counter-intuitive consequence, that all o f an artworks aesthetic properties 
supervene on any one unique non-aesthetic property o f the same is to stipulate that the 
relation must be e^qjressed as the complete set {a} supervening on the total non-aesthetic 
description {p}. This version gives us no grip on understanding why judgments o f particular 
aesthetic qualities invoke just these non-aesthetic features rather than some others.
It might be thought that SI somehow does not capture the intuitive notion o f supervenience, 
as expressed in the slogan “N o aesthetic difference without a non-aesthetic one”. The worry 
is that otherwise, aesthetic qualities become ‘free-floating.’ The intuition can be expressed 
formally by
S2 □[(Vx)(Vy)( OCX a  ~ojy —^ ~ ( p x  A  Py)]
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Where x and y are numerically distinct artworks. S2 says that, necessarily, if two works do 
not share the same aesthetic properties, then they must have different non-aesthetic 
properties. It cannot be the case that the same object can be rightly judged to have different 
aesthetic properties. But S2 is equivalent to SI.”  The former does, then, express the 
intuitive notion, and so the problems surveyed are not the result o f improper formulation.
Finally, the advocate o f supervenience might retreat to a claim o f global supervenience: 
necessarily, any two possible worlds which are identical in respect o f theic non-aesthetic 
properties are identical in their aesthetic properties. The supervenience claim, put this way, 
has been transformed horn a claim about the aesthetic properties o f individual objects to a 
conceptual claim purporting to show that aesthetic properties are not firee-floating, and that 
they are dependent on or emergent from some indefinite range o f purely non-aesthetic 
properties. It is instructive to note the way in which the positivist prejudice against aesthetic 
concepts, sustained by Mackie’s argument from queerness, finds a form in this very thin 
claim: though we concede that we cannot say in virtue o f what specific non-aesthetic 
properties these specific aesthetic properties are manifest, it surely must be that the totality o f 
aesthetic properties necessarily depend on only non-aesthetic properties. Global 
supervenience, then, is a much weaker claim even than the identity o f indiscernables. I f the 
totality o f non-aesthetic properties includes properties o f temporal and spatial location, then 
on any account o f identity what the global supervenience claim amounts to is that 
necessarily, any two possible worlds which are identical have the same properties. The 
uselessness o f this claim needs no further comment.
The global supervenience claim k most likely not even coherently formulable. The reason 
for this is that it requires a neat and principled distinction between aesthetic properties and, 
non-aesthetic properties. Indeed, every version o f the supervenience claim requires such a 
distinction. Regrettably for the friend o f supervenience, such an a priori distinction is not 
available for aesthetics. The reason is simply that, in principle, any property is potentially an 
aesthetic one. At the outset o f this enquiry, I avoided the question o f which predicates were 
distinctively or essentially aesthetic. O f course there are many which we recognize as 
typically aesthetic in certain contexts: predicates like ‘elegant’, ‘graceful’, ‘beautiful’, and the 
like, applied to artworl^. But I contend that it is not possible, in any metaphysically
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innocent way, to mark out those predicates (or more generally, descriptions) which exhaust
the aesthetic domain and are exclusive to it. Art historical practice shows that predicates and
critical, descriptions move firom aesthetic to non-aesthetic uses, and vice versa. This is not a
fact about change over time only; critics in one historical moment can and do disagree
whether particular features are aesthetic or non-aesthetic. Richard WoUheim provides a
number o f useful examples. He cites
tlie grammaticality o f Shaltespeare’s sentences, which has over history been 
regarded as a matter primarily o f philological interest. Recently, however, 
critics have suggested that the syntactical incoherence o f certain speeches, in 
e.g. Macbeth, may be o f significance as expressive o f deep and disordered 
trains o f thought....”
Presumably the critics who reject the suggestion might well maintain that the defective 
grammaticality is not a negatively valenced aesthetic property but not even an aesthetic 
property at all. An important way that concepts move from non-aesthetic to aesthetic uses 
comes ftom changes in critical practice. Such a transformation should not be possible if the 
non-aesthetic properties are mind-independent. In other words, it should not be the case 
that just by changing our practices o f thought and taUr, a non-aesthetic property o f a work 
could become an aesthetic one. But here too numerous examples abound. To take another 
from WoUheim:
.. .we might consider the fcee brushwork that frequently enters into the 
backgrounds o f Titian or Velasquez [Figures 10,11]. To the eyes o f  
contemporaries, these liberties, when not actuaUy offensive— and we have 
the hostile commentaries o f Vasari on Titian, even o f Diderot on Chardin 
[Figure 12]— might have had, at best, a representational justification. Even to 
Reynolds the merit o f Gainsborough’s ‘handling’ [Figure 13] was that it 
introduced ‘a Idnd o f magic’ into his painting, in that aU the ‘odd sctratches 
and marks’, which were individually observable close to, suddenly at a certain 
distance feU into place and assumed form. But since tlie turn that painting 
has taken since, say, Manet, these passages would now have a further, and 
more intimately aesthetic, significance for us, in their simultaneous assertion 
o f the sensibility o f the artist and the materiality o f the painting.”
Supervenience might at last be saved simply by stipulating which quahties are aesthetic and 
which are non-aesthetic. But this would yield a theory ultimately out o f line with art critical 
practice, which in the end is what a theory o f aesthetic judgment is in the business o f 
describing.
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Currie’s requirements o f an interesting supervenience claim both remain unfulfilled. The 
fkst, that it specify co-exemplification conditions that ensures the sameness o f aesthetic 
properties, fails because there are firequently additional features o f one artwork that defeat its 
having the same property as a similar artwork. This fact also shows the failure o f the second 
requirement, a specification o f conditions that distinct works are capable o f satisfying. This 
is not met because the aesthetic properties o f an artwork seem uniquely determined for any 
artwork where a forgery or fake is a possibility. Securing the aesthetic properties o f the 
original then requires a total specification o f the subvenient properties to ensure uniqueness. 
But even this move, or the thinnest global supervenience claim, in fact turn out to be 
incoherent because the distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties cannot be 
maintained in any non-stipulative way. Supervenience, then, is utterly inadequate to the task 
o f characterizing our aesthetic judgments. It is an incoherent thesis and is best omitted from 
a theory o f aesthetic judgment. Rejecting supervenience does not amount to rejecting the 
practice o f invoking qualities in support o f aesthetic judgments. That would necessitate an 
error theory about our practices. Objectivity requkes, it seems, this reason-giving feature o f 
aesthetic discourse. The claim is simply that supervenience is the wrong logical relation for 
describing the way judgments are supported.
2. Justifying Supervenience
If indeed supervenience is a troubled theoretical notion, the arguments that follow wül be 
superfluous. But even on the generous supposition that supervenience may yet be salvaged, 
other problems remain. Both robust and modest realism hold that aesthetic qualities are 
supervenient on non-aesthetic ones— neither reductionism nor platonism are viable realist 
options. But what grounds are there for holding the supervenience claim? I have shown 
that merely the defending o f aesthetic judgments in non-aesthetic terms is insufficient to 
establish supervenience as the correct relation. Supervenience is meant to capture our 
practice o f defending aesthetic attributions in terms o f other, non-aesthetic qualities. But 
there is no dkect inference from the fact o f this practice to the claim that the relationship 
between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic qualities cited is one o f supervenience in the 
technical sense discussed here. In Chapter 6 I shall develop an alternative relationship that 
captures the practice and is not vulnerable to the objections made here. In this section, I
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argue that the realist can only assert supervenience a priori, because what looks hke the most 
plausible justificatory argument for supervenience invokes an antirealist conception o f truth, 
and so is something to which the realist is not entitled.
Realism can be understood as a “thesis negating that truth k conceptually dependent on our 
capacity for Imowledge.”” Anti-realism (concerning truth in a given domain) might then 
center on the claim that an assertion is true if  and only if  it k  justified under ideal conditions. 
This still allows for a difference between justification and truth” , but the connection 
between them is tighter for the anfirealist. The antirealist need not hold that truth is the 
ideal limit o f warranted assertibihty, though someone who claimed this would certainly be an 
antireahst.”  For the aesthetic reahst, the possibhity remains that a critic might be ia an 
epistemically optimal position, and satisfy ah tlie norms and standards o f correctness 
appropriate to critical discourse, and yet still be mistalcen in her critical pronouncements. So 
ideal justification is not sufficient to guarantee truth. But it is this conception o f truth that is 
needed to justify supervenience. The reahst argument for supervenience might run as 
fohows:
o Let A(x) be an aesthetic judgment o f an artwork x  invoking aesthetic properties {a}„, so 
the judgment A(x) is made iff for ah a e  {oî}„ , x  is judged to instantiate a.
© Let {B(x)}„ be the set o f assertions about x  invoking non-aesthetic properties , so 
for each p g {p}„ there is a corresponding assertion
(1) Assume tliat o f a given artwork c, aesthetic judgment A(c) is true.
(2) A(c) is a normative judgment supported by reasons {B(c)}„.
(3) Let the same set o f non-aesthetic predicates contained in {B(c)}„ apply to anotiier 
artwork, d, in the absence o f defeater predicates {D} for the relevant aesthetic 
judgement A(d) : {B(d)}n & ~{D } .
(4) Therefore, the aesthetic judgment A(d) is true.
(5) Therefore, aesthetic properties supervene on non-aesthetic properties {p}„ 
invoked in
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There are a number o f problems with this Une o f argument. They lie with (2), and with the 
move from (3) to (4). What (2) amounts to is a claim that aesthetic judgments rest on non­
aesthetic predicates and nothing else, including other aesthetic predicates. But that claim is out o f line 
with practice. Consider Mondrian’s Composition with Blue again. Levinson gives a good 
catalog o f non-aesthetic features that do seem to warrant the predication o f tranquil 
strength. But that might not be enough to convince everyone. He might have to go further 
and cite the painting’s spartan elegance and its structural balance to shore up his claim. 
Levinson himself concedes that other aesthetic attributes are relevant: the “background 
carries with it a certain airiness, the deep blue square a decided coolness. Further, the 
structural relationship o f the two colors yields a sense o f harmony. Finally, the configuration 
o f four lines and a square, in its particular proportions and positionings, makes for a notable 
degree o f stabiUty and balance.” ®^ These aesthetic quahties, together with the more clearly 
non-aesthetic ones, together contribute to the impression o f tranquil strength. So the purity 
of the supervenience base is corrupted. If the base for tranquil strength includes both 
aesthetic and non-aesthetic quahties, we seem to have a web o f interconnections between 
experiential quahties— aesthetic and non-aesthetic—rather than one property class 
supervening on the other. A related worry about the dramatic width o f the subvenient 
property base has aheady been suggested, namely, that aesthetic quahties are negative 
condition-governed.^^ Having a large red square and a smaller yellow rectangle are defeaters 
for the tranquil strength o f Composition with Blue, as is the presence o f many more black lines. 
So too is having a portrait o f Miss Venezuela in the upper right comer. It seems then that to 
get the supervenience relation right demands that the base include not only all the properties 
o f tlie object and the relevant properties o f its context, but also the complements o f ah the 
properties tliat might get in the way o f our various judgments. The notion o f relevance for 
the properties in the latter two groups is blatantly question-begging. Also, this new 
supervenience base is far too wide to be informative about the experienced aesthetic quahties 
and their relations to other various attributes, as I argued in the previous section.
The defender o f supervenience might hold on to a minimal version o f its claim: necessarily, 
an aesthetic change can be effected only if there is some non-aesthetic change. This is 
equivalent to Blackburn’s formulation o f supervenience as a ban on mixed worlds. This 
version might seem to meet the worry about the impurity o f the supervenience base. If we
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first invoke other aesthetic properties to justify the one in question, we have a further
burden to justify those, ultimately in non-aesthetic properties. But the minimal version runs
into trouble when we examine a datum o f the artworld, namely, critical disputes. There are
plenty o f real-world instances o f critics who are, apparently, optimal viewers o f works o f art
who disagree in their aestlietic pronouncements. Here is one example, a dispute between
two distinguished students o f Mark Rothko’s (Figure 14) works:
Dr. Francis V. O’Connor: “While it is the glowing, ovoid areas o f color that the eye 
first embraces in a typical Rothko, it is useful to become aware o f how they are 
contextualized witli often dramatically emphasized horizons — and borders. ...They 
define a horizon gestalt between the areas o f color; the borders [mark] the peripheral 
limitation o f our normal view o f any horizon. We thus float at the center o f a 
prospect that falls out as below us, before us and above us — the artist leaving us to 
our own associations, but determining within his formal structures, the extent o f the 
woild he wants those associations to inhabit. Thus, .. .Rothko’s compositions 
present a radical abstraction o f die planet in cross-section from below the viewer's 
feet up, the internal light o f that world proves it welcoming warmth or abject 
negation, as befits the artist's moods. At the end o f his life, the last, sad, bipartite 
images [Figure 15] leave us with a single horizon between the black o f space and the 
earth's lithic interior — all place o f human grace on the surface under the sun having 
slipped away from his despairing reach.”^
And the contrary view:
Dr. David Anfam: “Rothko's utter disregard for nature in itself has become 
so obvious that it is hard to imagine any serious commentator again raising the 
landscape comparison.” Rather, a Rothko paintrug is a Idnd o f oracle which, though 
a Idnd o f visual riddle, veils intangible senses behiad a “simple” fronts. “It is almost 
a blank façade, an expanse o f perhaps two or three colors which seem to have 
materialized from nowhere, lilœ a mirage, instilling them into our sight. The initial 
impression might approach a blur were it not fixed by a spartan design which echoes 
the shape o f the rectangular object that supports it. This foundation, the material 
ground, coexists slyly with the air o f illusion breathed by the image.”^^
How are the two views to be reconciled? On the realist account, at least one o f the critics 
must be mistaken— but who? Presumably, we can attend to the features each o f them points 
out in support o f his judgment. Although they are writing about the same work and so, we 
can assume, share access to the same non-aesthetic qualities, they do not share the same 
aesthetic experience. Indeed, the presence o f irreconcilable disputes between optimal critics 
strongly su^ests that the aesthetic qualities are relational. In the example I’ve just given, it’s 
not at all clear tliat we can dissolve the problem by building in a “normal perceivers in 
normal conditions” clause. Relativism might exert some pull now, though as John Bender
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points out, relativist supervenience comes to “a trivial, and epistemic, constraint o f 
consistency upon rational judgments. It amounts to saying that from identical sets o f 
features used as a basis for evaluation, and from the same evaluative standards, the same 
evaluative conclusion rationally follows. Notice that this is true irrespective o f what 
metaphysical relations, supervenience or otherwise, might connect the grounding properties 
and the inferred property.””  Supervenience will be easily violated merely by bringing 
ourselves into alignment with a different optimal critic. If relativism is denied, it still is the 
case tliat the judgments stemmiug firom those different impressions inescapably involve the 
differing sensibilities o f the two critics. Given all the measures we might build in to ensure 
epistemic optimality, there seems to be no principled way to decide who is in error. And 
without such a pronouncement, we have an example o f a shift in aesthetic properties with 
no attendant shift in non-aesthetic ones. To say that one o f the critics is wrong without any 
specific reasons why simply begs the question m favor o f the supervenience claim.
Finally, the move firom (3) to (4) is illegitimate. All that (3) allows is that the judgment A(d) 
is justijfied— all the possible supporting reasons are available for that judgment as for the true 
judgment A(c). But even at the ideal epistemic limit, where no improvements on the 
judgment are attainable, the possibility remains that a critic might be mistaken in her 
pronouncements. So ideal justification is not sufficient to guarantee truth—it does not 
permit the denial that the critic is possibly wrong. Unless we add in the anti-realist definition 
o f truth as the ideal limit o f justified belief between (3) and (4), the conclusion for 
supervenience will not follow. One might object that the argument proposed is no more 
than a schematization o f the definition o f supervenience, not a real argument for it. Perhaps 
this is so, but that criticism is more appropriately directed at the advocate o f supervenience, 
since the slogan “N o aesthetic difference without a non-aesthetic one” if meant as an 
argument, one which gets its rhetorical force by first inviting challengers to refute it by 
counterexample and then denying that disagreements between optimal judges are real 
counterexamples. The problem is that the slogan loses any force without the anti-realist 
truth definition, since what it amounts to is a mission statement about the justification o f 
assertions, rather than a thesis about property relations. If this argument represents 
something that the realist would accept, then it seems she is forced to give up supervenience 
or give up realist truth. And since the realist alternative to supervenience renders the
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practice o f normative aesthetic discourse nonsensical, the burden has been shifted to the 
realist to find a stronger line o f argument in support o f supervenience.
Indeed, the predominant approach for realists about value has been to assert supervenience 
a priori. One can legitimately ask for a motivation for such an assertion. A typical reply is that 
it is part and parcel o f our understanding the vocabulary o f value properties that such 
vocabulary is used “to mark distinctions among the descriptive way things are.””  Drawing 
an analogy between the use o f ‘baldness’ and the use o f ethical vocabulary, Frank Jackson 
writes:
If someone asks: Why does baldness supervene on hair distribution? the 
answer is that the a priori nature o f the supervenience tells us that the 
explanation is that ‘bald’ is a word for marldng a distinction among Idnds o f 
hair distributions. I think we should say that we should say the same for the 
ethical vocabulary: it is an implicit part (if it were explicit, the matter would 
not be philosophically controversial) o f our understanding o f ethical terms 
and sentences that they serve to mark distinctions among the descriptive 
ways thin^ are.”
The difficulty with the analogy between baldness and ethical (or aesthetic) concepts and thek 
corresponding terms is quite simply that while ‘baldness’ could mean nothing else besides a 
(vague but recognizable) sparseness o f hair, there is no obvious and well-defined shortlist o f 
descriptive features for the application o f value terms. It is true that in deploying such value 
terms, there is a burden on the user to be able to identify other features in support o f her use 
if asked. But that is not yet a strong enough feature o f the use o f value terms to warrant the 
claim that the relationship is one o f supervenience. It may be granted that ki caking a 
particular melody ‘graceful’, what licenses that attribution is a delicacy o f voicing in tlie 
woodwkids, restrained dynamics, and a sostenuto melodic line with well-defined phrase 
endings. To say these descriptors (and ofiiers) are part o f the meaning o f ‘graceful’ would at 
best be correct only in this specific application. It is better to say that these descriptors are 
grounds for the attribution o f ‘graceful’. As I have argued above, it first o f all cannot be the 
case that the relationship between ‘graceful’ and the listed features holds a priori, because 
gracefulness can be realized in all sorts o f ways, and having said features cannot guarantee 
the appropriateness o f applying ‘graceful’ to the melody, even given an instance where a 
work is graceful and has the features cited. We must, in every instance, attend to the work to
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decide. N o list o f features wül teU us whether the melody is graceful or not, which would be 
the case if the supervenience relation held apriorifi
Furthermore, there is no direct inference from the fact that certain other features are 
adduced in one’s attribution o f gracefulness to the claim that the relation is supervenience.
At best we have the fact that said features license the attribution, and that gracefulness 
somehow is dependent on them. But supervenience is not the only relation o f dependence. 
It wül be a major component o f my arguments for cognitivist antirealism in Chapter 6 to 
show how the dependencies between aesthetic concepts and other features o f artworks can 
be given a theoretical account that does not involve supervenience. But supervenience is not 
the only game in town, and in any case does not even correctly capture the intuitions that its 
less formal expressions are advertised as doing.
3. Supervenience and True Judgments
I shall argue in this section that if  supervenience is granted as an a priori truth, at most one 
comprehensive aesthetic judgment o f any artwork can be true. Here I ignore the preceding 
difficulties with supervenience to show that any aesthetic judgment can be true only if it is 
comprehensible within a single ‘total’ judgment o f the work. If this is true, then in cases o f 
critical disagreement, no more than one o f the disputants can be correct. Any disagreement 
must be accounted for in terms o f some epistemic shortcoming—either ignorance, 
inattention, or insensitivity. Such a conclusion bars a position that holds great appeal for the 
realist, namely critical pluralism.
Aesthetic judgments may register an evaluation in a thin sense— a painting is good, for 
example. Many more judgments employ ‘thick’ predicates with both an evaluative aspect 
and a descriptive one— holding a melodic passage to be delicate or effete, say. In a different 
sense, any predicates, even ‘thin’ ones, are descriptive o f some real state o f affairs, on the 
realist account. And o f course not all aesthetic judgments are o f the form o f directly 
predicating somethiug o f an artwork (i.e. ‘This x is F’), but instead highlight various features 
o f the artwork in order to form some indirect attribution (e.g. the Rothko criticisms above). 
Any realist theory (and some antirealkt ones) take aesthetic sentences in the indicative mood
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to describe states o f affairs, or to pick out particular properties. Now, some judgments may 
describe only parts o f an artwork, wliile others instead attribute ‘overall’ qualities, to the 
work as a whole. The former should be conjoinable or comprehensible witliin a single 
judgment (schematically, something like ‘x is F’ and ‘x is H’ and ...). This ‘total’ or 
‘comprehensive’ judgment will then be a Idnd o f inventory o f all tlie aesthetic qualities o f the 
artwork. Why does supervenience legitimize at most one comprehensive aesthetic 
judgment? Grant that the account o f supervenience formalized in SI (and also 82) may yet 
be salvaged. In order to avoid the counter-intuitive consequence that all o f the aesthetic 
properties o f some artwork will supervene on any one o f that artwork’s unique non-aesthetic 
properties, we must stipulate that any supervenience claim will concern the total or complete 
set o f non-aesthetic properties. That ^ves
ST: oV p [(3x)( {p} X A  afi) (Vy)( {p}y ay  )]
which is to say that any particular aesthetic property supervenes on the total non-aesthetic 
property set o f x. Alternatively, the stipulation might be expressed as
81”: □ V p V a [(3x)( {p}x A  {a}x) —> (Vy)( {p} y —> {a}y)]
stating that the complete set o f aesthetic properties supervenes on the complete set o f non­
aesthetic properties o f x  Either version may be a plausible way to avoid the unique property 
objection. Both are trivial in just the way identified at the end o f section 1. Because 81’ and 
81” botli require the subvenient base to be the total set o f the artwork’s non-aesthetic 
properties, and because independent considerations necessitate a base widened beyond just 
the physical properties o f the artwork, there will be no common way for numerically distinct 
artworks to instantiate the same aesthetic properties. This, o f course, is one o f the central 
explanatory desiderata o f the supervenience claim. So if supervenience (either 81’ or 81”) is 
true it is explanatorily impotent.
There is at least this significant consequence: at m ost one comprehensive judgment o f an 
artwork can be true. Because aesthetic judgments are truth-apt descriptions o f particular 
states o f affaits (on the realist account), they can be understood as, in a sense, an inventory
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o f the present aesthetic properties. Presumably, this k  the metaphysical analog o f a 
judgment’s being responsible to the artwork. Judgments should only attribute to the artwork 
qualities that it has. In particular, they should not attribute a quaUty and its complement (in 
exactly the same way). Although supervenience is not identification or reduction, it cannot 
be the case that the right-hand side o f the main conditional be both  ^ > a and p —> ~a. 
And since the account we have after reckoning with the unique property objection, SI’ or 
81” specifies that the entaihnent obtains only between the total non-aesthetic property set 
and one or all aesthetic properties, a judgment must be internally consktent. That is, the 
comprehensive judgment cannot incorporate both the claim that a certain property obtains 
and tliat is does not.
This is hardly a surprising thought if  aesthetic discourse k  a descriptive one, but it imposes a 
constraint on the range o f aesthetic judgments that can be taken as true. If two judgments 
(total, or o f the same part o f an artwork) are contradictory, at m ost one o f them can be true. 
The other must be disqualified as fake, the result o f error or epistemic shortcoming, or the 
disagreement must be explained away as a merely apparent one. Thk k  a basic commitment 
o f realkm (in fact it is ako a commitment o f platonic realism and reductive realism as wek). 
The consequence o f this commitment k  that, for the realist, endorsiag a plurality o f 
divergent aesthetic judgments o f an artwork will only be possible with significant theoretical 
overhaul.
4. Critical Pluralism
Critical pluralism is, roughly speaking, the view that a multiplicity o f divergent judgments 
about an artwork can in some sense be appropriate or correct. These judgments could take 
the form o f interpretations, attribution o f specific aesthetic qualities to an artwork, or even 
overall assessments o f a work’s aesthetic value. Consider the following two examples:
1. Wordsworth’s poem “A slumber did my spirit seal...”
The so-called Lucy poems have generated a great variety o f divergent and apparently
incompatible interpretations, this poem perhaps more so than most. Among them:
a. “the girl, who to her lover seemed a thing that could not feel the touch o f earthly 
years, is caught up helplessly into the empty whirl o f the earth which measures
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and maltes time. She is touched by earthly time in its most powerful and horrible 
image.” ®^
b. “[the] last two lines succeed in effecting a reconciliation between the two 
philosophies or social attitudes [of humanism and pantheism]. Lucy is actually 
more ahve now than she is dead, because she is now a part o f the life o f Nature 
and not just a human ‘thing’.””
c. . .to represent ‘spirit’ by the feminine pronoun was well within tlie usual usage 
o f his verse.” *^^ “.. .there is nothing novel in the suggestion that the ‘slumber’ 
which ‘sealed his spirit’ was indeed that trance-lkce state which he usually
described in terms o f sleep or o f dreams And so there is no Lucy and the
poem is not about death.
2. Manet’s painting The Execution of Maximilian (Figure 16)
a. “It was by its ambivalence, by the studied lack o f dramatic rhetoric or moral 
signposting, that Manet’s purely ‘artistic’ [painting could function politically. Its 
detachment and its open-endedness, a distinctively Parisian language of 
opposition to Napoleon’s empire, set up this image o f Maximilian’s fate.. .as an 
icon o f the perils o f imperial and dynastic ambitions.”^^
b. “[the painting is a field] with Manet himself—Manet as painter-beholder— at 
once everywhere and nowhere.. As a victim o f the jury system .. .he belongs with 
Maximilian and the two generals. At the same time, as an aggressor against the 
public.. .he is aligned with the firing squad, which would give ironic force to the 
oft-repeated charge that his attempts to draw attention to himself at any cost 
were tantamount to discharging a pistol at the Salon.””
c. “A priori, death, coldly, methodically dealt out by a firing squad, is unfavorable 
to indifference; it’s a subject charged with meaning, giving rise to violent 
feelings, but Manet appears to have painted it as if insensible; the spectator 
follows it in that profound apathy. [.. .]the text is effaced by tlie painting. And 
the meaning o f the painting is not the text, but the effacement.
Add to these examples the dispute between O’Connor and Anfam about the proper regard 
o f Rothko’s paintings discussed above. In each o f these three cases, the set o f judgments 
offered is inconsistent. If there is no way to disqualify all but one party in each o f the critical 
disputes, they represent an intolerable situation for the realist. Realism is the thesis that 
assertions are true or false in virtue o f some mind-independent facts. Except perhaps in 
cases o f vagueness, realism disallows the possibility that asserting a set o f true judgments 
could involve asserting p & ~p. But the critical disputes here each involve judgments 
entailing the denial o f the others, much in the same way that asserting that an object is blue 
entails the assertion that it is not orange. These are not instances o f vagueness. In other
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words, the assertion o f the conjunction o f the judgments involves asserting a contradiction. 
It is essential for the realist somehow to dissolve the contradiction, to explain it away as 
merely an appearance. Failure to do so makes an antirealist theory o f aesthetic judgment all 
the more attractive.
Critical disagreements are ordinarily resolved by appealing to the artworks and inspecting the 
epistemic credentials o f the critics involved. Oftentimes, it is possible to identify some 
mismatch between the presentational features o f the work and the judgment. We might also 
become aware o f some consideration that undermines the authority o f the judgment, say, for 
example, that a particular critic is hostile to representational painting, or finds political 
significance everywhere. The situation that motivates the critical pluralist view is different. 
Here, we have exhausted the enquiry into the qualifications o f the disputants and find them 
all satisfactory, and the various judgments in play all accord with our own experience o f the 
artwork. Thus, the judgments are all apparently true and in conflict, and that conflict 
cannot, on the face o f it, be explained away by some epistemic shortcoming.
This scenario is a real feature o f the artworld. Critics with apparently optimal epistemic 
credentials do contradict one another. And given their apparent optimality, we have no 
principled way to settle the dispute. Critical pluralism (CP) advertises a way to defuse the 
disagreement that does not force us to choose a most qualified critical disputant, and so to 
sustain a set o f incompatible but individually plausible judgments.
Unfortunately for the realist, pluralism entails either relativism or antirealism. The main 
consideration for this claim is that dispelling the appearance o f contradiction requires either 
revising the semantics o f judgments (while preserving their descriptive character) or 
assimilating them to different critical aims. If this is true, then the realist has three options: 
abandon pluralism and insist that there is at m ost one correct judgment or interpretation o f 
an artwork; endorse relativism, or reject realism. I will begin by examining relativism and 
how it might be brought to bear on the kind o f disputes described above. Finding that 
unsatisfactory, I will look at two different anfirealist solutions to the problem. Then I take 
up a pluralist account that purports to maintain realism and avoid relativism. I will show this 
theory unable to avoid relativism or antirealism.
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a. Pluralism and Relativism
Relativism is a popular move in aesthetics, and its most extreme variety, subjectivism, enjoys 
a healthy life in and out o f the philosophical enterprise. It is a tempting position for a 
number o f reasons philosophical and otherwise. We witness the great number o f 
irreconcilable disputes. We Imow that others lilce different things than we do, and that 
others, in distant cultures, may value differently or may even have quite different ways o f 
encountering the world. With high-level art criticism, a good deal o f the ‘observational 
evidence’ is very clearly theory-laden. And there just doesn’t seem to be the same feeling o f 
urgency with critical disagreements that we experience in tlie etliical case— art is not often a 
matter o f life and death. This is not the place to consider general arguments for or against 
relativism. Instead, I wish to focus specifically on the sort o f disputes I’ve been discussing, 
disputes between critics who may have different sensibilities, but who share a language, a 
broad range o f values, and indeed a form o f life.
Relativism is a truth or value predicate-altering theory. Instead o f truth simpliciterwe assert 
only truth-in-W where W could be a critical school, a community, speakers o f the same 
language, and so on. Similarly with value predicate relativism— “good” is understood as 
“good according to standards o f W”. Subjectivism is a special case o f relativism, where W 
ranges across individuals. At the core o f relativism is the notion o f incommensurability. 
Disputes between members o f different W gtoups aren’t really disputes, because the 
apparently conflicting claims p and ~p are in fact p-in-W (l) and ~p-in-W(2). There is no 
disagreement because there is no shared standard across W domains o f what truth or value 
is.
Relativism o f either the truth- or value-predicate altering variety will allow the realist to avoid 
admitting a true contradiction. In cases where divergent judgments are separated by great 
cultural or temporal gaps, relativism may even seem plausible. For many in the West, 
Cliinese opera may be a difficult experience, by our standards cacophonous and shrill, but by 
Chinese standards lively and beautiful. And though we can understand the significance o f 
the use o f ultramarine in Quattrocento painting (Figure 17), perhaps we just don’t register 
the difference between more and less expensive varieties in the way a contemporary Italian
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would, and so our evaluation o f the painting will differ from h is”  Whüe these sorts o f gaps 
make relativism plausible, I want to suggest that in the examples given above, it is 
considerably less so, for the very reason that neither the temporal or cultural gaps are in 
evidence. So even if the realist is happy to embrace relativism, it is difficult to see exactly 
how the relativism is to be spelled out in many real disputes.
If we want to give the three disputes, over Manet, Rothko, and Wordsworth, a relativistic 
treatment, a good first question to ask is: relative to what? We should start by trying to 
specify the relational variable W in these cases, whether considering truth or value relativism. 
If no plausible candidate emerges, then so much the worse for the relativist move. In each o f  
the three example disputes, the critics involved do share a language and a form o f life. 
Nothing in the judgments encapsulated here, nor in the reasons given for the judgment, 
supports a subjectivist rendering o f those judgments. There is something incoherent in the 
idea o f giving reasons in support o f a purely subjective claim. The reader o f art criticism 
takes these reasons back to the artwork, to find out whether they accord with the 
presentational features o f that artwork, its art-historical context, and perhaps some 
theoretical notions o f art interpretation. Our interest in the critics’ claims is their possible 
illumination o f the artwork, and not merely a testimony o f the critics’ subjective responses.
It is worth noting that in the West, a range o f art critical theories has been on offer at least 
since the ancient Greeks. So we might consider, in parallel to some relativktic arguments 
from Kuhn, that what we experience in the artwork is relative to the theoretical apparatus 
which structures that experience. An art critical theory, then, is a sort o f framework within 
which judgments can be compared as true or false, but makes inter-theoretical comparisons 
inappropriate. Taking particular critical theories for the relational variable W doesn’t remove 
the difficulty, though. The advocate o f an art critical theory is often engaged in showing 
alternative theories to be inadequate—less illuminating, based on groundless assumptions o f 
autonomy o f the text, or on the reliability o f the historical record in establishing artistic 
intentions, or on the problem o f adverting to intentions where several people are involved in 
the artistic process. The test o f theoretical adequacy, though, is always one o f coherence 
with our behefs about what art is, how we are to experience it, and our wider knowledge o f 
the human world, together with a continued interest in enhancing the aesthetic interest in the
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works. It is my contention, tlien, that nnlilte the Kuhnian account where we have 
incommensurable representations o f a domain o f experience, in the art critical case we 
regularly make cross-comparisons with a view to balancing all these factors. This activity 
would be utterly beside the point if  there were truly no common language or criteria o f 
adequacy between them. But in fact all critical theories must be responsible to these basic 
considerations, shifting and vague though they might be, so the choice o f theory as the 
relational variable W does not dissolve the disagreement.
fo. Asserting and Entertaining “A s-If ’
There is no doubt still some room for tlie relativist to maneuver, but tlie worries I’ve raised 
may make an alternative position more attractive. One might accommodate a plurality o f 
incompatible judgments by seeing those judgments as doing something other than stating 
truths. Critical judgments, then, are imperatives, prescribing one to “Imagine that...” the 
content o f tlie judgment is the case. Alternatively, judgments could state truths, but are to 
be read as elliptical expressions for “It is appropriate to imagine that...” the content o f the 
judgment is the case. In either case the judgment is an “as if” statement, an injunction to 
imagine as if  X, or a claim that imagining as if  X  is warranted. This approach is developed 
by Roger Scruton, and is alluded to by Matthew Kieran and Steven Davies.^ ^ Call the view 
that judgments are imperatives to imagine the command view, and the other the warrant view. I 
claim that both successfully dispel the appearance o f contradiction, but require abandoning 
realism.
Under the former account, when Anfam writes that a Rothko painting is a mirage-Hlœ oracle 
which seems to vek hidden meanings behind its simple composition, his judgment should be 
taken as a command to imagine the painting in this way. Anfam does not assert that the 
painting is an oracle, but commands us to think as if it were one. Similarly with O’Connor’s 
judgment that the painting is an abstracted landscape— this is an elliptical expression for 
“Imagine that the painting is an abstracted landscape.” While we may have practical 
difficulties satisfying differing commands at once, the difficulty is at m ost a practical and not 
a logical one. “Imagine that p” and “Imagine that ~p” might strain our cognitive powers 
were we to obey both at once, but there is no contradiction in prescribing both. It is enough 
for the purposes o f this discussion to note that the command view is an antirealist one.
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Commands are not truth-apt sentences, and so apparently assertoric sentences— aesthetic 
judgments— fail to satisfy the representational role accorded to them under reahsm. While 
the command view solves the problem o f admitting a contradiction, it is an unsatisfactory 
theory in other ways. Could there be any constraints on commands to imagine? On what 
grounds might we rule out a command to imagine Rothko’s painting as a Marxist social 
polemic? Ruling out outré critical judgments is certainly something we want to be able to do 
if we are to avoid subjectivism. This task, though, seems impossible without bringing in 
considerations o f truth. The command view also is vulnerable to the Frege-Geach problem 
of embedded contexts. If aesthetic judgments serve only to express non-truth evaluable 
prescriptions, there is no way to explain their role in the antecedent o f conditionals. So 
while the command view solves the contradiction problem, it comes at an unacceptably high 
price.
What o f die warrant view? Certainly it solves the contradiction problem as well. Again the 
key word is ‘imagination’. The warrant view has us read Anfam as asserting that “it is 
appropriate to imagine that the painting is an oracle”. This is importantly different from a 
claim that substitutes ‘to beheve’ for ‘to imagine’. We need not think that the content o f the 
judgment is true o f the artwork. But then, the warrant view is also antireahst. For while 
judgments may be true or false (based on whether they are appropriate or not), imagination 
seems more a matter o f what we take the artwork to be than what the artwork is. And so 
even if bivalence is preserved, aesthetic judgments won’t be true purely in virtue o f some 
mind-independent state o f affairs. Rather, truth rests on some appropriateness o f fit between 
our imaginings and the artwork.
Proponents o f this sort o f move maintain that it does not entail that aU judgments are 
equally worthy. Manet’s painting has been given a formaUst analysis by Sandbkd”  which has 
been widely rejected, because the formahst approach makes no account o f the narrative 
content o f the artwork, which seems highly significant to our aesthetic experience. That 
content is made more salient by the title (consider the difference if  it were titled Composition 
in Blue) and, oddly enough, by the apparent moral indifference o f Manet’s depiction. Just 
how we determine those saliencies is going to vary from case to case, and will always be a 
subject for spirited discussion. A critic who found in Rothko’s Ught Bed Over Black a critique
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o f bourgeois values and a celebration o f the liberation o f the woiidng class would not be 
taken seriously, though if he produced some lost set o f the artist’s diaries which showed his 
communist sympathies, tlie story might be different. Even in this hypothetical case, the 
legitimacy o f the Marxist interpretation would not be secured; critics insisting on the 
autonomy o f the artwork might exclude this sort o f biograpliical evidence, and Rothko 
himself insisted, perhaps paradoxically, that he was happy to aUow any meaning someone 
attributed to his work. The proponent o f aesthetic judgments as statements o f appropriate 
imaginings, then, need not tolerate any judgment as acceptable. In general, the same 
constraints o f being attentive to the work and to the various conventions o f art critical 
practice will govern which ones are good and which bad.
The advantage o f such a view is clear—we can imagine an artwork as having all sorts o f 
qualities without worrying about the truth-status o f conflicting judgments, as under the view 
the conflict is only an apparent one. We can imagine U ^ t Bed Over Black as now an oracle, 
and shift our imaging to see it as an abstracted landscape. I see two difficulties with this 
proposal. One is that we seem to want some linguistic markers that indicate how we are to 
take sentences within aesthetic discourse. Surely some sentences wiU. be assertoric—  
sentences about the provenance o f a painting, the form o f a sonata, or indeed a summary o f 
the facts o f the editorial choices that collected six o f Wordsworth’s poems into “the Lucy 
poems”. A possible solution to this worry might begin by giving a speech-act account o f 
aesthetic utterances, where in some cases the utterance meaning and the utterer’s meaning 
are identical (e.g. successful factual statements), and in others come apart (e.g. judgments 
enjoining us to imagine something). N o syntactic markers wül help us to malce such a 
distinction; that is a pragmatic task.
The second difficulty is related to the first. It is not clear that outré judgments, such as die 
communist reading o f Rothko, can be so easily dismissed if we weaken the role o f truth by 
tying it only to the appropriateness o f various imaginings. As long as such judgments accord 
with the features o f the work, other considerations will be less helpful in disqualifying them. 
One might appeal to the fact Rothko had no interest in communism, but there is a very 
influential set o f art critical conventions holding that any appeal to actual or hypothetical 
artistic intentions is illegitimate. If art critical theories form part o f the conventions tiiat
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allow or disallow judgments, then some other theoretical arguments are needed against the 
anti-intentionaUsts. If those are lacking, it seems that if an outré interpretation enhances the 
aesthetic interest o f an artwork, we may lack a valuable resource— a substantial notion o f 
truth— to rid ourselves o f it. And this line o f thought goes as well for less extreme 
examples: both Brool^’ and Bateson’s interpretations o f “A slumber did my sprit seal” rest 
on a significant falsehood, that the poem refers to Lucy. But both interpretations generate 
some interest and enhance the poem’s richness. Both interpretations have long since 
become canonical. Witness too the continued interest in psychoanalytic criticism o f film and 
literature, long after the scientific theory has been discredited. I am not entirely sure that 
basing an interpretation on a falsehood, or a collection o f them, is inappropriate where the 
experience o f art is concerned. But it is hard to see how we might decide, once we deny 
ourselves the notion o f truth in judgments for anything stronger than the suggestion view. 
More troubling, it is hard to see how a determined advocate o f subjectivism might not win 
her case- Again, these difficulties may well not be insurmountable. The important point is 
that construing aesthetic judgments as statements about appropriate imaginings is an 
unquestionably anfirealist way to dispel the appearance o f contradiction,
c* ‘^ Relativism” and Antirealism
Joseph Margolis offers yet another solution to the problem that makes CP an attractive 
view.^  ^ He proposes a “relativism” that explicitly overhauls the truth predicate in a way that 
holds on to the assertoric character o f aesthetic discourse. It is not in fact relativism, and it 
is unsatisfactory, but the spirit o f his program moves us, I think, in the right direction if we 
take inarbitrable disputes to be a datum o f aesthetic discourse. The appeal o f CP rests on its 
squaring critical disagreements with a more basic commitment to realism. In general, realism 
is the view that (non-vague) assertions are determinately true or false in virtue o f some mind- 
independent facts. Antirealism is simply the denial o f that view; such a denial is only the 
basic material for a wide range o f theoretical positions. Within aesthetics, the datum o f 
critical disagreement is for some a motivation for some antirealist view, but the friend o f CP 
rather wbhes to acknowledge the disagreements while holding on to realism.
Margolis moves from a recognition o f this datum through the truth that there are coherent 
many-valued logics to advise that we reject the Principle o f Bivalence for aesthetics. (It is
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possible to adopt a multi-valued logic and maintain bivalence, but Margolis is explicitly not 
talcing this route.^^ He offers dûs as “the essential aletiiic motivation for a viable relativism 
[diat] is not itself a form a relativism”'*®. Tlûs is all right so far. But with the rejection o f 
bivalence, and with the specific refusal to award any judgments with the predicate Tnie^  
Margolis moves into antkealism. Once that commitment is in place, all talk o f relativism is 
superfluous, since antirealism can (diough need not) eiqilicitiy accommodate true 
contradictions and so eliminate any need to e^ qplain them as merely apparent 
contradictions.'** And nowhere does Margolis short-Hst any candidates for the variable W to 
which the truth predicate is to be relativized.
Why then, does MargoUs’ specific proposal strike me as unsatisfactory? The logic Margolis 
recommends would have the predicate ^alsc but no predicate Tnie\ rather it would have 
“truth-lilre” predicates including Plausibk, -A.pt, Keasonable, and so on. He makes this choice 
because he wants to treat truth and falsity asymmetrically, which allows judgments to be false 
(“as not according with pertinent evidence””*^  but does not allow them to be true (“since 
retaining truth would lead inevitably to contradiction”'*^ ). I find it surprising that Margolis 
resists an antirealism allowing true contradictions, since I think that they are entirely 
consistent with his ontological conception o f artworks. For our present purposes, it is only 
necessary to highlight that radical as his proposal is, it is in a way not radical enough. In 
failing to make peace with the metaphysical implications o f antireaHsm, his relationship with 
the truth-predicate becomes an uncomfortable one. He denies true as an available predicate 
in an admittedly assertoric discourse, but the price o f that denial is o f course adopting some 
Idnd o f error theory about just what it is we’re doing when we say “It is trvie that Manet’s 
painting refers to the artist himself.” That consequence is, as I have argued in Chapter 2, a 
ratlier ugly one, and so 1 think we’re better o ff to avoid it by allowing the value true in 
whatever logic we adopt.
d. Realist Pluralism
Up to this point, the approach to dispelling contradictions among critical claims has involved 
either relativizing some o f the predicates involved, re-interpreting the language o f judgments, 
or m ost radically, revising their logic. The latter two are antkealist, because they reconstrue 
judgments as non-descriptive, or as descriptive partly o f the activity o f our minds, or because
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they explicitly reject bivalence and the predicate 'True. Relativism, on the other hand, may 
allow one to retain a commitment to realism'*'*, but it will nevertheless be unpalatable to 
many realists for other reasons.
Robert Stecker argues'*^  that a commitment to (non-relativist) realism can incorporate 
pluralism by introducing a distinction between truth and acceptability. Truth can only be 
awarded to one comprehensive judgment, or to its conjuncts. Acceptability, though, may be 
conferred on those judgments that meet other critical aims. These judgments are “neither 
true nor false”'*'* but rather acceptable relative to some critical aim. So critical monism (the 
view that there is but one true comprehensive judgment) is compatible with critical 
pluralism. The three examples given above are prima facie candidates for this kind o f 
treatment; at most one judgment from each is correct, but perhaps others may be deemed 
acceptable based on their satisfaction o f some yet-to-be specified critical projects.
There are two needs to be met in Stecker’s compatibilist project; a distinction between true 
and false judgments, and a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable judgments. On 
the face o f it, any judgment could be evaluated for its truth and for its acceptability; a false 
judgment may be acceptable in that it satisfies some legitimate critical project, while a true 
judgment may be unacceptable because “it doesn’t explain what puzzles us about a work. It 
gets bogged down in matters we regard as trivial rather than getting to the heart o f the 
matter.”*’ So the distinctions mark o ff judgments into categories that are overlapping but not 
mutually exclusive.
There is an ad hoc quality about these distinctions that borders on incoherence. Stecker says 
that acceptable judgments are neither true nor false. He casually modifies this later'*® to allow 
that they can either be false or neither true or false. True judgments can also be 
unacceptable. But surely all true judgments can’t be unacceptable. If acceptability lies in the 
satisfaction o f some legitimate critical aim, then at least some true judgments must also be 
acceptable. So acceptable judgments can be true, false, or neither true nor false. And 
unacceptable judgments can be true or false, but apparently cannothc. neither true nor false 
(because they don’t meet the minimal acceptability conditions). Acceptability needs some
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further characterization if we are to be able to Imow when the neither-true-nor-false option 
is available.
Wliat then, makes an interpretation (or generally, a judgment) an acceptable one? Judgments 
can be acceptable, though not necessarily true, ‘because they satisfy criteria o f acceptability 
which have nothing to do with [their] truth. Such interpretations may aim at enhancing the 
aesthetic value o f a work, or at making the work more relevant to the interpreter’s 
contemporaries, or at just offering an interesting way o f reading the work.”'**' He goes on to 
say that not just any judgment is acceptable, because acceptability requires consistency with 
at least some facts about the artwork. But if this is Stecker’s solution to the problem o f 
inconsistent judgments, it is not a realist one at all. First, in pronouncing (at least some) 
acceptable judgments neither true nor false, he rejects bivalence in order to accommodate a 
plurality o f them with consistency. Furthermore, what legitimates judgments is their being 
warrantedly assertible. The conditions for warrant here include consistency with some facts 
about the artwork and the legjitimacy o f the critical project served. But the realist who wants 
to hold on to pluralism should do so because the judgments within the plurality hold in 
virtue o f something stronger than their assertibility. So where Stecker is a pluralist he is an 
antirealist. And by insisting on reserving the value tnie for at most one judgment, he is only a 
realist when he is a critical monist. The compatibilist option is untenable. Realism cannot 
allow the joint truth o f the example critical claims without introducing à relativism that, at 
least in these cases, seems unprincipled.
5. Chapter Summary
Both the modest and the robust realist hold that aesthetic properties supervene on non- 
aesthetic ones, and that supervenience captures much o f the practice o f defending aesthetic 
judgments. As I have argued, however, the intuition is utterly uninformative if  true, because 
it says nothing about how specific aesthetic qualities arise or emerge firom specific non- 
aesthetic ones. At best we have the trivial assertion that the total array o f aesthetic qualities 
depends on the total array o f non-aesthetic ones. This is no more than a denial o f platonism 
and reductionism. What a supervenience account should provide is an explanation o f when 
certain aesthetic judgements are licensed and when they are not, and supervenience plainly 
fails to deliver this. Most lüœly, the supervenience thesis is utterly incoherent.
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Worse still, supervenience must be asserted as an a priori thesis by the realist. The faith in the 
legitimacy o f such an assertion surely lies in a more basic commitment to some version o f 
physicalism, and the same sort o f worry that drives others into non-cognitivism, namely, that 
aesthetic qualities could not be anything but occult unless somehow constituted by natural 
properties. Should the realist be asked to justify her adherence to supervenience, she 
encounters a dilemma, in which she can only justify supervenience by invoking truth as 
warranted assertibility.
Even if these two problems can be dealt with in a satisfactory fashion, the realist is left with 
a strong commitment to there being but one correct comprehensive aesthetic judgment for 
any given artwork. That commitment is called into question by the fact o f icresolvable 
critical disputes throughout the artworld. Pluralism dissolves such disputes whüe upholding 
realism only if it is in fact relativism. I have argued that relativism is unsatisfactory as a 
solution to a great many disagreements, and so the realist commitment stands in opposition 
to an art critical practice that hosts a great many o f these disputes. Indeed, it is often taken 
to be criteiial o f great works o f art that they support a wide range o f judgments and 
interpretations, including some inconsistent with one another. The realist disallows this, and 
consequently, diminishes the explanatory appeal o f her theoretical position.
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Chapter 4
In this chapter, I talce up largely metaphysical problems associated witli the two realist 
positions left standing at the end o f Chapter 2. In the previous chapter, I argued that 
supervenience was a deeply troubled notion, so much so tliat modest aesthetic realism and 
robust aesthetic realism risk losing one o f the core theses tliat distinguish those positions 
from platonism and reductionism. That may appear to be a largely metaphysical issue, and 
indeed it is. But its interest lies also in the purported contribution it makes to the analysis o f 
aesthetic judgments: what are tliey, what counts as a good supporting reason for them, and 
how are we to understand the appearance o f conflict between them?
In this chapter, I examine more straightforwardly metaphysical issues, taking up 
supervenience only toward the end. Whereas robust and modest realism share much the 
same epistemological problems, the metaphysical issues are quite different. The strategic 
claims o f the chapter are:
1. The argument for the primary quality status o f aesthetic qualities rests on a confusion 
between truth-conferring and warrant-conferring properties.
2. The analogy between secondary quahties and aesthetic properties is significantly 
flawed.
3. Response-dependence is a retreat ftom the realist thesis o f mind-independence, one 
that may or may not undermine tlie general project.
4. Maintaining response-dependence as a realist tenet requites a viable notion o f 
supervenience, which previous arguments have shown to be unavailable.
Before undertaking the arguments for these four claims, it will be useful to give a more 
careful account o f realism and o f mind-independence.
Realism Revisited
Up to this point, I have been working with a serviceable but still rather crude notion o f 
realism. Realism represents a commitment to the truth or falsity o f assertions in a discourse 
being a matter independent o f the beliefs o f participants in the discourse. In other words, 
when a well-formed assertion p is true, it is not because the associated belief that p is held, 
but rather, because some independent state o f affairs obtains. A very rough sketch o f
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realism in some area o f thought is given by Pettit, as being “the doctrine that certain entities 
allegedly associated with that area are indeed real.”* But this characterization is far too crude 
to be helpful, even as a slogan. It gives rise to the prejudice o f antirealism as a claim that in 
some domain we are under some kind o f widespread, systematic illusion or error about the 
contents represented by our thought and discourse. What is needed is an account o f what it 
is to be real in some technical sense. Indeed, Pettit goes on to provide such an account.
Here I will survey Pettit’s account^ as well as Crispin Wright’s^ . In doing so I am arming at a 
better understanding o f what is preserved o f realism if aesthetic qualities are given a 
response-dependent treatment, and how much the core realist tenets must be compromised, 
if at all, in moving away from a response-independent treatment.
Pettit writes that a survey o f the non-realist theory demarcates realism as the commitment to 
three theses:
1. The Descriptivist Thesis (DT)
2. The Objectivist Thesis (OT)
3. The Cosmocentric Thesis (C l)
What are the claims o f these thesis, and how do they mesh with the taxonomy I have been 
using tlius far? DT is the claim that “participants in the discourse necessarily posit the 
existence o f distinctive items, believing and asserting things about them.”* Moreover, it is 
necessarily knowable a prion by anyone who would count as understanding an assertion that 
a description fads (i.e. the assertion is false) in the absence o f the items posited by the 
description. Bringing DT into alignment with our taxonomy shows that its denial leads to 
expressivism or quasi-realism, Pettit also identifies reductionism as an opponent o f DT.^
On tills point, our taxonomy is misleading in marking reductionism as desctiptivrit; at the 
level o f the controversial discourse, the claim is that there are no distinct entities posited by 
the discourse, because all the entities o f that discourse can be reduced to or identified with 
those posited by the reduction level. So there is a sense in which one might see DT as 
satisfied by reductionism, though not straightforwardly. At any rate the important 
observation is that all three o f the serious contender views (cognitivist antirealism, RAR, and 
MAR) all incorporate DT. It is a necessary but not sufficient commitment for realism.
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OT is the claim that “the objects posited exist and have their character fixed independendy 
o f the dispositions o f participants in the discourse to assert and believe things about tliem”.** 
This is a two-part claim and so can be opposed in two ways. Denying existence to the 
discourse’s posits delivers an error theory; by DT assertions are true when the right state o f 
affairs obtains, and the error theorist accepts this thesis but denies that the right state ever 
obtains. Following the taxonomy from top to bottom, we are now left with cognitivist 
antkealism as the only non-realist position, and indeed what distinguishes this view from the 
realist views below it is the claim that while DT holds, the entities wliich aesthetic judgments 
posit are not independent o f our knowing. Here a potential confusion resides in the word 
‘objectivity’. Pettit uses it to signal mind-independence, and this is not to be entwined with 
the use o f ‘objectivity’ to characterize judgments. The former has its roots in the notion o f 
objecthood. The latter, recall, associates with judgments their improvability by the ^ving o f 
reasons, and the idea that there are better and worse judgments. The judgment-related sense 
of objectivity has no necessary logical connection to the object sense used by Pettit and 
others.
Finally, Pettit’s CT, is an epistemological thesis and thus not always included among the core 
realist claims. CT holds that “error and ignorance are always possible with regard to the 
substantive propositions o f the discourse. It is possible.. .that participants are wrong about 
all and every substantive claim in the discourse.”’ Implicit in this thesis is the allowance for 
the possibility that every participant is wrong about one, many, or even aU the substantive 
claims comprised by the discourse, and this is so under epistemic conditions ranging from 
the actual to the normal to the ideal. So the ‘always’ in the statement o f CT above should be 
taken in the strongest sense possible. As Pettit notes, it may seem redundant to assert CT as 
a realist thesis independent from D T and OT. It is usually taken to be the case that mkid- 
independence carries implicitly a commitment to CT. Pettit holds, however, that it is not 
inconsistent to claim DT and OT while denying CT. Such a view would involve, additionally 
to the first two theses, that tlie error or ignorance o f the discourse’s posits is a priori 
impossible at some limit. One such view, according to Pettit, is the ‘interpretationist’ idew 
that “the referents o f any [substantial] discourse.. .are tliose entities which it most flattering 
to the discourse to take as its referents: those entities such that participants can be held to 
say more true tilings about them than anything else.”® This view resides in the logical space
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formed by affirrning only the first two realist theses, but it is difficult to see just what the 
corresponding theory o f aesthetic judgment would be. And outside aesthetics, what might 
such a discourse look like? One possibility might be a highly ciccumscribed discourse o f 
first-personal avowals; statements o f one’s own intentions, beliefs, and desires. Given a 
certain understanding o f these mental entities, it might be plausible to consider a discourse 
about them to obey DT and OT but not CT. But this case seems to be a special one, and 
the only one where such a combination o f tlieses is possible. This combination only works 
for this discourse because o f the particular subject matter o f the discourse, and the logical 
relation holding between that discourse and its referents. In any other discourse, I maintain 
that CT follows from the joint affirmation o f DT and OT, and is part and parcel o f an 
aesthetics-appropriate realism a la Pettit. Realism, then, on his account, represents a 
commitment to the conjunction o f DT, OT, and CT; they are (jointly) necessary (and only 
jointly) sufficient for any position identified as a realist one.
At this point a distinction between trivial and non trivial senses o f ‘miad-dependence’ 
should be noted. Trivial examples include self-conscious avowals, such as “I think that the 
vase is delicate”, third-person assessments o f belief, such as “He thinks that the vase is 
delicate”, or statements about minds or mentality, as in, “She has a beautiful mind.” I take it 
to be unnecessary to qualify the notion o f mind-dependence so as to exclude these trivial 
cases. The interesting sense (and the one I intend by the unqualified term) is one in which 
apart from the obvious trivial cases, the state o f affaks posited by an utterance is in a 
significant sense constituted by something like the beliefs attendant to the utterance. 
Roughly, it is the thought that thoughts o f ‘x’ play an extension-detertoining role for ‘x’. A  
discourse in which thoughts played such a role would violate Pettit’s CT. The more fraught 
question is whether Modest Aesthetic Realism, which takes concepts to be response- 
dependent, employs a distinct notion o f mind-dependence. This question anticipates a 
central argument o f this chapter; much more is needed before that question can be properly 
addressed.
Wright’s characterization o f realism is given in very different terms than Pettit’s, though a 
common core can be identified. The distinction between antkealism and realism has 
historically been confiised with the distinction between non-cognitivism and cognitivism.
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The latter contrast is between (cognitivist) theories that hold sentences in a discourse to be 
proper assertions and to have truth-values, and (non-cognitivist) ones that deny either or 
both o f these things. But non-cognitivist theory does not exhaust the logical space o f 
antkealism. An antkealist can maintain that a discourse is genuinely assertoric, and that the 
assertions can have truth-values. The conception o f truthful assertions as representing the 
facts is a platitudinous one, and so one tliat makes no metaphysical commitments either way 
in the debate between realists and antkealists. To state the platitude, even in metaphysical 
terms such as ‘judgments fitting the facts’ or ‘corresponding to reality’ does not yet give a 
substantial, coiumittkig, content. “Antkealism”, says Wright, “is now properly identified 
with tlie view tiiat, with respect to a particular region o f assertoric discourse, nothing further 
can be done to substantiate the representative aspect o f the notion o f truth beyond what is 
accomplished by the platitudinous connections with normativity. Antkealism thus becomes 
the natural, initial position in any debate.”® The push to realism comes with the satisfaction 
o f criteria indicating tiiat the antireahst conception is too thin a metaphysics for the 
explication o f our discourse-related practices.
Wright develops four ‘constraints’ such that each is “a sufficient condition for the propriet)’^ 
o f a move away from [antkealism].”*® In other words, if  the constraint is talcen to hold for 
some discourse, the need for a realist account becomes evident. These constraints, then, 
characterized as they are, fit less neatly into the taxonomy o f Figure 1; some o f them cut 
across it. A look at Wright’s constraints will prove useful, however, particularly as one o f 
them serves to mark out Modest Aesthetic Realism firom a close but antkealist relative,
Wright’s constraints are (possibly in descending order o f decisiveness);
1. Evidence-transcendence (ET)
2. Cognitive Command (CC)
3. Best Explanation (BE)
4. Order o f Determination (CD)
I survey each o f them briefly in turn. Evidence transcendence would, if  satisfied, clearly 
decide the case for die realist. It corresponds with the strong interpretation o f Pettit’s 
Cosmocentric Thesis. If aesthetic discourse were evidence-transcendent, the possibility 
always remains open that everyone could be wrong about a particular judgment, or about all
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o f them. It would have to be possible that all o f us who find Miro’s paintings playfully 
insightful were mistaken, that no matter what practices we engaged in to improve our 
judgment, the truth about his art would remain beyond our (and his) grasp. Some aesthetic 
realists, notably Eddy Zemach (whose views I exarnine below) hold on to a notion o f truth 
that involves ET. But realism need not invoke this strong conception. In particular, is it not 
at all clear that the Modest Aesthetic Realist invokes ET. It is possible that MAR motivates 
its move to realism on the basis o f a weaker constraint on the operative notion o f truth. But 
note tliat, if  my associating Pettit’s CT with ET is correct, then a modest realist theory has 
compromised the notion o f mind-independence in some way. This o f course is the reason 
for labeling MAR as ‘modest’. What needs to be examined is how much this can be 
compromised and still be a realist view.
Cognitive Command is formulated as a suitably realism-committing notion o f convergence. 
The latter figures centrally in much o f the debate between realism and antkealism, though as 
Wright argues, convergence is often formulated in a way that is non-committal between the 
two. O f course, if  the realism at hand is underpinned by an evidence-transcendent 
conception o f truth, then a fiirther constraint o f convergence would be superfluous. For 
convergence as it is usually expressed holds that if  a sentence is true, then appropriately 
situated parties to the discourse would agree that the sentence is true. And so a realist 
discourse exhibits this tendency o f convergence on true statements. ET k  stronger because 
even if there were convergence, there is still no guarantee that there has been convergence 
on the truth; ex hjpothesi the truth may outrun all available evidence according to ET. On its 
own, convergence is too loosely formulated to mark out the reasons for truth as suitably 
realist ones. Wright accordingly casts convergence as cognitive command: “it is a priori that 
disagreements, when not attributable to vagueness, are ultimately explicable in terms o f 
cognitive shortcomings; specifically, some material ignorance, material error, or prejudicial 
assessment.”** Is the discourse o f aesthetic judgment such that truth is constrained by 
cognitive command? It seems that the realist who wants to defend a pluralist position, in 
spite o f the arguments offered in Chapter 3, does not hold aesthetic discourse to be so 
constrained. If critical pluralism is the thesis that there are instances where conflicting 
judgments can all be true, then the disagreement cannot be understood as arising from 
cognitive failures. The realist could either accept this charge and insist that cognitive
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command does constrain trutli in aesthetics, or she could see the conflict as signaling what 
might, in Hume’s language, be called a ‘blameless disagreement’. This could involve a 
relativizing o f the judgments, and one favored candidate for the relativizing parameter is 
sensibility. ‘Sensibility’ is again a loose term, but it is worth considering whether a response- 
dependent realism represents this sort o f move, and further, whether it will succeed. I take 
up these questions below.
Wright’s third constraint. Best Explanation, is another that has received confusing treatment 
in the debate. Crudely, the idea is that truth is constrained by BE in cases in which if one 
tliinks p to be true, tiie best expknation for tliat thought is that p. Why do you believe that 
the water is dangerously cold? Because it is— because were you to dive in, you would feel a 
pain in your chest, feel your muscles harden, and feel the need to get to shore immediately. 
The best explanation for your belief is that the properties o f the water caused you to have it. 
There has been a tendency in tiie literature to see BE as requiring truth-conferring entities to 
stand in a causal relation to judges, but this is a mistake. The intuition is very strong that 1 4- 
2 = 3, and few believe that we hold the belief in virtue o f standing in a causal relationship to 
a realm o f mathematical objects. Putting aside the arguments for mathematical 
constructivism for the purposes o f the present illustration, BE says that we believe that 1 + 2  
= 3 because 1 + 2 = 3, that the best explanation for our so believing is that it is flie case. At 
any rate, one who held 1 + 2 = 3 to be true because o f some independent facts would have 
to make such an account plausible. It is not at aU clear that aesthetic judgments are so 
constrained. Again, it is o f course true that were truth constrained by ET or CC, the wealcer 
BE falls out as a corollary. But if these are not asserted as holding, so, say, we allow for 
blameless disagreements, it seems difficult to understand how to fill out a BE constraint. If 
Anfam and O’Connor disagree about the interpretation o f Rothko’s paintings, and we resist 
the thought that this dispute signals the cognitive shortcomings o f at least one o f them, in 
virtue o f what is the truth o f theit judgments to be eiqîlained? O f BE in general, Wright 
states, “What is important for this particular constraint is that the states o f affairs which we 
regard our judgments as reflecting enjoy a ividth of cosmological wle, as it were, sufficient to 
force us to regard theit role as truth-conferrers in more than rninimal terms.”*^  What this 
means is that, were truth in aesthetics constrained by BE, then not only must it be the case 
that the best explanation o f the truth o f our judgments is that they represent artworks as
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beating certain aesthetic properties. “There must be more things which are so because o f the
obtaining o f such states o f affairs than the formation in us o f certain beliefs.”*^  Wright gives
a nice example that brings out the contrast between statements whose truth is quite plausibly
understood as constrained by BE***, and those for which the intuition is not nearly as strong.
Compare the Wetness o f These Rocks, and The Wrongness o f That Act. 
Reference to the wetness o f the rocks can, uncontroversially, contribute 
towards explaining at least four kinds o f things;
(1) My perceiving, and hence believing, that the rocks are wet.
(2) A small (prelinguistic) child’s interests in his hands after he has touched 
the rocks.
(3) My slipping and falling.
(4) The abundance o f lichen growing on them.
The wetness o f the rocks can be ascribed, that is, each o f four kinds o f 
consequence: cognitive effects, precognitive-sensuous effects, effects on us 
as physically interactive agents, and certain brute effects on inanimate 
oi'j^nisms and matter. By contrast, the wrongness o f that act, though citing 
it may feature in a vindicatory explanation o f my moral disapproval o f the 
action, and hence o f the further effects on the world which my approval may 
generate, would seem to have no part to play in the direct (propositional- 
attitude unmediated) explanation o f any effects o f the latter three sorts: 
precognitive-sensuous, interactive, and brute.*^
So the question to ask here is, what else is so because the Rothko canvas is an abstracted 
landscape, or because it is an enigmatic oracle? It is extremely difficult to give any answer 
besides various other beliefs. If aesthetic discourse is realist, it is not because its truths are 
constrained by BE.
The Order-of-Deteimination constraint is the one o f greatest interest to the theoretical 
debate in aesthetics, as it is closely linked to the idea o f response-dependence.*^ OD  
“intuitively.. .marks the distinction between classes o f statements about which our best 
opinions— opinions conceived by subjects and in circumstances which we think o f as 
cognitively ideal for statements o f that kind— (partially) determine the extension o f the truth 
predicate among them, and classes o f statements our best opinions about which at most 
reflect an extension determined independently.”*’ If aesthetic judgments fall into the latter 
group, then the case for realism seems a strong one. The historical genesis for this contrast 
is o f course the Eutbjphro dialogue, in which Euthyphro asserts that something is pious 
because the gods love it (where Because’ has the constitutive sense), against Socrates who 
argues tliat the gods love those things because they are pious. The force o f the argument is
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that the concept o f piety is logically prior to the pro-attitudes o f the gods. Read in this way, 
the Euthjphro seems to offer a simple contrast between a simple projectivism and an equally 
simple detectdvism. But the picture is more complicated than that. Secondary qualities are 
taken to be paradigm candidates for this sort o f treatment. Understood as dispositions o f 
things to elicit certain responses in subjects, secondary qualities might be roughly 
characterized in the following way (taldng the color red for example);
X is red iff x appears red to normal percenters under normal conditions 
The latter sections o f this chapter talte up the secondary quality analogy and response- 
dependence in detail, and so I put them to one side for the moment.
1. Response-Independence
Robust Aesthetic Realism (RAR) is distinguished from its Modest counterpart in holding 
that aesthetic qualities are independent o f our responses. In Lockean terms, RAR 
characterizes aesflietic properties as primary qualities, while MAR as secondary. To call 
aesthetic properties primary qualities is to say that those properties have their nature 
independent o f any experiencing subjects and invariant across experiential conditions. If all 
aesthetic properties were response-independent, objectivity would easily be secured 
(skeptical worries aside). A painting’s elegance, a poem’s triteness, or a concerto’s stirring 
bravado would be there for anyone to detect, and once detected, would be the same for 
everyone who did. Thus, there would be no worry about the meaning o f aesthetic 
predicates, since theit successful use would require only the detection o f their corresponding 
properties— additional questions about an individual’s epistemic credentials, or about the 
conditions o f experience would be superfluous. Judging these artworks aesthetically would 
logically be no different than, say, determining that this book has a mass o f 2.5 kilograms.*® 
We could be wrong about the measurement due to inattention, or a faulty measuring device, 
but we would be right to expect anyone else, regardless o f their particular sensibilities or 
envkonments, to arrive at the same measurement. Any divergences would simply be wrong.
Aesthetic Properties of Theories
Eddy Zemach offers an argument*® that aims at the conclusion that some aesthetic 
properties are primary. Such a conclusion would lend considerable support not just to
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realism, but to its robust subspecies. Under the Lockean conception o f the 
primary/secondary quality distinction, primary qualities are those whose nature is 
independent o f the subjective conditions for their qualitative character. So while blueness 
implicates a certain perceptual apparatus and observation conditions in its specification (even 
an ostensive one), primary qualities are perspective-invariant. The primary/secondary quality 
distinction certainly has a troubled history, and there is a real question as to whether we can 
name any properly primary qualities. Zemach’s argument, however, does not seem to 
involve itself in these issues. Rather, he argues that in some sense, at least some aesthetic 
qualities are basic response-independent constituents o f the universe. Throughout I have 
been examining only aesthetic features o f artworks, but o f course if it were true that aesthetic 
properties were instantiated in the natural world, then it would be a short argument to 
establish their residence in artworks.
Zemach points out quite rightly that the acceptability o f a scientific theory depends in part 
on its aesthetic merits. What seems to have encouraged the gradual acceptance o f the 
Copernican model o f the solar system over the Ptolemaic model was not its predictive 
power—indeed, until the formulation o f Kepler’s Laws, the Copernican model was a worse 
predictor that the dominant one. The Ptolemaic system was incredibly complex, and 
required numerous epicycles to explain the appearance o f retrograde motion and other 
seeming anomalies. Rather, theoretical simplicity and elegance encouraged the acceptance o f 
the Copernican model, which over time was vindicated as a better one. In general, according 
to Zemach, “unity, simplicity, scope, elegance, dramatic power (prediction), all o f them 
aesthetic virtues, make them beliefworthy. Now, if  a theory’s beauty is what justifies 
believing it is true, then some aesthetic propositions need to be true in order for us to be 
justified in believing any other proposition is true.” ®^ He goes on to provide a reductio 
against the view that there are no aesthetic properties. “If no aesthetic properties exist, then 
all attributions o f beauty are false, and thus the theory that denies the reality o f aesthetic 
properties is not beautiful. But a non-beautiful theory is unworthy o f acceptance.” *^
Zemach’s argument is unsuccessful. His sample Hst o f aesthetic virtues is not limited to the 
aesthetic. Dramatic power, for instance, is a prejudicial re-construal o f theoretical or 
predictive power. More importantly, even granting the claim that a theory’s aesthetic merits
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make it that much more beliefworthy, the move to the claim that such a theory is true 
requires a further premise— tliat o f the set o f competitor theories, the most beautiful one is 
the closest to being true. And that premise is simply false. Without that premise, all 
Zemach has given is an argument for acceptability, which on the realist conception, is 
insufficient to establish truth. A great many mathematical results can be given a number o f 
proofs, and while it is the case that the more elegant and simpler ones wiU typically become 
canonical, they are no more or less true than the others. What Zemach calls the aesthetic 
virtues o f unity, simplicity, and elegance overlap with broader coherence constraints on 
theory formulation and acceptance. Zemach asserts that “our tlieoretical constraints are all 
aesthetic: there are no other criteria for judging theories.”^^  To the objection that coherence 
is not an exclusively or purely aesthetic quality, Zemach might respond that we do indeed 
delight in the discovery o f new coherences, and in the activity o f bringing our beliefs into 
coordination with one another. But if  this is what makes coherence a purely aesthetic 
quality, Zemach seems to be involved in a confusion, one analogous to the psychological 
hedonist’s, as exposed by Butler. Butler rightly claims that while we do take pleasure in 
performing aU sorts o f actions, this in itself does not show that pleasure is the end at which 
we aim in all those actions. So the mere presence o f pleasure is insufficient to establish that 
we only act to experience our own pleasure. Similarly, that we take delight and find aesthetic 
merit in theoretical coherence does not establish that aesthetic considerations are the only 
ones in theory formation. Coherence can be non-evaluatively characterized as a term o f 
degree: given two domains o f belief statements, one is more coherent than another only 
when it contains fewer logical contradictions. O f course coherence as analyzed here cannot 
be an adequate criterion o f the epistemic worth o f a domain, since a domain might be more 
coherent than another simply by containing far fewer, or only one, belief statement. But it 
remains the case that aesthetic delight is at best an accompaniment to, and not an intrinsic 
component of, theoretical coherence.
Zemach’s view is actually rather complicated. He contends that all aesthetic properties are 
tertiary, and further that some o f those are primary. This claim requires unpacking. Zemach 
draws a three-fold distinction: "'‘primmypwpeiiies are properties o f noumena (real things); 
secondmy properties are properties o f phenomena (appearances o f real things to minds); teHiaiy 
properties are properties o f significant phenomena (phenomena mediated by interest).
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Zemach’s claim that some tertiary properties are also primary seems to mean that that 
interest-mediated phenomena are identical with properties o f ‘real things’, that is, are 
strongly mind-independent. How can this be so? He writes that we perceive an object as 
having certain aesthetic properties only if we perceive it conatively. But the phenomenology 
o f such a perception does not locate the quality in us, but in the object we are perceiving. 
Still, the observation involves “desire perceptually interpreting nature” *^*; “specific aesthetic 
properties are then phenomenal properties o f desite-constituted aesthetic objects.. ,”3^  So 
on Zemach’s account, our desires (or more generally, our interests) play a constitutive role in 
our qualitative experience o f things regarded aesthetically. This appears to be a 
straightforward antkealist rendering o f aesthetic qualities, because not only are the aesthetic 
qualities we meet in experience available only when we have certain interests, but because 
those interests play a role in forming those aesthetic qualities. To take two o f his examples; 
an object is “ostentatious or g^udy only if it satisfies a deske for self-assertion and self- 
aggrandizement. Sublime and awesome things are only those that are mightier than we are, 
things that may harm us and that we cannot force to comply with our deskes.” *^* One can 
ignore the obvious errors in the necessary condition for gaudiness and ostentetiousness; 
what is important here is the logical structure and the fact that what fills in the necessary 
condition is a contingent set o f deskes and interests. This sort o f tertiary property story 
seems to be a concession to the antkealist challenge. How Zemach aims to avoid an 
antkealist conclusion is by noting the role o f subjective interests, but then continuing on to 
establish an identity between some o f these and the purportedly primary aesthetic properties 
o f nature, as expressed in true scientific theories. But without Zemach’s conclusion about 
the properties o f scientific laws, it is hard to know in some non-question begging way when 
we could identify our deske-mediated phenomena as also being something strongly mind- 
independent. It does not, for instance, debar the conclusion that the properties o f scientific 
theories themselves are tertiary.
2. The Analogy With Secondary Qualities
The problem with which I initiated this project arises firom the clash between two intuitions: 
that artworks seem to be mind-involved entities and that our aesthetic discourse is 
purportedly objective. By far the most influential approach to handling this tension is to
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draw an analogy between aesthetic properties and secondary qualities. The experience of 
color is, on our best understanding, something tliat is ineliminably subject-involving, and yet 
is seems entirely proper to mark out color judgments as right or wrong, better or worse. The 
evidence from our practice, then, is that we take there to be a fact o f the matter. And so our 
discourse can be objective, if  not in the strongly mind-independent sense.
The analogy is a troubled one, however. The matter is complicated by the fact that the 
analogy is drawn more or less tightly by different thinkers. Some, most notably John 
McDowell, draws a tight analogy in claiming that the epistemology o f aesthetic properties is 
like that o f secondary quahties, tiiat in some sense we directly perceive the aesthetic 
properties in the same way we look and see that something is blue. Others, including Mark 
Johnston, use the analogy loosely, at a very abstract level, suggesting that the logical structure 
o f aesthetic (or moral) concepts is akin to that o f colors, while abstaining from any 
commitment to the similarities or differences in their epistemology. In understanding the 
analogy, then, it is necessary to examine tlie particular work it is intended to do, as some 
disanalogies will constitute objections more obviously to the tighter analogy than to the 
looser one.
On the appeal o f tlie analogy, McDowell writes: “Shifting to a secondary quahty analogy 
renders irrelevant any worry about how something that is brutely there could nevertheless 
stand in an internal relation to some exercise o f human sensibility. Values are not brutely 
there— not there independently o f our sensibility— any more than colours are; though, as 
witli colours, this does not stop us supposing that they are there independently o f any 
particular experience o f them.” ’^ Embedded in this motivational sketch is an assertion o f 
the sort o f mind-independence specific to MAR as opposed to RAR. Values, including 
aesthetic properties, need not be independent o f a perceiver’s counterfactual mental states, 
but only o f her actual, occurrent ones to be sufficiently mind-independent for realism. The 
analogy is supported by at least three considerations. Fkst, sensitivity to aesthetic properties 
and secondary qualities can be refined through training and critical practice. Second, 
aesthetic properties and secondary quahties supervene but are not reducible to oflier 
properties. And thkd, the experience o f both is o f an external object presenting itself with a
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certain quality, though reflection and investigation reveals that quality to have a dispositional 
nature.
Clearly, however, the tight analogy is strained. While it is true that the judgmental capacities 
for aesthetic quahties and smells and colors can (at least to some degree) be improved by 
training, in the case o f aesthetic quahties, such training or cultural influence is necessary for 
proficient discrimination. It seems that without some famiharity with the appropriate artistic 
genre and the possession o f an adequate stock o f critical vocabulary (and not just these), 
identifying the elegance o f a Beethoven string quartet or the bathetic quahty o f a patriotic 
poem whl not be possible. Sensitivity to colors and smells, on the other hand, are basic to 
normal human functioning. While perhaps only color experts can name a great number o f 
the hues in our human color space, even persons lacking abstract words for colors are 
demonstrably able to distinguish between unique hues and to group color samples into 
groups o f like resemblance.^ ® And while it is also true that our perception is inextricably 
linked to our higher cognition even in the color case, the necessity o f traioing and experience 
in tlie identification o f aesthetic quahties gives higher (i.e more self-aware) cognition a much 
larger role to play. Granting that aesthetic predicates refer to properties, it is clear that 
aesthetic properties must be different firom color properties. Sibley points out that “whereas 
there is notliing about the way a thing looks that makes it look blue, there are aU sorts o f 
visible features that make a thing look, or are responsible for its looking graceful (though 
their presence does not entail what they are responsible for)”.^ ® So the logical structure o f 
aesthetic concepts is very different from that o f secondary quahties.
Despite their dissimilarities, secondary quahties and aesthetic quahties at least have a 
resistance to explanation by supervenience in common. The friend o f the tight analogy says 
that aesthetic quahties supervene on a wide range o f non-aesthetic properties, just as colors 
supervene on physical properties o f surface reflectances and incident light. Where this claim 
is baseless assertion in the former case, it is straightforwardly false in the latter. For 
supervenience (ejqpressed either as SI or 82) to be respected for color, the subvenient base 
needs to include facts about the observer— simply indexing their correct apphcation to 
normal observers and normal conditions will not do, as these cannot be specified to give a 
univocal sense o f ‘color’. Also, even holding ah these factors fixed, we need to be able, for
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instance, to account for differences in use o f the material; gold appears greenish when used 
as a filter but reflects a reddish color/® Also, the phenomenon o f color metamerism— the 
changing o f colors due to changes in lighting conditions— destabilizes the thought that the 
‘true’ color o f an object is that which is seen under bright daylight. If two objects match in 
color under incandescent lighting, but not in bright daylight, the identification o f the latter as 
the standard conditions is purely stipulative. The case for color supervenience looks like that 
for aesthetic properties—if it can be formulated so as to come out true, what results is an 
entirely trivial case-by-case specification which gives us no interesting supervenience thesis.
Supervenience is meant to capture the way aesthetic judgments are justified. But it plays no 
such role in tlie case o f colors, smells, tastes, or other secondary qualities. If a critic found 
Horst’s photographic portraits to show a cool and inaccessible beauty, we might well ask for 
reasons in support o f the judgment. If tlie critic were unable to give them, we would not 
accept his judgment, and it might not be improper to suggest that he did not understand the 
meaning o f his own critical pronouncement. His inability to cite reasons would call his 
competence as a critic into question. On the other hand, it is almost never the case tliat we 
are able to provide justificatory reasons for secondary quality claims in the same way. The 
nature o f justifying response for the critic’s judgment takes the form “it is in virtue o f x, y, 
and z that I find it to have a cool and inaccessible beauty”. But it is no part o f being 
competent to judge something’s being red, or tasting acidic, that we must be able to say why. 
So the analogy is in a sense misaligned here. Supervenience is meant to capture the practice 
o f making aesthetic judgments (and ftom that draws its metaphysical claim) but has no 
analog for secondary quality ascriptions. What supervenience may well capture in the 
secondary quality case is an arguably trivial thesis about property relations, where in tlie 
aesthetic case we have reasons to think that without an argument by way o f the practice o f 
judgment, we have no independently viable property relation thesis. In other words, in the 
case o f secondary qualities supervenience at best captures a trivial property relation which 
does not figure at all in our assertions. In the case o f aesthetic qualities, supervenience at 
best trivially captures the practice o f malting and defending assertions, and only via that 
practice says anything about properties.
8 6
4.2: The Analog With Secondary Qualities
If these two analogical connections— the influence o f training and supervenience— are 
severed, a third connection remains. What seems true o f both secondary qualities and 
aesthetic features is that they are experienced as ‘out there’, though in an important sense the 
sensibilities o f experiencing subjects are deeply implicated in their character. So while the 
tight analogy, claiming the epistemology o f the two kinds o f qualities to be comparable, is 
untenable, a looser analogy may well hold. This analogy, recall, takes both secondary 
qualities and aesthetic qualities to be response-dependent.
3. R esponse-D ependence
Modest Aesthetic Realism (MAR) holds aesthetic properties to be response-dependent. 
Secondary qualities are advanced as paradigmatic entities o f this sort. If red is a response- 
dependent property, then formally,
RD(red): a priori ( x is red iff x  would look red to standard observers under 
standard conditions)
and generally, for some secondary quality F,
RD(F); a priori ( x is F iff x  would look F to standard observers 
under standard conditions)
A number o f features o f this characterization bear mentioning. The definition is given 
counterfactuaUy. A red thing need never actually be observed, but if  it iuere then it would 
have a certain appearance. This is signaled by the locution ‘would look’ as opposed to 
‘looks’. Secondly, the quality o f the look is indexed to standard observers under standard 
conditions. This makes red a normative concept. The judgments o f the color-blind, or o f 
those looking under ultraviolet lighting, should not fall within the extension o f ‘red’. And 
the definition is an a priori one. What this means is that, if  the standard conditions are met 
and a standard observer experiences phenomenal red, then she cannot be wrong in her 
judgment that the thing before her is red. Under the stipulated conditions, there is no room 
for error or ignorance.
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So far, drawing an analogy between aesthetic properties and secondary qualities by way o f 
this model is non-conimittal on the issue o f the epistemology o f either—whether the two 
cases are similar or dissimilar. Having moved through the claims for the tight analogy and 
found them wanting, one might hold on to a loose analogy, which asserts that aesthetic 
properties are analogous to secondary qualities only in this very abstract sense, that the 
logical structure o f the concepts is response-dependent. Such an account “would not itself 
be an account o f the ontology or meaning or o f content. It would imply that the truth about 
meaning and content cannot outrun our idealized dispositions to gtasp that truth.” *^ Clearly 
such an account rules out the first three o f Wright’s individually sufficient conditions for 
adopting a realist metaphysics. Wliat would motivate the adoption o f realism given the 
response-dependent account o f aesthetic properties is the right sort o f story about the order 
o f determination constraint. In Pettit’s terms, it appears that while DT and OT can be 
maintained alongside a response-dependent treatment, CT is going to come under some 
strain. But before investigating these two related worries, it is important to note a key 
difference between the response-dependent structure o f secondary qualities and that o f 
aesthetic properties.
That difference is this: let ot be some aesthetic property. MAR holds that
RD*(«); a priori (x is a iff x would be experienced as having a by ideal judges under 
ideal conditions)
The shift from standard (or normal, in an alternative but equivalent formulation) to ideal 
observers and conditions is motivated by a collection o f related concerns, (note: RD*(ot) 
talks o f ideal judges rather than ideal observers', this contrast is intended only to avoid confusion 
with ideal observer theories) We take judgments o f redness to be part and parcel o f a normal 
person’s conceptual capacities. That ability is in some sense a basic one. Judgments about 
aesthetic properties, on the other hand, do not seem basic in this way. The epistemic 
credentials required to judge the elegance o f a string quartet include not only normally 
functioning hearing but a good deal o f specialized knowledge o f the musical artform. Ideal 
conditions are specified here because, unlilte judgments o f color, aesthetic judgments are
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sensitive to things like our occurrent emotional states, our interest in the artwork before us, 
and so on. The roots o f this account lie in Hume’s seminal essay, “O f the Standard o f 
Taste”, and philosophers following Hume in giving what has been developed into the 
response-dependent account have not diverged much from Hume’s criteria for ideal judges. 
Hume writes, “Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by 
comparison, and cleared o f all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; 
and the joint verdict o f such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard o f taste and 
beauty.”^^ I take up this account in detail in the following chapter. The response-dependent 
treatment o f aesthetic properties avoids talk o f something like a “joint verdict” o f judges 
meeting the specified criteria. Indeed, it seems that even if  only one judge were to meet the 
criteria, her judgment would suffice to identify the correct application o f the aesthetic 
predicates in question. Those criteria, expressed in contemporary terms, might include: 
knowledge o f the art historical context and other instances o f the genre o f the artwork; a 
lack o f bias toward or against the artwork, the artist, or even closely related entities like the 
patron or the commissioning body; a sensitivity (however this is to be unpacked) to either 
the non-aesthetic bases o f aesthetic properties, or to those properties themselves; and 
perhaps a well-developed critical vocabulary. Ideal conditions would likely include, though 
not be limited to: an environment where the phenomenal properties o f the artwork were 
most easily discriminated; an absence o f distraction; adequate time to study or experience the 
artwork; and so on.
One issue that arises immediately in making a shift from normal to ideal judges and 
conditions is the following: is ‘ideal’ meant as some abstract, possibly unattainable hmit, or is 
it ratlier to be understood as something like the best one might plausibly be expected to 
achieve, optimal yet realizable in practice? A little reflection serves to show that it must be 
the latter. Consider the case where ‘ideal’ means not realizable, in the same way that an ideal 
surface is a frictionless one. Such a notion is useful as a theoretical notion, but cannot be 
realized in practice. We might be interested in such a notion when we wish to determine the 
gravitational constant, and undertake to do so by measuring the time it takes for a ball to roll 
down an inclined plane. One source o f inaccuracy in our results will be the friction between 
the inclined plane and the ball—our theoretical equation (if we are beginning physics 
students) only tells us how time and distance are related. We can reduce the inaccuracy by
89
4.3: Response-Dêpendence
reducing the friction between the surfaces, but we cannot eliniinate it entirely. The 
response-dependent treatment o f aesthetic properties is meant in part to explain critical 
disagreements by way o f a substantive (if open-ended) specification o f experiential 
conditions. If the ideal judge in RD^(a) is ideal in the sense o f being very remote firom 
actual human capacities, then the explanatory usefulness o f the account is vitiated. If two 
actual and seemingly well-qualified critics disagree, one insisting that a Bach prelude is leaden 
while the other claims it to be stately, and ‘ideal’ is used in the remote sense, then it could be 
difficult to explain the disagreement in terms o f one critic’s not approximating the ideal.
Such a remote idealization also creates a gulf between our quotidian uses o f an aesthetic term 
and its philosophical analysis according to RD*(^). And the remote idealization moves the 
constraint on truth from the weakest on Wright’s list at least to tlie stronger Cognitive 
Command constraint. Here, recall, it is a priori that disagreements are to be explained in 
terms o f some sort o f cognitive shortcoming on the part o f at least one disputant. Further 
stiH, if the conception o f an ideal judge becomes quite remote ftom present human 
capacities, the realism at hand shifts to one employing the strongest, evidence-transcendent, 
conception o f truth. Either o f these constraints eliminates the possibility o f an account o f 
aesthetic properties that incorporates a subjective component. But after all, this was the 
initial motivation for adopting a response-dependence theory, and so RD*(ot) must be more 
carefully spelled out if  response-dependence is to satisfy its own desideratum. For this 
reason, then, ‘ideal’ should not be taken to mean something analogous to the frictionless 
surface, a theoretically useful but in practice unattainable standard. Rather, it should connote 
a high but humanly possible standard, which I will signify witli the contrastive label 
‘optimal’, giving
RD(oi): a priori (x is ot iff x would be experienced as having a by optimal judges 
under optimal conditions)
So, to amend Johnston’s slogan, the truth o f aesthetic property ascriptions cannot outrun 
optimal dispositions to ^asp that truth. But if R D (a) is to be at all substantial, the particular 
criteria for judges and conditions need to be specified, even if that specification is open- 
ended. As has often been pointed out in the discussion o f response-dependence, if the 
specification opens up into ‘whatever it talres’ to satisfy the biconditional, then it becomes
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entirely vacuous. This is again the problem Hume considers in “O f the Standard o f Taste’’ 
in a different guise. It is a live question whether the optimality specifications can be given in 
a non-circular fashion. I leave this issue to the side for the moment.
But what is most germane to the present discussion, whether such an account indicates a
realist or an antireaHst interpretation^^, is whether the judgments under optimal conditions
play an extension-determining or extension-reflecting role; that is, are optimal judgments
constitutive or reflective o f the aesthetic qualities o f the artwork? Wright’s fourth and
weakest constraint on truth that would support the move to a realist account is order-of-
determination (OD). The basic idea is that^  where the ‘emphasis’ o f the biconditional is on
the left-to-right arrow, then the property in question is sufficiently independent o f our best
responses and a realist theory is indicated; whereas if  the ‘emphasis’ is right-to-left, then our
best responses play an extension-determining role and an antirealist theory is needed. The
motivation in mining RD(a) for such an emphasis is much more obvious than the way in
which one is to be found. Wright argues^ '^  that one way to do so would be to provide a
substantial specification o f the optimal conditions and judges such that any occurrence o f a
in that specification would be given only in an intensional, rather than an extensional, way.
Only if this can be done will Wright’s desired contrast be available, if the following objection
due to Johnston is to be answered:
To put it as a dilemma: either one should aim to characterize strict one-way 
response-dependence, in which case the concept [a] in question should be banished 
from the specification o f the response as well as from the specification o f the 
conditions o f the response, or one should abandon the idea o f an order o f 
determination and allow (but o f course not require) the concept [a] to figure both in 
the specification o f the response and in the specification o f the ideal conditions o f 
the response.^ ^
The first option is essentially the aim o f the reductionist project. Under this option, the 
right-hand side o f the biconditional would give only a characterization o f the experience o f « 
that in no way referenced the concept, as well as optimality requirements on judges and 
conditions the satisfaction o f which would guarantee a correct judgment, without directly 
requiting optimal judges or conditions to be the ones yielding a judgment o f a. I have 
argued in Chapter 2, Section 5 that the reductionist project is a non-contender for aesthetic 
qualities. So the second horn o f the dilemma is forced upon us. One point should be 
noticed immediately. If a reductionist account is unavailable, it is difficult to see the
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plausibility o f Jolinstoti’s parenthetical hut o f course not require’ clause. The idea here 
seems to be that we could exercise as an option the freedom to reference a on both sides o f 
the equation. But should we decide not to— because we are not required to do so—-are we 
not back on the first horn o f Johnston’s dilemma? Denying the prospect o f reductionism 
requires us to take the second horn and drop the parenthetical clause. RD(gî) requires a 
conception o f interdependence o f the specifications o f the concept and the optimality 
constraints on its being signaled.
Wright’s response to Johnston is difficult, but for the purposes o f the present enquiry it may 
safely be ignored. What matters is an easier target. If Johnston has provided an adequate 
characterization o f RD(oe) and the different interpretations available within that 
characterization, the options are either to understand (X as essentially incorporating our best 
responses, or (if Wright can demonstrate the possibility for any particular case) to see those 
responses as putvly extension-determining—-that is, the truth o f judgments is constituted by 
best responses. The purely extension-reflecting possibility was eliminated with the 
abandonment o f reductionism and platonism as live options. But both o f the two available 
options for a response-dependence view are mind-dependent conceptions. This much is 
aclmowledged, perhaps, in the modesty o f modest aesthetic realism. But now the question 
must be pressed: if aesthetic properties are essentially mind-dependent, in what way is MAR 
a realist view?
4. R ealist M ind-Dependence?
With the more carefully worked out picture o f realism, the pair o f realism and rnind- 
dependence seems more than an almost certainly fiactious marriage, but a marriage all the 
same. The two are theoretical contradictories. The burden is unequivocally on the would-be 
matchmaker to justify the possibility for a harmonious union between the two. Johnston 
writes that “precisely because o f WWependence there is no implication o f content or 
meaning being constituted out o f die contents o f attitudes.” *^' But this is not clear. Put to 
one side the prejudicial use o f ‘attitudes’—it is far ftom clear that only attitudes as contrasted 
with beliefs can play a meaning-constituting role. Johnston’s claim is bizarre coming as it 
does after his assertion that RD(oe) does not give the content o f the meaning or the ontology
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o f an aesthetic property a. Quite simply, the response-dependence account stands apart 
from both meaning and any sufficiently committed ontolo^cal view. The realist who wants 
to marry response-dependence to realism needs some further premise.
Pettit acknowledges as much in his admission that any response-dependence treatment looks 
as if it compromises his Cosmocentric Thesis (C l), which again is the claim that error and 
ignorance are always possible with regard to the substantive propositions o f the discourse. 
Aside from special cases like a discourse consisting only in first-personal avowals o f beliefs, 
pains, and the like, CT follows by implication from the Descriptivist and the Objectivist 
theses. And so if CT is violated, then the joint assertion o f DT and OT will fail, and the 
account on offer whl fail, without further shoring up o f the arguments, to be a realist view at 
alL I claim now that the response-dependent account o f aesthetic properties fails to 
conform to CT, and is therefore incompatible with a broader realist theory.
Pettit sees the need to deal witli two issues if  realism is to be reconciled with an account o f 
properties that essentially implicates our responses to them. Both issues go directly to the 
objection that such a characterization violates CT, and both seem to function as necessary 
conditions on holding on to realism. The first is a condition o f ontic neutrality. Even if 
response-dependence introduces an anthropocentric conception o f a class o f properties, we 
must still be able to say plausibly that “there are certain kinds o f entity we recognize that are, 
as we might put it, intrinsically important kinds, not just kinds that are important for the way 
they engage with us. [...] N ot only does it allow us to speak o f discovering independent 
facts, it also lets us speak o f discovering independent kinds.”^^- If ontic neutrality is to be 
respected for aesthetic properties, it should be plausible to imagine other species marking 
out a Modigliani portrait, an Edward Weston photograph (Figure 18), and the prose o f 
Kawabata as aU exemplifying a graceful beauty. Why should we imagine this to be so? The 
issue is made all the more acute by the fact that these three examples, though all might be 
said to possess graceful beauty, exemplify it in very different ways. Graceful beauty seems 
less an independent kind than a linguistic label that brackets a disparate assortment o f 
presentational features. Ontic neutrality seems even less plausible for aesthetic qualities 
when we consider a somewhat more complex art critical judgment. In a review o f the New
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York debut o f Wayne Thiebaud’s still life paintings (Figure 19), Max K ozloff writes:
Thiebaud paints with all the virtuosity o f Manet or Morandi, although 
undoubtedly his world is harsher and less humane than theks. His surfaces 
are juicy (the sign o f a constant appetite for paint), but his thought is arid. As 
magnetic specters o f our most immediate commerce with matter, these 
images remain self-sufficient.
Nevertheless, he satisfies one o f the age-old principles o f the stül-îife 
tradition: that a practitioner discover some vktue, not in inanimate objects as 
such (most elements o f visual experience may have that vktue), but in the 
isolation o f tlie inanimate object. He invests many o f our poor nutrients with 
a sardonic, bright pathos, partially because o f this isolation. After seeing a 
Thiebaud, one can no longer wallt into a hamburger stand with the same 
casual famüiarity.^ ®
If aesthetic properties are ontically neutral, then the union o f the ‘juiciness’ o f the painted 
surface witli tlie ‘arid’ thoughts displayed (meaning, perhaps, tlie conceptual simplicity o f the 
painting qua artwork), or the sardonic, bright pathos o f the objects depicted, would 
somehow be plausibly thought o f as picking out features which figured in the accounts o f 
experience o f creatures very different ftom us. Such a perspective-free salience is difficult to 
imagine. Appreciating Thiebaud’s paintings in this way requkes not just a sense o f kony, 
and a sense o f the celebratory element that coexists along with the konic, but possession o f a 
rich sets o f associations with cultural objects in specific connotative contexts. The very idea 
that these qualities signal independent, even natural, Idnds, looks very much lilœ the platonic 
account the modest realist is so labored to avoid.
The second necessary condition for maintaining realism is epistemic servility. This is tlie 
idea that “in trying to get things right in [an] area o f discourse, even if we are normally 
functioning and normally or ideally positioned subjects, we have to strive to get in tune with 
an independent authority: we have to do the sort o f thing that would malte no sense with 
trying to get [dictatorial claims as to what is the case] straight.”^^ Just what are the things we 
do to get in tune? Typically, we seek the judgments o f optimal critics. But what if we 
ourselves are optimal critics? What alignment must we undertake to bring ourselves into 
contact witli the sardonic, bright pathos o f Thiebaud’s still lives? It strains plausibility to 
imagine that his paintings have this apart firom, among other things, a certain art critical 
practice o f approaching still lives with the background assumption that isolating an object in 
a painting frames its having some vktue. To find the pathos we must bring ourselves into
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line with an audioiitative convention that suggests we are to presume some virtues o f the 
object represented, or to presume that it has some virtues. But that is altogether different 
from a bringing ourselves into line with something that is the case in some mind- 
independent sense. This activity would be something like detecting the virtues or valuable 
aspects without any appeal to convention, social or allegorical significance, or to specific art- 
related practices. When we approach Thiebaud’s paintings, the question “Why should I be 
interested in looking at just this slice o f pie, or this tray o f sweets?” suggests itself, but only 
for viewers situated in the right cultural context. And without a sense o f that question and 
its possible answers, something like the pathos o f those things is not something we can hope 
to have any access to at all.
One way m which the modest aesthetic realist might give a plausible account both o f ontic 
neutrality and epistemic servility is by insisting that, though perhaps many o f our aesthetic 
concepts are culturally-bound in some sense, the properties they pick out ace supervenient 
on something more plausibly conceived o f as independent o f our thoughts. Indeed, it seems 
that tlie only way for the advocate o f response-dependence requites a supervenience thesis 
to effect the marriage with realism. Natural (or at least non-aesthetic) properties are, most o f 
us take it, independent o f our individual and cultural perspectives, and are the sort o f thing 
which legitimates talk about ‘getting something right’ in representing them in our discourse. 
Though there are strong scientific arguments against conceiving our color discourse as 
robustly representative, the intuition that it is nevertheless is quite strong. But this is because 
we do understand color to be dependent on a wide range o f physical factors— so some kind 
o f property dependence thesis seems intuitively rather plausible. On the other hand, the 
supervenience o f the aesthetic on the natural is closer to an article o f faith. In the color case 
we can conduct scientific experiments to discover the relations between physical properties 
and our experiences, but such relations in no way enter into our judgment-giving practices. 
Conversely, the features o f our reasons-giving practices constitute the only motivation for 
advancing a supervenience claim for aesthetic judgments. O f course, this claim is made 
more plausible by the fact that most o f us are good physicalkts— we wish to avoid positing 
occult properties wherever possible. And the worry is that we cannot have objectivity 
without some stable set o f mind-independent properties, so the supervenience o f aesthetic 
properties is asserted as an prioti thesis. But I have argued that this thesis is either trivial or
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false. If it is false, then, response-dependence loses its anchor in a mind-independent realm. 
Pettit’s CT fails and by modus toUens the joint assertion o f DT and OT fads to be true. If 
supervenience is trivial but true the results are no less disappointing for the realist. Recall 
that the trivialized supervenience thesis came to the claim that the aesthetic properties o f Just 
this artwork supervene on the non-aesthetic properties o f Just this artwork. N o claim is made, 
tlien, that graceful beauty indicates either the same property or the same subvenient base for 
the Modigliani portrait and the Weston photograph. Wedding this supervenience claim with 
RD(ôe) infects response-dependence with the same triviality. The response-dependent 
account, then, merely marks out, say, graceful beauty o f this unique sort as being picked out 
under opttmakty constraints that very Idœly will vary from artwork to artwork. Response- 
dependent aesthetic properties, then, would become strongly indexical. There would be no 
principled talk about the reasons we apply the same language to artworks by Weston, 
Kawabata, and Modigliani.
The need for a workable supervenience claim is all the more acute in light o f criticisms o f 
the alleged a priori nature o f the conceptual structure o f secondary qualities. The point o f 
asserting these concepts to have such a nature is to rule out the possibility o f global error—  
the truth o f judgments about secondary qualities cannot outrun ideal dispositions to judge. 
But the role played by the a priori claim in RD(oj) is considerably stronger. Paul Boghossian 
and David VeHeman argue that such formulations “misappropriate whatever aptioii truth 
there may be in the relevant biconditionals.”'*® Even if there are privileged conditions for 
judgments o f secondary qualities, that fact alone supports only the much weaker 
biconditional
X is to be described as F iff x  would look F to standard observers under standard
conditions.
“Even philosophers who regard colour experience as globally false, for example, wdl 
nevertheless want to say that some colour experiences are correct in the sense tliat they yield 
the colour attributions tliat are generally accepted for the purposes o f describing objects in a 
public discourse.”'** The point is that tlie stronger biconditional might seem true only 
because it is mistaken for the weaker one involving description. In any case there is good 
reason to think that that fact about our concepts and the way they figure in our thought and 
discourse license at best the weaker biconditional above about descriptions and not the
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stronger about “the way things really are”. The point is much, like the one about 
supervenience— inasmuch as supervenience claims are grounded in reflection on the nature 
o f our judgment-giving practices, supervenience should be understood as (as best) capturing 
a feature o f that practice. A further premise, that our discourse represents real properties, is 
required to move from the claim about practice to the claim about property dependence. So 
too with the move ftom describing color e2q)eriences to marking them as properties o f 
things. Though the weak conditional has some intuitive appeal as an a priori claim, there 
seems to be no good reason, without further argument, for taking the property claim as an 
priori truth. If Boghossian and Velleman’s criticism is not met ditectly, a further premise 
about property dependence— supervenience— is needed to move us from a claim about talk 
to a claim about properties.
The conclusion, then, is that without supervenience there is no independent justification for 
asserting response-dependence as a realist account o f aesthetic properties. I argued in 
Chapter 3 that supervenience is either incoherent or trivially true. If incoherent, then 
supervenience is not available to secure the ontic neutrality and epistemic servility needed to 
maintain the Cosmological Thesis. And if it is true but trivial. Modest Aesthetic Realism 
becomes an anemic theory with very little explanatory power. An adequate theory o f 
aesthetic judgment must be found elsewhere.
Chapter Summary
This chapter began with an argument for Robust Aesthetic Realism, the view that aesthetic 
properties, or at least a significant portion o f them, are strongly mind-independent. This 
view would require that even if there were no minds, there would be aesthetic properties. 
Even in the happiest circumstances, such counterfactual arguments challenge our powers o f 
careful intuition. The argument considered here, however, is fatally flawed in its attempt to 
arrive at the strong conclusion by examining the way in which our scientific theories are 
formed. Though it seems a default position to hold that what our theories represent is a 
mind-independent order, there is no argument firom acceptability criteria o f theories to 
properties o f things. A beautiful, elegant, or dramatic theory cannot be taken to show that
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the reality represented by the theory is in any way beautiful, elegant, or dramatic, 
independent o f any possible thoughts about it.
More typically, the sensible realist will not deny that our aesthetic concepts necessarily 
implicate our responses in their characterization. The Modest Aesthetic Realist maintains 
that aesthetic properties are independent o f a particular judge’s actual mental states, but not 
counterfactual ones, by strüdng an analogy with secondary qualities. These latter, tliough 
involving our responses, are represented by normatively constrained discourse, and are 
broadly taken to have some anchor in mind-independent reality. However, the tight analogy, 
taldng the epistemology o f aesthetic qualities to be the same as that for secondary qualities, 
fails to hold. The question remaining then is whetlier or not a formal characterization, a 
loose analogy, is still connects the two. But this question is a detour ftom tlie crucial issue 
for this enquiry— does such a characterization preserve a sufficiently realist mind- 
independence? The answer is no. Without a workable account o f supervenience, there is no 
reason to assert that though response-dependent, aesthetic properties still fall within the 
boundaries o f realism. Realism and response-dependence may yet be conjoined, though 
only if  the supervenience thesis is the trivial claim about individual works only. But such a 
realism lacks any sort o f explanatory power. The questions to be addressed are in vittue o f 
what are our aesthetic judgments objects objective, and how do we account for 
disagreements between optimal judges. Realism initially looks well-suited to provide an 
answer to the first question— our judgments are objective because there are mind- 
independent properties which our judgments represent. Ultimately, it is the failure o f 
realism to provide an adequate answer to the second question that undermines our faith in 
the answer to the first. In the end, the explanatory promise o f aesthetic realism goes 
unfulfilled.
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up to tihds stage, the argvitnents offered have been primarily negative ones. I have attempted 
to show that a number o f philosophical theories o f aesthetic judgment have been inadequate 
to the task o f providing an acceptable metaphysical and semantic account o f our art-related 
thought and talk. In the chapters remaining, I shall develop a tlieory that, I contend, best 
captures those practices. I suggested at the outset that the various theories on offer can be 
seen as responding to an apparent tension between two beliefs about artworks: first, that our 
judgments about them are objective in some substantial sense, and second, that the 
distinctive qualities o f artworks are bound up with our thoughts about them. Thus far, aU o f 
the theories examined have treated the two intuitions as in tension with one another, and 
have sought to revise one o f tiie intuitions. To reiterate my primary goal: I claim tliat there is 
logical space for a theory that accommodates both intuitions. Doing so will not involve 
denying one o f die intuitions as misguided, but rather revising some odier o f die attendant 
notions underlying a theoretical understanding o f our practice o f aesdietic judgment.
In this chapter, I wish to survey one historical position that occupies the same logical space 
as the view I develop. Various reconstructions o f Hume’s aesthetic theory have been 
conscripted to a number o f very different contemporary views, including Simon Blackburn’s 
quasi-realism, Alan Goldman’s supervenience-reliant antirealism, Eddy Zemach’s Robust 
Aesthetic Realism, and many others. I am not interested here in die question o f Hume’s true 
metaphysical allegiance. My interest in investigating Hume is to show how an antirealist 
theory can coherendy maintain bodi the claim that aesthetic properties are not ‘in the world’, 
independent o f our thoughts regarding them, together with the claim that our aesthetic 
judgments can be truth-apt and cognitive. In this respect, Hume anticipates the kind o f view 
I develop in Chapter 6.
How can a survey o f Hume’s aesthetic theory illuminate a project in analytic philosophy? I 
think it is best to be modest about the expected gains ftom such an examination. The right 
cautionary note is struck by Michael Ayers, in a review o f Jonathan Bennett’s books Learmng 
From Six Phi/osopbers: “Within every great philosopher a perceptive analytic philosopher is 
struggling to get out. Bennett is there to help.”* Ayers’ ironic comment serves as a reminder
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that tlie projects o f philosophers in previous centudes differed from contemporary analytic 
ones. So it would be a mbtake simply to assimilate the concepts and arguments o f Hume to 
this project. It would also be a mistake to assume that because Hume wrote in English that 
he uses liis words in the same way we do. Hume’s arguments are unclear and equivocal in 
many places. Applying a principle o f charity, it is possible to clarify and extrapolate from 
Hume’s express views, but the results o f this activity must be considered Humean, not 
Hume’s. Bearing these caveats in mind, I shall consider in detail what Hume says about 
aesthetic judgment, paying special attention to the arguments supporting the location o f 
Hume’s view in cognitivist antirealist territory. Doing so will also require examining 
reconstructions o f Hume^. My main interest, again, is to show what a historical view o f this 
variety looks like, to identify difficulties that a contemporary view must avoid, and to flag 
promising lines o f argument.
Any complete discussion o f the logical space in which I wish to situate aesthetic judgment 
must also include Kant. Kant holds that aesthetic judgments are subjective but universal.
He rejects the view that aesthetic judgments are strictly rational, as well as the view that they 
are merely expressions o f feelings. His theory clearly is to be placed under cognitivist 
antirealist ones in my taxonomy. However, I will not discuss Kant’s thought in any 
significant detail. Kant treats the subject o f aesthetic judgment directly in the ‘Analytic o f 
the Beautiful’ in his Critique of Judgment. Many commentators on Kant’s aesthetics have 
treated the Analytic as a free-standing essay on aesthetics. But this is a mistake. Kant’s 
development o f the theory o f aesthetic judgment needs to be situated in the larger context o f 
arguments running through the Critique of Judgment and the Critique of Pun Reason^  and so an 
adequate treatment o f his views would take us far from the immediate concerns o f this 
enquiry. Secondly, Kant is overwhelroingly concerned with judgments o f the form ‘This is 
beautiful [or ugly]’. While such judgments according to Kant have the same logical status I 
have urged for judgments o f particular qualities, the analysis o f judgments o f beauty is much 
less amenable to an approach that has principally involved the content and use o f aesthetic 
judgments. The word ‘beauty’ in Kant’s usage never signals an aesthetic disvaluing, and for 
that reason would function as a ‘thin’ aesthetic concept; our investigation has focused 
exclusively on ‘thick’ concepts and avoided discussion o f strictly evaluative ones. Finally, 
Kant’s obsession with system leads him to some very strange views about artworks. For
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Kant, what constitutes beauty is a certain formal quality that promotes the free play o f the 
imagination and the understanding. But because formal attributes exhaust tlie ground for 
judgments o f beauty, Kant claims o f paintings that “The colors which light up the sketch 
belong to the charm; they may indeed enliven the object for sensation, but they cannot make 
it wordiy o f contemplation and beautiful.”  ^ Any theory which explicitly holds that the color 
o f painting is aesthetically irrelevant rightly arouses suspicion. N o doubt tliere are re­
interpretations available to the dedicated neo-Kantian, but such a project is a significant 
undertaking, and ultimately unnecessary for the present purpose, wliich is to explicate a 
liistorical theory that can be categorized as cognitivist antirealist. So now I turn to Hume.
1. A esthetic Value and A esthetic Q ualities
Hume’s theoretical account o f die epistemology o f value is deeply dependent on his 
philosophical understanding o f mind. In a certain sense, that account is the one demanded 
if  liis claims about mind are to be sustained. Crudely, the mind as a “theatre o f perceptions” 
wdl lead to certain conclusions about how the phenomenology and epistemology o f value 
must be if it is to be importantly different from the Rationalist mind that can determine 
necessary truths by die exercise o f reason alone.
In an obvious sense, we stand at great advantage over Hume, who could not have 
anticipated and dius phdosophically accounted for developments in cognitive psychology 
and neurobiology that have radically redirected and accelerated work in the phdosophy o f 
mind. Rather than discard Hume’s thought on the basis o f an outmoded model o f mind, it 
may be useful instead to look to Hume as offering an explanatory model. Setting aside the 
shortcomings o f the foundation, die test o f adequacy o f his value epistemology wdl be how 
well it captures the experience o f value,
Hume has little to say about the nature o f aesthetic judgment in the Treatise or the Enquifj 
Concerning the Principles of Morals apart from what he says about ethics. The buHc o f his purely 
aesthetically directed thought is to be found in the essays “O f a Standard o f Taste,” “O f the 
Delicacy o f Taste and Passion,” and “The Sceptic.” But Hume quite clearly considers the
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epistemology o f beauty and good to be o f a kind with one another, and so the discussion will 
assume that what applies to ethics applies mutatis mutandis to aesthetics.
Antirealism is often understood to entail a commitment to noncognitivism. That is, if  
aesthetic value is not real in the strong sense which incorporates the metaphysical claim o f  
mind-independence, then aesthetic judgments must be mere expressions o f preference or 
attitude. This route, if followed, does indeed place the objectivity o f judgment at great 
tiieoretical distance. But the antirealist need not take that path; antirealism and cognitivism  
are not mutually exclusive. The importance o f Hume’s thought to the present discussion is 
that it develops a cognitivist view that denies much o f the realist position whde still 
coherently maintaining the normativity o f aesthetic discourse. To be sure, Hume’s 
discussion is couched in the language o f sentiment. This fact has led many, including Simon 
Blackburn, to construe Hume as a non-cognitivist- But this seems incorrect, as Hume takes 
pains to reject the view that “the difference.. .is very wide between judgment and 
sentiment”.'* The view that Hume is opposing is one that would limit judgments o f reason 
to making claims about independent facts, while confining expressions o f sentiment to be 
purely subjective. Even if a judgment may express a preference, the content o f that 
judgment need not be limited to that function—it may assert something about its object as 
well. The crux o f Hume’s position is that “there are certain qualities in objects, which are 
fitted by nature to produce [the feelings o f beauty and deformity].”  ^Those qualities are 
arguably not themselves aesthetic qualities. Hume’s use o f terms such as Beauty’ and 
‘deformity’ might seem consistent with theit interpretation as thin predicates in our sense, so 
the feeling expressed in a judgment may be purely evaluative. But close reading o f Hume’s 
essays shows this interpretation to be incorrect. The aesthetic theory that originates in Kant, 
is modified by Schopenhauer, and has contemporary adherents, treats ‘beautiful’ and its 
cognates as thin or purely evaluative predicates. If this were Hume’s usage, then the main 
target o f his arguments is a theory o f judgments o f aesthetic value, while ours is a theory o f 
judgment o f aesthetic qualities (and only indirectly one o f aesthetic value). This would pose 
difficulties for our investigation because aesthetic qualities (in our sense) would not be 
marked out even in a case-by-case manner from non-aesthetic ones, or they would be 
superfluous to Hume’s account. However, the correct interpretation o f Hume requires the 
abandonment o f the thin predicative use o f ‘beauty’, ‘ugliness’, and their cognates. In several
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places in “O f the Standard o f Taste”, Hume refers not to beauty sinrpliciterhvA. to the 
“beauties and blemishes” o f individual works. He also writes o f “species o f beauty”, 
“excellences” o f performance and particular characters o f “each excellency”, which possess a 
specific quality and degree. Specific examples o f such beauties or excellences include 
expressive qualities (e.g. tenderness, passion), formal qualities (e.g. conciseness, simplicity) 
moral qualities (e.g. the “want o f humanity and decency” in the ancient poets, the 
inflammatory religious views in some French tragedy), and so on.
In other words, Hume’s use o f Beauty’ and Beauties’ might seem consistent with our 
contemporary use o f ‘aesthetic qualities’, with one possible significant difference. Hume 
seems to hold that as “certain terms in every language.. .import blame, and others praise”,^  
specific aesthetic qualities will essentially be positively or negatively valenced. So it would 
not, on Hume’s view, be coherent to say that something is graceful while also pronouncing it 
bad. Current thinking on tliis point is o f two minds. Some, lilce Levinson, maintain that 
‘gaudy’ might not necessarily indicate either a disvaluing on the part o f the critic, or a 
demerit o f the work itself.^ Others follow Frank Sibley  ^in holding that the evaluative aspect 
is inextricable from the concept, and to value or see as meritorious a quality that might in 
otlier instances be called ‘gaudy’ calls for a different concept altogether, such as Bold’.
Hume unequivocally falls into the latter camp. So on his account, critical disputes will not 
talte the form o f an opposition o f valuing where the descriptive content is uncontroversial. 
To give an example, critics will not disagree by finding something gaudy but disagreeing in 
the valence o f their estimation o f it. They will eitlier disagree that the quality is gaudy or 
something else, disagree in their relative valuing o f it, or whether it is present or not. I will 
take up the significance o f this view later. For our immediate purposes, it must be noted 
that clearly Hume allows a role for thick aesthetic predicates, which would be out o f place in 
a non-cognitivist theory o f judgment. Unfortunately, Hume’s use o f Beauties’ is deeply 
ambiguous—in the next section we will see that Hume shifts between locating the beauty in 
the object and locating it in a complex object comprising the object and our responses to it.
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2. Objectivity and Sentiment
Much o f the contemporary debate centers on whether or not Hume is a non-cognitivist, a 
projectivist, an emotivist, a radical relativist, and so on. The imposition o f these labels on 
Hume is anachronistic o f course, as is talk o f Humean “aesthetics”. But just as there is some 
usefulness in talking about Hume’s “aesthetics”, so is there some use in at least assessing the 
validity o f the claims o f those who would appropriate Hume to their faction. In this section I 
examine Hume’s theory o f judgment to see how it accommodates the intuitions that 
launched this enquiry. I will also attempt to tease out Hume’s ideas, or at least Humean 
ideas, on the ontology o f aesthetic value and aesthetic qualities.
Hume develops a sense theory o f value, one that is importantly different from that o f
Francis Hutcheson, whose work Hume saw as a step in the right direction away from the
theological rationalists Malebranche, Montesquieu, and Wollaston. For Hume as for
Hutcheson, moral and aesthetic worth are determined in some way by sentiment. Hume
defines virtue “to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of
(^probation; and vice the contrary.”® He has the explicit goal o f repudiating Rationalist
theories o f moral epistemology, a fact that must be kept in mind especially when trying to
precipitate his philosophical claims from his rhetoric. “Taste” is the term he most often uses
to name that faculty or capacity for judging value, though it unclear whether he means this in
a strictly functional way or something specifically biological. He delineates the boundary
between reason and taste in the following passage, which is worth quoting at length, as it
su^ests most o f the concerns salient to attempts to categorize him:
[Reason] conveys the knowledge o f truth and falsehood: [Taste] gives the 
sentiment o f beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers 
objects as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: the 
other has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with 
the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new 
creation. Reason being cool and disengaged, is no motive for action, and 
directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us 
the means o f attaining happiness or avoiding misery: Taste, as it gives us 
pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a 
motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. 
From circumstances and relations, known or supposed, the former leads us 
to the discovery o f the concealed and the unknown; after all circumstances 
and relations are laid before us, the latter makes us feel from the whole a new 
sentiment o f blame or approbation.*®
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It is easy to see how this passage, and others like it, lends support to the reading o f Hume I 
wish to resist. Taste as a “productive faculty” is most obviously interpreted along antirealist 
lines. The apparent sharp dichotomy between taste and reason, where the latter involves 
truth and falsehood, su^ests that truth is not an applicable notion for the former— the 
central claim o f emotivism. And if truth is not an applicable notion, and value is stained 
witli the colors borrowed from within, then it is hard to see how radical relativism cannot be 
Hume’s position.
Hume holds benevolence to be a virtue because it engenders an immediate feeling o f 
approbation. However, he declines any temptations o f a reduction o f virtue to pleasure. In 
his essay “The Dignity or Meanness o f Human Nature,” Hume explicitly rejects the 
suggestion that felt pleasure is what makes a trait a virtue: “The virtuous sentiment or 
passion produces the pleasure, and does not arise firom it.”** The attendant pleasure is a 
necessary byproduct o f the manifestation o f the virtue, not what constitutes its being 
virtuous. Hume makes a careful distinction between that rejected possibility and a vktue as a 
pleasure-causing trait. The goodness is not derivative from the pleasure felt, but indicated by 
die fact that the trait necessarily engenders a certain pleasure when it is displayed. So here 
Hume is ki fact closer to Hutcheson than some interpretations would suggest. The 
difference between the two is that Hutcheson identifies the feeling as approbation (the 
counterpart to condemnation, both o f which are the fundamental moral ideas), where Hume 
takes it to be a probably more primitive pleasure. Hume also admits a wide range o f virtues, 
each with its own particular character but all producing tliis simple pleasure; Hutcheson 
holds that benevolence is the only vittue, other traits being various species o f it.
Hutcheson takes approbation and condemnation to be simple ideas, and because he accepts 
Locke’s doctrine that every simple idea can only be received by a corresponding sense, he is 
committed to asserting the existence o f a moral sense. The moral sense is an internal sense, 
as contrasted with perceptual senses, which provide information about physical objects. 
Hutcheson talœs die moral sense (as well as the internal senses o f beauty, honor, and 
sympadiy) to be some sort o f mental capacity to produce ideas (i,e. approbation and 
condemnation) in response to perceptual stimuli. Objects o f approbation and 
condemnation are, in essence, Lockean secondary qualities.
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Many readings o f Hume fall into error by claiming that he gives a secondary quality account 
o f value. “Euclid,” Hume writes, “has fully explained every quality o f the circle, but has not, 
in any proposition, said a word o f its beauty. The reason is evident. Beauty is not a quality 
of tlie circle—  It is only the effect, which that figure produces upon a mind, whose 
particular fabric or structure renders it susceptible o f such sentiments.”*^  This sort o f claim, 
which Hume often makes about beauty and virtue, lends itself to either the projectivist 
interpretation or to a secondary quality interpretation. He certainly wants to maintain that 
the quality appears or is thought “to lie in the object, not in the sentiment,” the explanation 
being that “the sentiment is not so turbulent and violent as to distinguish itself, in an evident 
manner, from the perception o f the object.”*^ The experiencing subject plays a crucial 
generative role— an object has no beauty or virtue in the absence o f a mind fitted to produce 
tlie corresponding sentiment
But that claim does not commit Hume to a Lockean secondary quality model. Hume 
criticizes the primary/secondary quality distinction in the section o f the Treatise entitled “O f 
the Modern Philosophy” (Book I, Part IV, Section IV). Secondary qualities are mind- 
dependent; they are “nothing but impressions in the mind, deriv’d from the operation o f 
external objects, and without any resemblance to the qualities o f the objects.”*'* Hume’s 
“modem philosopher” concludes ftom this that with “the removal o f sounds, colours, heat, 
cold, and other sensible qualities, from the rank o f continu’d independent existences, we are 
reduced merely to what are called primary qualities, as the only real ones, o f which we have 
any adequate notion. These primary qualities are extension and solidity, with their different 
mixtures and modifications.. ..”*^  The “modem philosopher” would allow principled talk 
only o f primary qualities. The suggestion that values (or aesthetic qualities) are analogous to 
secondary qualities in this sense would serve the subjectivist, the expressivist, and the error 
theorist equally well. The first two would get the premise that value is really entirely in the 
mind, and the last would gets the premise that there is no external object about which our 
evaluations are either true or false. However, Hume gives what he rightly sees as a “very 
decisive” objection to the Lockean distinction. He recommends (as the first step in a 
reductio) that instead o f explaining “the operations o f external objects” in terms o f the 
primary/secondary quality distinction, “we utterly annihilate aU these objects, and reduce
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ourselves to the opinions o f the m ost extravagant scepticism concerning them.” The 
implied absurd consequence is obvious— we cannot, for instance, “conceive extension, but 
as composed o f parts, endow’d with colour or solidity”*^ . Attempting to define solidity 
without recourse to other concepts o f bodies cannot be done. Hume concludes that the 
distinction cannot be maintained if  we are to have any ideas o f matter at all. “If colours, 
sounds, tastes, and smells be,merely perceptions, nothing we can conceive is possest o f a 
real, continu’d, and independent existence; not even motion, extension and solidity, which 
are the primary qualities chiefly insisted on.”*^ The distinction is neither useful nor 
sustainable. There is not a privileged class o f qualities such that only judgments implicating 
them alone are truth-apt. And while Hume does compare value to colors, tastes, and smells, 
he just as readüy compares judgments o f value to judgments o f shape and size. The latter 
comparison figures prominently in a lengtliy discussion about the rational correction o f the 
vagaries o f perception and the need to take the general view in evaluative practice.
Hume writes that taste “has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects 
with the colours, borrowed firom internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation.”*® 
This is compatible with the quasi-realist claim that value is entirely internal to the evaluating 
subject, but perceived as if  it were a property  ^o f the objects in view. What is notable about 
the quasi-realist thesis is that it implies that a certain understanding o f moral practice is false. 
An agent takes qualities o f internal sentiment to be qualities o f objects (where “objects” is 
used in a wide sense that includes physical things, acts, and persons), but this reassignment is 
mistalten. However, the core o f Hume’s theory is compatible with a response-dependence 
account—that whke our evaluative judgments o f objects rely on the sentiments to which 
they give rise, there is still some quality o f the objects that is suited to produce those 
sentiments in rninds. Tony Pitson suggests that Hume may be “operating with an 
oversimple dichotomy between the properties which belong to objects, and those which 
belong to perceptions. It is as though he has moved from the premise that beauty and vicme 
are not absolute properties o f the objects concerned, to the conclusion that tliey must 
therefore belong, as such properties, to perceptions themselves.”*® Such a move actually 
contradicts Hume’s position on the Lockean primary/secondary quality distinction. If 
Hume is committed to the idea that all we can experience, and so have knowledge of, are so- 
called secondary qualities, the dispositional character o f aesthetic qualities should not force a
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quasi-realist view on him. Elsewhere he acknowledges this very point. Noting the
comparison o f aesthetic and moral qualities with “sensible” qualities and the suggested threat
to descriptivism therein, he writes:
this doctrine, however, takes o ff no more from the reality o f the latter 
qualities, than from that o f the former; nor need it give any umbrage either to 
critics or moralists. Though colours were allowed to lie only in the eye, 
would dyers or painters ever be less regarded or esteemed? There is a 
sufficient uniformity in the senses and feelings o f mankind, to make all these 
qualities the objects o f art and reasoning, and to have the greatest influence 
on life and manners. And as it is certain, that the discovery o f the above- 
mentioned in natural philosophy, makes no alteration on action and conduct; 
why should a like discovery in moral philosophy make any alteration?^®
The last sentence signals Hume’s recognition o f the fact that if aesthetic or ethical qualities 
are irreal (meaning that judgments involving them are not descriptive), then not only e^ ca l 
and artistic practice but science too is based on a mistake. Even if  qualities depend on our 
minds, we can still talk about those qualities in principled ways that admit the notion o f a 
shareable standard o f truth. Here Hume explicitly reveals why he thinks this is possible: 
because o f the uniformity in the makeup o f humankind. Hume is very much a man o f his 
age in relying so optimistically on such a claim. It proves to be a key premise o f Hume’s 
theory that most likely cannot be sustained, and its failure will bring the theory it is built 
upon down with it. I shall return to this issue later.
Annette Baier makes much out o f Hume’s rejection o f the primary/secondary quality 
distinction and its implied correspondence with the objective/subjective distinction. Mackie 
famously assimilates the two, his argument from queemess amounting to the claim that value 
must be o f an ontological kind with “scientific” properties if  value judgments are to be 
objective. Baier rejects this picture, offering instead something she suggests might be called 
“internal realism”:
The human mind does have a great propensity to spread itself on external 
objects, but in moral evaluation the “internal sentiment” with which it gilds is 
spread on internal not external objects, since it is some human minds and
characters that are “gilded” with the impartial mind’s approbation o f them__
There need be no illusion o f something “out there” when in fact it is really 
“in here.” The character traits are “out there,” in the people in whom they 
are found. The “gUt,” or approval, is in the approvers, but their actual 
approbation makes a real difference to the approved persons—
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Baier sees Hume as a realist because, contra Mackie, the gilded objects o f sentiment are real, 
even if internal. The objects o f Humean moral evaluation are psychological entities: 
dispositions, habits, qualities o f character. This is so far not inhospitable to a wider 
projectivist theory. After aU, though the objects o f evaluation are real, the sentiment is still 
internal to the approver, and if the sentiment provides whatever ontological mooring there is 
for moral value, then the projectivist thesis remains standing. Baier tries to undermine this 
by claiming that the approval makes a real difference to the approved, but this does notliing 
to undergird any sort o f objectivity for moral judgments about distant acts or persons, and 
still less for aesthetic judgments o f inanimate objects.
David Wiggins appropriates Hume’s ideas to construct a different understanding o f the 
gilding phenomenon, one which seems to deliver a stronger conception o f objectivity. He 
writes that “there is something in the object that is made forÛ\& sentiment it would occasion 
in a qualified judge, and it brings down the sentiment upon the object as so qualified.”^ This 
is the relation between the judging subject and the object judged that Hume develops m ost 
consistently in “O f the Standard o f Taste.” The (crude) projectivist stance is a strongly 
relativist one, because if value is purely internal to the subject and fireely projected, then there 
is no constraint on where one might project certain values. Indeed, it is difficult to see how  
such a projectivism is more than a slicked-up subjectivism, Hume adduces a host of 
empirical counterexamples to the relativist: “The same Homer, who pleased at Athens and 
Rome two thousand years ago, is still admired at Paris and at London.”^^ This could be 
coincidental and thus consistent with tlie projectivist stance. Hume’s explanation o f this 
agreement contradicts that view: “.. .the beauties, which are naturally fitted to excite 
agreeable sentiments, immediately display their energy; and while the world endures, they 
maintain their authority over the minds o f m en,... Some particular forms or qualities, from 
tlie original structure o f tlie internal fabric, are calculated to please, and otliers to displease; 
and if  they fail o f theft effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or 
imperfection in the organ.” *^ Again, it is very unclear that the forms or qualities which Hume 
says are calculated to please or displease are aesthetic ones or non-aesthetic ones on which 
the aesthetic ones are somehow dependent. In a discussion o f the sources o f blameless 
disagreements among critics, Hume writes that
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One person is more pleased with the sublime; another with the tender; a 
third with raillery. One has a strong sensibility to blemishes, and is extremely 
studious o f correctness: Another has a more lively feeling o f beauties, and 
pardons twenty absurdities and defects for one elevated or pathetic stroke. 
The ear o f this man is entirely turned toward conciseness and energy; that 
man is delighted with a copious, rich, and harmonious expression.^ ^
What is unclear in this remark, and many others like it, is what Hume takes to be the
ontological status o f qualities such as energy, harmonious expression, and tenderness. In
places he seems to locate them in objects, from where they excite various sentiments o f
praise or its opposite. And yet, he suggests that disagreements can also take the form o f
disputes over the very qualities experienced in artworks:
There are certain terms in every language, which import blame, and others 
praise; and aU men, who use the same tongue, must agree in their application 
o f them. Every voice is united in applauding elegance, propriety, simplicity, 
spirit in writing; and in blaming fustian, affectation, coldness, and a false 
brilliancy: But when critics come to particulars, this seeming unanimity 
vanishes; and it is found, that they had affixed a very different meaning to 
their expressions.^ ^
Here, the thought is not that critics will value the same qualities differently, but rather, their 
disagreement concerns just in virtue o f what other features the predication o f ‘elegance’ or 
‘simplicity’ is warranted. Hume’s solution to such disagreements is, in the majority o f cases, 
to determine just who among the critics are “true judges”, that is, who possesses “delicacy o f 
taste, whether we employ these terms in the literal or the metaphorical sense.”^^
The key to giving a consistent reconstruction o f Hume’s view o f the ontology o f aesthetic 
qualities is again to be found in the characterization o f the taste being a productive faculty, 
which gilds and stains and “raises in a manner a new creation”. Hume insists that aesthetic 
judgments are cognitive— they are truth-apt and represent states o f affairs. Hume resists two 
opposed views o f what those represented states are: either pure states o f subjective 
preference or subject-independent reports o f worldly facts. If aesthetic qualities are those 
creations ‘raised up’ by way o f sentiment’s staining o f natural objects, then aesthetic qualities 
are complex entities which as it were straddle the mind/world distinction. They are neither 
separable from empirical properties nor from our feelings about them. Instances o f 
aesthetic or moral qualities, then, comprise some feature or complex o f features o f the 
experienced object along with the sentiment to which they give rise within the experiencing
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subject. The relationship between the objective features and the sentiment produced 
crucially involves the constitution o f the subject— an embodied mind—but the subjective 
element does not exhaust the ontology o f value. The sentiment is fitted to some feature or 
features o f the object, and so divergence in judgment is explicable in terms o f the capacity o f 
subjects to experience the relevant objective features.
Now  the crude projectivist/subjectivist reading o f Hume begins to unravel. Hume cannot 
be taken as claiming simply that, since taste gilds external phenomena with internal 
sentiment, we can ignore the value-neutral experiential realm and look only to the 
qualifications o f judges in determining the difference between good and bad evaluative 
judgments. Since there are some features o f the experiential realm that are “naturally fitted 
to excite” internal sentiments, it is possible to talk meaningfully about those features in 
conjunction with their corresponding sentiments. The fact that there are features 
corresponding to particular sentiments negates the possibility that subjects might freely 
project their sentiments where they please. Certain sentiments are appropriately paired with 
certain experiential qualities, and the notion o f appropriateness means that truth may be 
predicated o f value judgments. The implicit agreement-demanding nature o f value 
judgments, then, is neither an expression o f emotion nor a mere prescriptive speech act. 
Rather, it is a substantive claim that tlie object in question is fitted to a certain reciprocal 
sentiment; that is, it stands as an appropriate member o f the extension o f a certain value 
concept. That value concept has a particular affective component. In an instance o f “wilful 
murder,” ®^ the vice is not to be located within the features o f the event alone. The moral 
qualities o f that act are partly to be found within one’s “own breast”, where one “find[s] a 
sentiment o f disapprobation.” Properly speaking, the concept wiljtd murder is an evaluative 
one and so demands the affect corresponding to the sentiment o f disapprobation. To 
experience value is just to have the right sentiment. The experience o f value on Hume’s 
account is different from other experiential Idnds. The mind, rather than “merely surveying 
its objects” in the case o f value-neutral (e.g. “scientific”) phenomena, “feels a sentiment o f 
delight or uneasiness, approbation or blame, consequent to that survey; and tliis sentiment 
determines it to affix the epithet beatitiful, deformed) desirable or odious. Now, it is evident, that 
this sentiment must depend upon the particular fabric or structure o f the mind, which 
enables such particular forms to operate in such a particular manner, and produces a
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sympathy or conformity between the mind and its objects.” ®^ Thus value is neither what the 
subjectivist claims it to be— a purely internal mental state— nor is it what the realist claims it 
to be— an external property o f a mind-independent sort. But again there is an ambiguity in 
Hume’s view, one that might still give support to the quasi-realist reading. He says that 
“when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that 
from the constitution o f your nature you have a feeling or sentiment o f blame from the 
contemplation o f it” ®^, which appears to be close to the quasi-realist’s view. Like the quasi­
realist, Hume clearly holds that our practice is not deeply misconceived: “Nothing.. .can 
concern us more, than our own sentiments o f pleasure and uneasiness; and if  these be 
favourable to virtue and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation o f 
our conduct and behaviour.” *^ For Hume, value qualities are not independent o f judges in 
any strong sense. It is unclear whether Hume is properly taken as locating value entirely 
within one’s sentiment or in a complex that comprises the sentiment and the object o f 
judgment (as the gilding metaphor would suggest). Reading him in the former way makes 
his tlieory o f judgment quasi-realist, and not cognitivist antirealist. The question remains 
then, whether we can continue plausibly to interpret Hume in the latter sense without too 
much strain. If we are able to do so, there may yet be some light shed on a way in which the 
two starting intuitions might be accommodated.
3. Judgment and the Problem of Circularity
Hume notes that conventional wisdom maintains that de gmtibus non est disputandum, but were 
someone “to assert an equality o f genius and elegance between Ogüby and Milton”®^ her 
sentiment would be pronounced “absurd and ridiculous.” Truth and falsity, or at least 
appropriateness and inappropriateness, are properly predicated o f evaluative judgments. 
Wliat grounds correctness o f judgment is in some sense a social construction, a convergence 
o f evaluative judgment based on the attributes o f individuals who correct the defects o f their 
idiosyncratic experiential capacities by the employment o f reason. But Hume controversially 
also claims that certain non-aesthetic qualities have a specific fit to the fabric o f human 
minds, such that properly constituted judges will reliably attribute the same aesthetic qualities 
to the same cases. This uniformity o f human nature underpins Hume’s arguments for the 
objectivity o f aesthetic judgment. Such a thesis does not sit well with our modem
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conceptions o f humanity. I will conclude tliis section with a discussion o f Hume’s reliance 
on a uniform view o f human nature. But Hume is not so crude as to believe that aU persons 
have equal claim on the aesthetic facts o f the matter. Only certain “true judges” can claim to 
issue aesthetic judgments that are reliably taken to be true. It is their joint verdict which in 
some sense is the true standard o f taste.
Lilce Hutcheson, Hume holds that value relates to a sentiment that is common to all humans, 
though individuals possess it in varying degrees.^ ® That sentiment is normative in terms both 
o f the objects it picks out and the verdicts rendered o f those objects. Because sentiment is 
possessed by all humans, moral and aesthetic judgements bind those capable o f making 
them. “... (T]he sentiments, which arise firom humanity, are not only the same in all human 
creatures, and produce the same approbation or censure; but they also comprehend all 
human creatures; nor is tliere any one whose conduct or character is not, by theit means, an 
object to every one o f censure or approbation.” '^* For Hume, the possession o f the 
sentiment for value places humanity within a common perspective, internal to which 
evaluative judgments have objective validity.
Hume is notoriously triclcy on the standard o f correctness o f judgment he offers, as the texts 
surveyed so far appear to sustain two independent models. One is an external standard, 
developed most thoroughly in “O f the Standard o f Taste,” and centering on the epistemic 
credentials o f “true” judges o f value. It is external in attempting to say something about the 
realm o f value from outside that realm. Tliis approach has the aims o f 1) supplying a 
criterion o f truth and falsehood (or appropriateness and inappropriateness) for evaluative 
judgments by means o f 2) specifying the epistemic qualifications o f those best suited to 
attribute value reliably, and thereby 3) providing an epistemic indicator o f value for the less 
qualified judges, by means o f which they might refine theit own sensibilities. The second 
standard is internal in that the verdicts o f true judges play a more strongly constitutive role in 
the attribution o f aesthetic qualities. This view is hinted at in “O f the Standard o f Taste”, 
but receives greater development elsewhere in Hume’s writing. Both internalist and 
externalist interpretations are antirealist, though realists have tried to reform the externalist 
Humean view to support their own positions. I examine the externalist position in this 
section, and take up the internalist reading in the following one.
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There are at least two significant problems with the externalist standard, the second much 
more radical in its implications. The first is an apparent circularity in Hume’s specification. 
If the joint verdicts o f true judges constitute the standard o f taste, then their judgments will 
indicate which objects exhibit certain qualities, for example, elegance. But true judges will not 
be the only persons offering verdicts; others wkl suggest that the object in fact does not 
exhibit elegance but awkward restraint. Whose judgment is better? How do we identify so- 
called “true” aesthetic judges? True judges are those whose critical verdicts are correct at 
least most o f the time. This answer appears on first examination to lead us into a 
justificatory circle from which we have no escape. True aesthetic judges are identified by 
tlieir critical track records— that is, how often their judgments about artworks are correct. 
How are we, the less-than true, to know if  any particular judgments are correct? Why, by 
asking a true judge, o f course. And now the circle is formed.
This circular account is held by a number o f commentators to keep Hume’s aesthetic theory 
from getting o ff the ground at all.®^  In “O f the Standard o f Taste,” Hume takes up the 
project o f finding a rule “by which the various sentiments o f men may be reconciled; at least, 
a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another.”®^ Hume takes it 
as a datum that people often disagree on their valuing o f artworks; one finds powerful what 
another finds bombastic, and so on. His task is to spell out the characteristics that true 
aesthetic judges must possess in order to make correct judgments o f value, with the idea that 
we might resolve at least many o f such disputes by examining their epistemic credentials.
Five characteristics are essential to the rare character that bestows the status o f true judge: 
“Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, 
and cleared o f all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint 
verdict o f such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard o f taste and beauty.”^^ All 
this seems reasonable enough. But the worry o f circularity arises again when we consider 
how we are to determine if the necessary attributes are present in a candidate judge. For it 
seems that the only way to do that is by looking at the critical pronouncements she makes. 
Given that we are undecided about whether a melodic passage is monotonous or unified—  
indeed this is what we want the critic to clarify for us— we seem to be unable to assess the 
correctness o f the critic’s claim.
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It is worth backing up here and pointing out that Hume sees his account as resolving a
conflict in our thinldng about aesthetic judgments. On the one hand, Hume writes that
There is a species o f philosophy, which ,. .represents the impossibility o f ever 
attaining any standard o f taste. The difference, it is said, is very wide 
between judgment and sentiment. All sentiment is right; because sentiment 
has a reference to nothing beyond itself.... pSQo sentiment represents what 
is really in the object.... Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists 
merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a 
different beauty.^ ®
This view is a widespread common sense idea, which has gained philosophical support from
non-cogniflvist theorists. It is important to note that Hume identifies this view but does not
identify with it. Altliough he will maintain that sentiment is centrally involved in the aesthetic
experience, he need not, and indeed does not, come out on the side o f the non-cognitivist.
Hume wants to give equal consideration to the thought that we do have a real sense that
some works are aesthetically better than others. In his words:
Whoever would assert an equality o f genius and elegance between OGILBY 
and MILTON, or BUNYAN and ADDISON, would be thought to defend 
no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hih to be as high as 
TENERIFFE, or a pond as extensive as the ocean. Though there may be 
found persons, who give the preference to the former authors; no one pays 
attention to such a taste; and we pronounce without scruple the sentiment o f 
these pretended critics to be absurd and ridiculous. The principle o f the 
naturd equality o f tastes is then totally forgot, and while we admit it on some 
occasions, where the objects seem near an equality, it appears an extravagant 
paradox, or rather a palpable absurdity, where objects so disproportioned are 
compared together.^ ^
Hume wants to extract what is right in the former claim, without accepting die stronger 
claim, which is certainly not entailed by it. What is right, on Hume’s account, is that there is 
a subjective contribution to the location o f value. But that claim does not warrant the 
conclusion that all value is merely a projection o f subjective preference, as Hume 
underscores by way o f the reductio against the natural equality o f taste.
Hume’s project in “O f the Standard o f Taste” is, given the premise that the spectator makes 
some constitutive contribution to the aesthetic features o f some object, together with the 
premise that there is something correct behind at least coarse-grained qualitative rankings o f 
artworks, to develop criteria for identifying correct aesthetic judgments. Appropriately,
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those critem refer back to the subjective contribution to value. Hume’s is not the only 
theory attracting the charge o f citcularity. It seems that any ideal judgment or ideal observer 
theory wül as well. The problem is in fact more pressing in these instances because o f the 
constitutive role assigned to the judgments. Ideal observer theories take the following form: 
Jin object 0  has aesthetic quality iff ideal observer would so Judge it  
Note the constitutive role expressed by the “only i f ’ dieection o f the biconditional. An ideal 
observer theory will also give the attributes o f the observer which, since they typically 
include characteristics like “omniscience with respect to non-evaluative facts”, would 
exclude all o f us from ideal observer candidacy. Since this kind o f ideal observer theory 
posits a truly ideal observer, it seems we have nothing against which we can compare our 
judgments. For more realistic ideal observer theories, which do not make use o f 
supernatural abilities and would more appropriately be called optimal observer theories, we 
come up against the same problem o f citcularity that critics attribute to Hume’s model. 
Looking at the “i f ’ direction o f the biconditional makes it clear that our individual 
judgments may only be coincidentally correct. They might, however, be more than 
coincidentally correct. We may give the same answer as the optimal judge, and presumably 
our answer will not be a simple pronouncement, but one for which we can provide some 
measure o f justificatory accompaniment. But now, in order to settle the question o f which 
justifications are the appropriate ones, we seem to be in need o f some way o f identifying an 
optimal judge. The circularity o f the account seems to emerge again. So this is a problem 
posed not just to Hume, but also to any proponent o f an ideal (or optimal) judgment theory.
Peter Kivy proposes a way to break the appearance o f circularity in Hume’s model.^ ® His 
tliought is that we should be able to characterize at least some o f Hume’s five critical 
essentials in terms that do not refer to artworl^. If it is possible to give, if  not a non- 
evaluative definition at least a non-art critical definition, Hume will have escaped the 
circularity. Kivy argues that, while some o f the criteria seem inescapably drcular, not all o f 
them are. In particular, the attributes o f a practiced sensibility and experience with 
comparisons are defined circularly. Hume writes that “nothing tends further to encrease and 
improve this talent [the faculty o f taste] than practice in a particular art, and the frequent 
survey or contemplation o f a particular species o f b e a u t y . T h e  notion o f a practiced 
sensibility, then, seems to play an especially important part in the identification o f true
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judges. Obviously practice with anything wiU not do, since the motivation for this feature is 
that it yields famUiarity with the aesthetically relevant features o f specific genres, and tlius 
increases the reliability o f judgments o f works in those genres. Experience in maldng 
comparisons refers directly to artworks in the same way. What a candidate judge must have 
some experience in making comparisons between are “the several species and degrees o f 
excellence,” as well as with “estimating their proportion to one another.”'^  ^ And while this 
seems an eminently sensible stipulation for Hume’s true judge, on a straightforward reading 
it seems to fail to neutralize the worry about circularity. For these two attributes, we are 
unable to determine whether anyone has them unless we possess prior knowledge o f the 
relative quality o f some collection o f artworks. But o f course, this is what we were hoping to 
learn from the critic. However, the practiced sensibility criterion might be given a better 
showing by considering the role o f the canon in forming and reflecting a standard o f taste. 
Given a body o f artworks, each o f which is are widely agreed to be o f high aesthetic merit, 
we can establish as a non-evaluative fact whether an individual has or has not spent a 
significant amount o f time in the study and contemplation o f these works. We can also 
establish whether her judgments are in agreement with the judgments marldng these works 
as canonical. This account, if we remain faithful to Hume, might well break the citcle, but 
would deliver a rather conservative judgeship. We also need to be told when we are to 
accept a judgment that diverges from the canonical, and Hume’s account only provides the 
two sources o f blameless disagreement. Surely great art critics, ones we might well consider 
to be true judges, wÜl offer divergent judgments which nevertheless impugn their true judge 
status. Hume’s test might allow for some divergence from the canon without threatening 
that status, but the range o f divergence allowed seems too narrow. In particular, it gives little 
help in deciding whose judgments to accept for very novel artworks. Perhaps, then, Hume 
can escape the charge o f circularity, but only by delivering a theory that is unsatisfactory in 
other ways. Moreover, the appearance o f artworks, even artworks antecedently judged as 
canonical, in the analysans o f the concept o f true judge is unsatisfactory to some. Can the 
concept be unpacked without reference to artworks?
Kivy believes that the other three attributes— strong sense, delicacy o f taste, and freedom 
from prejudice— can be cashed out in ways that make no reference to artworks. Delicacy o f 
taste could be attributed to someone “not on the basis o f his critical judgments but rather on
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the basis o f his general emotional reactions to non-aesthetic situations.”^^ This claim is 
premised on the thought that delicacy o f taste can be tightly linked to delicacy o f passion. 
This move is one that Hume would block, however. The effect o f delicacy o f passion is to 
make one “extremely sensible to all the accidents o f life— The deHcacy o f taste resembles 
the other species in that it “produces the same sensibility to beauty and deformity o f every 
kind, as [the other] does to prosperity and adversity, obligations and injuries.”*^^  Both have 
the effect o f enlarging “the sphere both o f our happiness and misery, and make us sensible 
to pains as well as pleasures, which escape the rest o f mankind.”^ But it is explicit in his 
account that he not only thinks the two capacities are independent o f one another, but also 
thinks that we should assign very different values to them. “[N]otwithstanding this 
resemblance, delicacy o f taste is as much to be desired and cultivated as delicacy o f passion is 
to be lamented, and to be remedied, if possible.”^^ By “remedied” he surely means cured in 
the very same sense that to cure a disease is to rid oneself o f it entirely. That he takes the 
two to stand relatively independent o f each other is also clear: “Whatever connexion there 
may be originally between these two species o f delicacy, I am persuaded, that nothing is so 
proper to cure us o f this delicacy o f passion, as the cultivation o f that higher and more 
refined taste, which enables us to judge o f the characters o f men, o f compositions o f genius, 
and o f the productions o f the nobler arts.”'^® So not only are they independent capacities, but 
we can cultivate one to exorcise the other. Kivy’s suggestion about the escape from 
circularity on this point will not do the trick. N oel Carroll points out that furthermore, 
delicacy o f taste also makes reference to normatively ranked artworks or aesthetic qualities. 
“A critic proves to have delicacy o f taste by noting fine shadings in tones, colors, and 
meanings, in the course o f commenting on acknowledged accomplishments o f a given 
artfbrm.”^^ The circularity remains.
Carroll and Kivy both agree that strong sense and freedom from prejudice can be spelled out 
in non-circular, non-art referring terms. This may be true. But notice that even if it is 
granted that such a definition is available, the worry about circularity is not eliminated. By 
saving some but not aU o f the attributes, we are left with an incomplete set o f criteria for 
true aesthetic judges, unless o f course we wish to drop the required set to the two that admit 
of the right characterization. The conjunction o f strong sense and freedom from prejudice
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alone is not sufficient for true judge status. This means tliat the circularity charge must be 
answered in a different way if Hume’s model is to be defended.
Such an answer, one that does not begin by cashing out the true judge’s attributes in some 
unacceptable way, is available, says Hume. What is deshed, ultimately, is an answer to 
questions o f the form, “Is artwork X  better or worse than artwork Y?”, where such answers 
wiU include some reasons in support o f the answer. The reason we look for such an answer 
in the first place is, presumably, because we cannot offer an answer o f our own with 
anything approaching certainty. If we grant what seems to be reasonable, that Hume’s 
criteria for judges are partly citcular, then there is the appearance that we have no way to 
validate one critic’s judgments over another. But this appearance is built on the assumption 
that we are only entitled to accept statements as true (or justified) when we can fully inspect 
their epistemic credentials. The worry that we cannot do tliis for at least some aesthetic 
judgments is a reasonable worry to entertain. The way to dispel the worry is by taldng the 
route o f understanding tlie claims o f candidate judges as testimony. What this means is that 
the specific statements o f judges, say, “Beethoven’s 5^ ' Symphony is far superior aesthetically 
to his 8* Symphony,” can represent a transmission o f real Imowledge to the rest o f us 
provided tliat the judge knows this fact. And our belief based on the testimony o f the judge 
is justified provided tliat we have justification for taldng the judge to be credible.
This account may arouse some suspicion. It is also worth noting, as Carroll points out, that
Hume himself seems to disallow the possibility o f testimonial knowledge, or o f any non-
inferential Imowledge. Hume should not hold diis position. The suspicion o f testimonial
Imowledge is warranted only to the extent that one is unaware o f the ftequency with which
we take testimony as reports o f truths. On a day to day basis, we operate with an implicit
presumption tliat the people we speak with are sincere and knowledgeable, unless we have
good reason to believe odierwise. We might call this the Presumption o f Testimonial Trutli.
This presumption is not just a heuristic for our going about the world, a sort o f economy o f
epistemological effort. It is also fundamental in our acquisition o f language and concepts,
and essential in linguistic communication. As Michael Dummett writes.
Thoughts are o f their essence communicable; whether or not more than the 
most rudimentary thoughts are possible for those witliout language, our 
thought is shaped by the means for communicating it that we start to acquire
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in infancy. This means, not only that the experiential basis o f knowledge 
must consist in our experience, not in my experience, but that experience can 
be characterized only as the experience o f a common world inhabited by 
others as well as me; it is intrinsic to our grasp o f language that we take 
testimony as contributing to our stock o f information.^ ^
So we do have a real epistemic dependence on testimony that goes beyond our claims to 
knowledge o f specialist disciplines (e.g. higher mathematics, medicine, auto mechanics) to 
the root o f our ability to think and communicate. We can disqualify statements merely on 
the grounds o f theit being testimonial only on pain o f losing these abilities.
That is not at all to say that we have no grounds for disqualifying at least some testimony.
To return to Hume’s model: We have just discovered a young up-and-coming artist, Damien 
Wurst. His artistic genre. Conceptual Vivisectionism, is also new and unfamiliar. We want 
to know if his work has aesthetic merit. We have our own ideas, o f course, but we realize 
that we may not know all the tenets o f the Conceptual Vivisectionist manifesto, or 
understand what the genre is reacting against. Or perhaps the delicacy o f our passion is too 
great to prevent some kind o f prejudicial aesthetic verdict against the artistic display o f 
animal parts (or o f animals in parts). What do we do? We seek out the purported experts in 
tliis area.
The claim about the epistemological legitimacy o f testimony as knowledge is not meant as a 
suggestion that once we find those experts writing about Wurst’s work, we can go no further 
in justifying our beliefs about it. Hume’s model in “O f the Standard o f Taste” attempts to 
give us the resources to do just that. Unfortunately for his account, Hume’s proposal for 
identifying the judges whose testimony we should accept as true will not ultimately work. 
The proposal works on the following sort o f model: Let us say that there are a number o f 
critics writing about Wurst. One o f them is something o f a kingmaker in the artworld, but 
when we learn that he owns a gallery where Wurst’s pieces are shown (and, he likely hopes, 
sold), we might be justified in disqualifying his judgements on the grounds that they are not 
free from prejudice. Another critic absolutely despises Wurst, but he is really a music critic 
who occasionally dabbles in criticism o f other artforms. We can write him o ff for fading to 
have practice and ability to draw comparisons in the relevant genre. Two more critical 
opinions are avadable, and they are in utter disagreement. As far as we can tell, they both
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pass the tests that the other two fail. It also seems that both appreciate the subtleties o f the 
way in which Wurst’s Conceptual Vivisectionist artistic statement is made. And from tliek 
respective writings, tliey both appear to have “the same excellence o f faculties which 
contributes to the improvement o f reason, the same clearness o f conception, the same 
exactness o f distinction, tlie same vivacity o f apprehension”^^ which constitute strong sense. 
Whose judgement is right?
Hume proposes a Idnd o f test we could in principle apply to tlie candidate true judges. His 
test is formed from an analogy with a story from Don Quixote. He recounts Sancho Panza’s 
story o f two Idnsmen, who shared witii him a hereditary ability to judge the qualities o f wine. 
His kinsmen were asked for theit opinion o f a wine o f good vintage. One affirms the good 
qualities o f tlie wine whke noting a taste o f leather, which compromises the quality, while the 
other approves o f the wine while at the same time saying that the easily detectable taste o f 
iron stands in the way o f his fuller approval. The kinsmen were laughed at for their verdicts, 
but once the cask was drained, a leather thong tied to a key was discovered. Hume thinks 
that because diere is a “great resemblance between mental and bodily taste”^^ an analogous 
model for the determination o f true judges can be provided. Hume thinks that the chemical 
metaphor can be extended to aestlietic qualities. He says that “as these qualities may be 
found in a small degree, or may be mixed and confounded with each other, it often happens, 
that the taste is not affected with such minute qualities, or is not able to distinguish all the 
particular flavours, amidst the disorder, in which they are presented.”^^ What delicacy o f 
taste is, then, is specifically tlie capacity to perceive even the smallest amount o f a quality, 
and to identify all the qualities presented. So when we have two judges who seem to have an 
equal claim on true judgeship, but disagree in their particular judgments, Hume suggests the 
following test: Apply the “general rules o f beauty” to form a set o f test cases^ '^ . The judges 
will be presented first with obvious and simple instances o f the quality in dispute. Assuming 
they agree in their pronouncements, successive cases will be presented wliich also have die 
disputed quality, only to a lesser degree or in combination with other qualities that might 
confiise the judgment. So essentially determining the true judge is a matter o f determining 
who can make the finest discriminations o f the quality in question. The first candidate who 
cannot judge a quality determined to be present by die examiners’ initial application o f the 
general rules o f beauty faks the test, and is not a true judge.
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Seeing the test described in detail clearly shows the inadequacy o f the external version o f 
Hume’s theory. Hume is conflating two notions o f delicacy o f taste. One is as Hume 
describes, the ability to discern small quantities o f various qualities. But since taste is 
explicitly dejSned as that faculty which gilds and stains natural properties with sentiment, 
delicacy o f taste is the capacity for the right sort o f hedonic response. Hume denies the 
possibility that die two can come apart. In his discussion o f blameless disagreements, the 
source o f diose disagreements is identified with a difference in sentiment, owing either to 
one’s individual make-up or to one’s cultural membership. Even these differences do not 
allow for a dispute to take the form o f two judgments agreeing on the present quality but 
pronouncing it to have opposite valence. Hume writes that the “young man, whose passions 
are warm, will be more sensibly touched with amorous and tender images, than a man more 
advanced in years, who takes pleasure in wise, philosophical reflections concerning the 
conduct o f life and the moderation o f the passions. At twenty, Ovid may be the favourite 
author; Horace at forty; and perhaps Tacitus at fifty.”^^ What is not in dispute between the 
old man and the young man is whether Ovid’s images are tender and amorous, or whether 
these are anything but positively-valenced qualities. The dispute only concerned the relative 
ranking such qualities are to be given relative to others, such as the soberness and 
reflectiveness to be found in Tacitus. Hume’s reason for thinking this is again the idea that 
certain words essentially import blame or praise. But this is not true o f all aesthetic 
predications. It is very often indeterminate what evaluation is being made on the basis o f a 
critical comment. Formal qualities like balance, stability, or odd ungrammaticality can appear 
in contexts where they have positive, negative, neutral, or indeterminate evaluative 
connotations.
A further problem with this model is that, as I have argued against the subjectivist, it is not 
necessary to be in any particular affective state at all to determine the salient aesthetic 
qualities o f an artwork. Hume’s theory is not (consistently, anyway) non-cognitive, because 
judgments are not merely reports o f preference, but it suffers from the fact that it holds the 
subjective contribution to aesthetic experienced^ to be purely affective. But there is no direct 
connection between affect and aesthetic qualities. It seems, contra Sibley, that in certain 
contexts we might take gaudiness to be a positive feature, while still holding it to be
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gaudiness and not boldness we are experiencing. Similarly, it does not seem implausible 
that—perhaps in a lesser writer than Ovid— tenderness could easily be taken as negative or 
neutral. Indeed, in some cases it is conceivable that the natural features which might cause a 
certain predictable human response might well, together with that response, have an 
aesthetic quality valenced in opposition to that response. Our Conceptual Vivisectionist 
might have the express artistic aim o f exciting our natural re^mlsion at seeing a dissected 
animal, with a view toward maldng some political or social statement. In that case, it would 
be a positive aesthetic feature o f such a work that it produced negative responses in its 
viewers.
It also seems strange to think that aesthetic qualities are essentially the sort o f thing that can 
come in quantifiable degrees. O f course it is true that we do make comparisons o f the form 
‘this is more graceful than that’. In contrast, recall the critical characterization o f Rothko’s 
paintings as a Idnd o f oracle which, through a Idnd o f visual riddle, veils intangible senses 
behind a “simple” firont. This quality, though perhaps not neatly expressible in a predicate, 
seems a properly aesthetic one. And yet, it is not at all something that could come in 
degrees. Either the painting is appropriately characterized as oracular or not. Here too is an 
example o f an aestlietic quality tliat does not connect in any obvious way with human 
evaluative responses.
Hume’s overarching philosophical project is a naturalist one. He believes that only a 
uniformity o f human nature wÜl allow a defensible claim o f objectivity to be made for 
aesthetic discourse. He believes further that such a uniformity in fact obtains. Hume allows 
for only two sources o f critical disagreements which are blameless and cannot be debated: 
“the different humours o f particular men; the otlier, the particular manners and opinions of 
our age and country.” The reason Hume takes these particular sources to be exceptions is 
that they both arise from some deeply-rooted aspect o f our individual sensibilities. O f the 
first sort o f difference o f opinion, the one exemplified by the young man’s preference for 
Ovid and die old man’s preference for Tacitus, Hume writes that “it is almost impossible not 
to feel a predilection for that which suits our particular turn and disposition. Such 
preferences are innocent and unavoidable, and can never reasonably be the object o f dispute, 
because there is no standard, by which they can be decided.”^^ About the second sort o f
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difference, Hume has in mind instances the English or the French displeasure at comedies 
such as uAndna ofTetence, or Clitia of Machiavel., which in their reservedness is more suited to 
ancient Greek and modern Italian audiences. Hume says that “a man o f learning and 
reflection can make allowances for these peculiarities o f manners; but a common audience 
can never divest themselves so far o f their usual ideas and sentiments, as to relish pictures 
which in no wise resemble them.” ®^ But having said this, it is evident that Hume should 
acknowledge a stronger role for cultural facts in aesthetic judgments/^ Hume’s remarks here 
lend themselves to the view that it is not just natural features o f artworks but also their 
cultural associations and contexts which affect the sentiments excited in audiences. And his 
account seems oblivious to another realm o f facts which are absolutely essential to the 
formation o f aesthetic judgments, namely, art theoretical facts. Hume seems to take for 
granted that the genres o f comedy and tragedy are weE-deflned with respect to one another, 
and does not address the fact that many critical disputes turn on questions o f the proper 
genre identification o f specific works. Surely facts like these underpin aesthetic judgments, 
and agam are just not the sort o f thing which one can detect in a way analogous to what the 
oenophile does. Hume’s account is fatally inadequate on this point when we consider 
contemporary conceptual works, such as the Conceptual Vivisectionist ones. A certain body 
o f art theory is needed in order to get so much as an entry into a proper appreciation and 
understanding o f such works. And so the relation o f natural properties which are somehow 
fitted to excite the sentiment in certain uniform ways is an incomplete picture. Cultural and 
art-theoretical facts also play a determinmg role in our aesthetic judgments. Hume’s 
externalist conception o f the aesthetic experience as involving only feelings, and o f aesthetic 
qualities as incorporating only those feelings and natural properties, fails to capture our art- 
related practices. This interpretation does occupy the cognitivkt antirealist space but is 
unsatisfactory on otlier grounds and must be abandoned.
4. The Euthyphro Question, Again
It is not clear whether the joint verdict o f true judges is meant to be indicative or constitutive 
o f evaluative merit or demerit. The dominant interpretation is the indicative reading. In 
Anthony Savile’s words, “O f the Standard o f Taste” is “a contribution to the theory o f 
aestlietic evidence, not to the theory o f aesthetic nature.”*"® But his model o f value as
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comprising objective features and subjective sentiment lends itself to a constitutive 
interpretation. That issue plays a central role in the internal standard model o f judgment, 
which stems from dieoretical commitments Hume maires primarily in the Treatise and the 
inquiries. Those commitments, if  maintained, force Hume to abandon a merely indicative 
role o f the verdicts o f true judges, and show that the constitutive reading o f the external 
standard collapses into tlie internal standard. This internal, constitutive interpretation seems 
to be a cousin o f the response-dependence account o f aesthetic qualities.
The internal model develops from two premises. The first is that “though it be certain, that 
beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in objects, but belong 
entirely to die sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed, that there are certain 
qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.”*^ Thb is 
the claim diat value is both mind- and world-involving. The second premise is diat 
evaluative judgments admit o f truth values— that is, what distinguishes a good judge from a 
bad one is a matter o f rightness o f judgment. Both o f these figure in die external 
interpretation surveyed in the previous section. One o f the conspicuous failings o f that view  
was that cultural and social practices were accorded an improbably weak role in the 
constitution o f aesthetic qualities. With that sort o f caveat in mind, David W i^ins spins out 
an evolutionary story o f sorts to show how evaluative critical practice develops around 
socially shared <quality, response> pairs^ ,^ such as < funny, amusement>. Where we end up 
when a culture has reached a sufficient degree o f sopliistication is this: certain <quality, 
response> pairs become established, and widiout undermining die general stability o f die 
associated concept, botii the quality and the response become contestable, each in terms o f 
the other. That is, attributions o f an evaluative predicate (or more generally, responses) are 
open to critical challenge about whether the requisite quality for the attribution is present. 
Additionally, disputants are licensed to question what responses are rightiy linked with 
particular qualities. Within a given value, our critical practice can maintain disputes and 
revisions o f the mind’s role in terms o f the world, and o f the world’s role in terms o f the 
mind, without losing a conceptual grip on the value itself.
Having put this internal standard in place, W i^ins argues that the typical critical claim will 
take the form of, for example, “genuinely funny things are things that amuse because they are
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funnff, another apparent circularity is removed by understanding that “this Because’ 
introduces an explanation that both explains and justifies.”*^^  The idea is that although the 
specification o f judges and true judgments is circular, there is space for disputing what things 
fall under the extension o f the quality concept, and who is a suitable judge o f the quality. 
Disputes about the correctness about either member o f the evaluative <quaHty, response> 
pait are resolved in just the very way that Hume says is the only real way available: to 
produce the best arguments that their invention su^ests to them. A central requirement for 
evaluative concept possession is, again, standing in the right affective relationship to the object 
o f the concept, one o f Hume’s central themes which is echoed by Wiggbis. “If a property 
and an attitude are made for one another,” he writes, “it wkl be strange for one to use the 
term for the property if  he is in no way party to the attitude and there is simply no chance o f 
his finding that the item in question has the property. But if  he is no stranger to the attitude 
and the attitude is favorable, it wkl be the m ost natural thing ki the world if he regards it as a 
matter o f keen argument what it takes for a thing to count as having the property that the 
attitude is paired with.”^^
The central claim o f “O f a Standard o f Taste” is that aesthetic character is as the joint 
verdict o f true judges pronounces it to be. With the Euthyphro contrast in mind, we might 
ask: what is the sense o f that ‘is’? It indicates either a constitutive or indicative claim. The 
dominant interpretation is for the latter, which places true judges in the role o f discovering 
value and making true attributions o f value concepts. The direction o f judgment is from 
world to mind— some experiential feature warrants a particular attribution. But value is both 
subject- and object-involving, and so an indicative reading must mean that judges are 
discovering things not just about objects (the usual understanding in talk about “rules o f 
art”) but also about subjects, specifically, which qualities pair up with which sentiments. But 
the only plausible way in which judges could make these true attributions (of concepts to 
subjects) is if some version o f psychological nafivism were true. That is, since judges cannot 
inspect the conceptual contents o f other minds, their attributions can be correct only if  the 
concepts in question— those “discovered”— were innate. But this is something that Hume’s 
empieicism famously denies. That leaves the constitutive interpretation as the only 
alternative. Taken as a whole, Hume’s more general theoretical claims might be seen to 
force the constitutive, internalist standard o f value. The anchoring o f response is partly
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taken up by some (if not Hume’s exactly) epistemic specification o f the constructors o f 
value. That can take place nowhere else but within the social sphere. Artists can introduce 
new value concepts or revise existing ones by showing that novel ways o f seeing are properly 
valued, or that strident and dissonant can fall under the extension o f beautiful. Similarly, moral 
exemplars can literally make industty a positive moral value concept, or dissolve the virtue of 
piety.
Wiggins’ account is in many ways a commendable revision o f Hume’s theory. It addresses 
the objection raised for the internal reading that the role o f social and cultural practice is 
underrepresented. However, it suffers from some o f the same problems as the internal view. 
Most crucially, it attaches qualities to affective responses. As I have argued before, the 
affective does not exhaust tlie full range o f responses to aesthetic qualities. And W i^ins’ 
theory introduces a new problem: if what we respond to are aestlietic qualities, then although 
our responses are tied to them in deep ways, the account seems to have ontologicaEy 
divested tliose qualities o f the affective responses. On the internal reading, what aesthetic 
qualities are most plausibly interpreted as are complexes o f natural properties and affective 
responses. The beauty o f a circle is not a property o f the circle independent o f our 
responses. Taste raises up a new creation— staining the circle with our affective responses, 
and it is that created quality which we label beauty. Beauty incorporates botli the mind- 
independent properties o f the circle and our affective responses. Wiggins’ account, on the 
other hand, has the judge responding to an aesthetic quality that is perhaps keyed to a certain 
reliable affective response, but does not essentially incorporate that response. His choice o f 
examples shows this— a paradigm < quality, response> pair is <funny, amusement>. While 
he says that things are funny because they amuse, the way in which the quality is named 
seems to give it a status as funny independent o f the response. In any case Wiggins’ 
reconstruction o f Hume is faithful in its ambiguous treatment o f aesthetic qualities. 
Sometimes they are treated as funny, odious, tender, and so on, apart from our responses, 
and so primitive, and other times they are complexes arising fiom  the interaction o f our 
responses to independent qualities. W i^ins, Eke Hume, seems to slide between quasi­
realism and cognitivist antirealism. If cognitivist antireahsm is to be distinct from quasi­
realism, it needs to tek a story about why judgments are not merely expressions o f attitudes. 
Telling this story will involve us in properly locating aestlietic qualities.
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5. Chapter Summary
In investigating the several theories o f aesthetic judgment, the focal points have been the 
intuitions o f the objectivity o f aesthetic discourse and the mind-dependence o f aesthetic 
qualities. Hume’s theory is the first among those surveyed which does not seek to explain 
away one o f the intuitions as somehow mistaken; rather, it accommodates both o f them. 
Ultimately, Hume proves to be deeply ambiguous on the status o f aesthetic qualities, and on 
the function o f aesthetic judgment. One way o f reading Hume is largely consistent with a 
cognitivist antirealist view. Hume’s, “beauties”, “excellences” seem to correspond to what 
we call aesthetic qualities, and are complex entities incorporating features o f objects or 
events together with certain warranted affective responses. Aesthetic qualities are mind- 
dependent, and so the canonical aesthetic judgment, ‘That artwork is F”, where F is an 
aesthetic predicate is not a statement about the artwork detached fcom any human 
responses. Judgments are objective because it is possible, says Hume, to determine a class o f 
true judges whose judgments are privileged as true, but whose membership in that class is 
answerable to independent criteria. Because Hume’s view reconciles the two intuitions, it is 
properly classed as a cognitivist antirealist theory.
Unfortunately, this interpretation o f Hume is not consistent with much o f Hume’s writing.
In contrast to the reading just summarized, Hume often seems to say either that the beauties 
are things we respond to, and so are somehow characterizable independent o f those 
responses, or that our judgments are simply expressions o f approbation or condemnation. 
The first view is realism, inadequately worked out, and the second is quasi-realism. So in the 
end, Hume’s theory does not turn out to be one that can be comfortably appropriated by 
any o f the contemporary factions. There may yet be some Humean insights that would aid 
in constructing an adequate theory o f aesthetic judgment.
A view that accommodates the two starting intuitions is appealing for the simple reason that 
it allows us to retain much o f our ways o f thinking about aesthetics, and avoids attributing 
error to our practices. But plainly Hume’s account is not a sustainable view, even with tiiese 
merits. Hume optimistically attributes a uniformity to human nature o f a much stronger sort
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than we could sustain alongside our greater Imowledge o f the diversity o f human life. Hume 
also gi,ves little to no role to cultural factors, including, quite significantly, art critical 
practices. Many o f the aesthetic judgments we make and encounter in our everyday lives 
would be nonsensical without an attendant art theoretical enterprise. Clearly, tlien, a 
plausible cognitivist antkealism—judged not only on its accommodating the two intuitions 
but on capturing the range o f art-related practices— cannot rely on an implausible view o f 
human nature, and cannot ignore cultural factors. In the next chapter, I attempt to develop 
just such a theory.
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In the previous chapter I argued that wliile Hume’s antirealist theory o f judgment avoids 
many o f the problems o f realist theories, it rests on unsustainable premises. I shall now 
develop an antirealist theory which is in some respects inspired by Hume’s, but which does 
not rely on Hume’s assumptions about human nature, the fittingness o f certain qualities, or a 
dichotomy between reason and desire.
Rather, my approach wkl be to give a wide berth to issues in the philosophy o f mind and to 
focus instead on extant art theoretical and critical practices. Any theory o f aesthetic 
judgment must have something to say about the status o f the discourse associated with these 
practices. The discourse comprises data to be given a general interpretation by the theory 
chosen. These data are given very different treatment by the various theories surveyed. In 
many cases, there is an underlying general view about what must be the case for an assertoric 
sentence to be apt for truth. That view is that assertoric sentences are representational o f 
particular states o f affairs, and such sentences are true just when the representations 
correspond in some sense with those states. For realists, those states are independent o f our 
myriad thoughts^ representing them, and so the discourse enjoys a strong objectivity. 
Subjectivists, error theorists, and reductionists also hold to this picture o f truth-aptness, but 
for differing reasons find the substantive predicates o f aesthetic discourse suspicious and in 
need o f treatment. The subjectivist in essence holds that aesthetic judgments serve only to 
express individual preferences, and so are either true only o f their utterers or are merely 
disguised exclamations with no truth value. Error theorists claim that no entities exist which 
could be the referents o f aesthetic predicates (or alternatively, that there are no facts which 
are the referents o f aesthetic judgments), and thus aestlietic sentences are all false,^  And the 
reductionist can attribute trutli only because the suspicious predicates can be reduced to 
empirical, natural, or in any case non-suspect language. The quasi-realist is a special case.
Her argument proceeds firom a certain ontological picture o f the world which does not 
include aesthetic qualities, and a desire to preserve an entitlement to attribute truth and 
falsity to aesthetic judgments. These features, together with the same representational 
conception o f assertions, lead the quasi-realist to the view that aesthetic judgments are 
expressions o f attitudes toward particular objective facts. This view necessitates a revision o f
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the syntax o f judgments, with the damaging consequences already discussed. I wish to begjn 
by denying the claim that truth-apt assertions are representational in anything more than a 
platitudinous sense. Like the realist, however, I maintain that we should begin firom a 
position that presumes that participants in the discourse are at least mostly correct in what 
they take themselves to be doing as participants. Typically, aesthetic judgments are 
assertions, which means they are implicitly asserted as being true. Also implicit in judgment 
making is a readiness to give supporting reasons upon demand. And while some judgments 
are defended with reasons explicitly offered as reasons only for the judge, the paradigm 
judgment is supported with reasons offered as convincing evidence for the judgment. Any 
adequate theory should accommodate these implicit tenets o f aesthetic discourse, and move 
away from them only in light o f sound philosophical arguments. It is a vktue o f the theory I 
develop that these tenets are preserved to a greater degree than on any other antirealist view 
surveyed here, and at a lower theoretical cost than on any o f the realist ones.
My theory is cognitivist aesthetic antireaHsm. I shall also refer to it as cognitivist antirealism, 
with the understanding that its application is only the aesthetic domain. In previous chapters 
I have given arguments which served to undermine the case for realism and other varieties 
o f antirealism. O f course, a theory cannot be accepted merely because it sidesteps the same 
problems. So here I argue for the following claims:
1. Well-formed aesthetic judgments are truth-apt, but in virtue o f minimalist truth- 
theoretic criteria.
2. Many aesthetic sentences, including judgments and theoretical/critical claims, 
show artworks to be mind-involving entities. This is manifest most clearly in art- 
theoretical and metaphorical aesthetic discourse.
3. Correctly understanding some aesthetic sentences as metaphorical provides the 
key to solving the problem o f expression.
4. The mind-dependence o f aesthetic qualities delivers a satisfactory explanation o f 
irresolvable critical disagreements.
Defending an antirealist theory involves dealing with a range o f issues that are much more 
easily addressed by the reaUst. These include:
A. In virtue o f what do judgments converge, if  aesthetic qualities are mind- 
dependent?
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B. What constraints serve to demarcate true judgments from false ones?
C. Is antireaHsm revisionaiy o f any pre-theoretical intuitions about art?
I shall address questions A. and B. in the course o f motivating claims 1 through 4. I wiU 
reserve a discussion o f C. for the concluding chapter.
1. Truth in A esthetics
In his Enqui/j Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume writes that taste “has a productive 
faculty, and gilding or staining aU natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal 
sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation.”  ^Hume’s metaphor nicely captures the 
metaphysical alternative I suggest is superior to the realist view. The image o f gilding and 
staining has lent itself to a number o f different interpretations, most notably Blackburn’s 
quasi-reaUsm. I think it is largely an exegetical question whether Hume is more properly 
assimilated to a non-cognitivist view Hlce Blackburn’s or a cognitivist one as offered here. In 
fact I think a convincing argument can be made that Hume has been misread when he has 
been talren to be a non-cognitivist in our sense. But the exegetical issues are not important 
here. To recast Hume’s picture in our terms, I claim that truth in aesthetics is constituted by 
our best judgments. In other words, those best judgments play an extension-deterrnining 
role for the substantive predicates o f aesthetic discourse.
The most fundamental differences between my view and Blackburn’s quasi-realism are that I 
talce aesthetic discourse to be a genuinely assertoric one, and one that does not involve 
supervenience in any way. To say that D e Kooning’s female figure paintings from the 1960’s 
(Figure 20) “became firank instruments o f sex— lustfuUy enticing, yielding yet demanding, 
and crueUy anxiety provoldng— [and] although they aUude to Baroque and Rococo nudes, 
they are distorted by obsessions with the body and its functions, by desperate passions, 
psychological quandaries, and ferocious appetites tliat the old masters usuaUy preferred not 
to depict”'^ is to claim that in some sense these things are the case. Certainly the sentence 
appears to assert. Under non-cognitivism, such a sentence is talcen in fact to be an 
expression o f preference masquerading as an at least partiaUy descriptive sentence. But there 
is no good argument to the effect that the pragmatic function o f expressing preference 
exhausts the use o f such sentences, or even is a necessary feature o f them.^  The burden on
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the non-cognitivist is to give some independent argument why this is so, and it must not rely 
on the claim that aesthetic language is non-descriptive or otherwise defective, because this 
move would be question-begging. I contend that no such satisfactory argument is available, 
and in the absence o f one we should be content that the appearance o f assertion is a reliable 
one.
If claims like the one about D e Kooning’s paintings are assertions, they present their 
asserted contents as being true. If truth in aesthetics is constituted by our best judgments, 
how are we entitled to talk o f truth? According to Crispin Wrighl; a discourse that “deals in 
assertoric contents”  ^allows for a genuine truth predicate. What determines whether a 
discourse is properly assertoric? It should be so reckoned “just in case its ingredient 
sentences are subject to certain minimal constraints o f syntax— embeddability within 
negation, the conditional, contexts o f propositional attitude, etc., and discipline: their use 
must be governed by agreed standards o f warrant.”’ Aesthetic sentences do figure in all 
these syntactical roles. And the sentences, which I have called judgments or critical claims, 
are indeed disciplined by standards, some internal and some external to the discourse.
Those standards or constraining norms are multifarious and shifting. One critical claim 
might well be accepted when it conforms to some subset o f the norms, while another might 
be accepted for very different reasons. The norms themselves are introduced, modified, and 
withdrawn as our art-related practices develop. And the content and application o f those 
norms will always be a contested realm for art theorists, critics, and artists. But it is clear, 
from even a casual survey o f art critical writing, that aesthetic discourse is disciplined by 
norms. A paradigmatic approach to unseating some critic’s claim is by demonstrating that 
her judgment does not somehow respect one or more o f the discourse’s norms. What are 
some o f those disciplining norms? Aesthetic judgments should be responsible to a work’s 
presentational features. They should conform to admissible myths and critical canons (e.g. a 
judgment about Tiepolo’s Immaculate Conception (Figure 21) had better cohere with the 
relevant Catholic theology, and a judgment about Bacon’s Three Studies for Figures at the Base of 
a Crucifixion (Figure 22) needs to be interpreted under much the same constraints). 
Judgments should also take account o f practices o f medium and genre (e.g. an acceptable 
judgment o f Bacon’s painting should reflect that the format o f the triptych is, historically, a
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format for Christian altarpieces, and should interpret the painting in light o f its titling as 
‘studies’). Aesthetic judgments should provide a coherent way in which the artistic design o f 
the work can be construed (e.g., taldng note o f the way a musical theme is recapitulated, or 
is re presented in a different voicing). They often aim at providing an interpretation that 
maximizes significance or interest. Judgments also reflect successfully realized intentions o f 
the artist. Questions about intention very clearly show that the overriding concern in issuing 
judgments is with standards o f warrant, and not some stronger conception o f truth. Many 
art critical judgments are rejected on the grounds that an artist never intended, or could have 
intended, something which stimulates critical analysis. So for example, aesthetic judgments 
deriving from reading “dark Satanic mills” in Blalce’s poem ‘"Jerusalem” as a damnation o f 
the Industrial Revolution have been widely rejected on the basis o f anachronism. But 
reflecting the artist’s intentions is not necessary for acceptance o f a judgment. Leni 
Riefenstahl’s films have been judged frighteningly beautiful by critics who rightly see .the 
glorifying representation o f Nazi strength as evil and terrifying—this in spite o f the &ct that 
the filmmalter herself surely did not beHeve that the Nazi vision o f humanity was evil. 
Similarly, an influential interpretation o f Andy Warhol’s silkscreens (Figure 23) holds that 
they are itonic takes on the banality o f celebrity, showing the way in which, by repeating an 
image o f a face over and over again, an individual becomes a hollow icon. This view, 
though, flies in the face o f the fact that Warhol courted celebrity and probably should not be 
seen as doing anything Hlœ cultural commentary. His attitude toward the commercial was 
more celebratory than cynical.
The standards o f warrant for aesthetics also include considerations about the competence o f 
critics. Some o f these factors include the same characteristics that identified optimal critics: 
familiarity with the work and its art-historical context, properly functioning senses, a 
reasonable lack o f prejudice, an adequate repertoite o f critical concepts, and so on. Though 
again these considerations amount neither to necessary nor sufficient conditions on an 
admissible judgment, they are at least criterial, and a lack o f a good number o f them in a 
critic would certainly make her judgments Ikcely to be rejected as false. Hume’s account 
holds truth in aesthetics to be the joint verdict o f true judges. Our theory differs formally in 
that while criteria for judges are in effect, they do not suffice to mark out the collection of 
true judgments. It might well be the case that a judgment could be accepted as true even
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when the issuing judge failed to meet Humean criteria, so meeting judge-related criteria is 
not strictly necessary for a judgment to be true. On the other hand, it is not logically 
sufficient either—merely demonstrating one’s optimality as a critic does not guarantee the 
truth o f one’s judgments, as they might fail to satisfy other, work-related, norms.
On our view, truth as correspondence to the facts is merely platitudinous. It is not 
informative to say that a judgment is false just when it does not correspond to the facts, 
especially when a great many facts are, on this account, constituted or given by the practice 
itself. So there are no convenient and metaphysically substantial slogans that capture the 
distinction between true and false judgments. True judgments are those that fall into the 
category o f best opinions or best judgments. False ones are outside this category, though I 
remain agnostic on the issue o f bivalence. Bivalence might well best capture our practices, in 
which case Best judgments’ and ‘non-best judgments’ are mutually exclusive and joindy 
exhaustive categories. Or there may properly be more than two truth values for aesthetic 
discourse. It might be thought that what it is for a judgment to be false is for it to contradict 
one or more norms o f the discourse. But this is not quite right. It is more accurate to see 
false judgments as not conforming to, or not satisfying, a sufficient number® o f norms. I 
return to these and related concerns in Section 4. It is enough to say here that aesthetic 
judgments at least admit o f the values True and False,
The norms o f aesthetic discourse are public ones, shared by a community o f persons who 
value art and its attendant practices. Reasons given in support o f a judgment are reasons for 
acceptance in light o f one or more norms. It is this reason-giving practice, and the shared 
nature o f the norms it reflects, that renders the discourse an objective one. This sort o f 
objectivity is, admittedly, a less robust one than that enjoyed by, say, discourse about 
medium-sized material objects. But our judgments about art can be principled, 
communicable and shared, and taken seriously as the kind o f assertions they appear to be, 
even without a very strong conception o f objectivity.
I have not sought to defend minimalism as a theory o f truth in general. My claim is 
conditional: if minimalism is a viable theory o f truth anywhere, ihen it certainly has 
applicability to aesthetic discourse. In Chapter 4 1 argued against stronger conceptions o f
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truth on independent grounds. But I rejected the claim diat diere is no truth in aesthetics. 
Aesthetic judgments do exhibit the right grammatical form and are governed by a collection 
o f norms which provide standards o f warrant, even if individual norms make different 
contributions to the sanctioning o f different judgments.
2. A esthetic D iscourse and M ind D ependence
It seems then that aesthetic discourse has the features needed to legitimate a role for truth. 
How is the account on offer an antirealist one? I claimed that best judgments play an 
extension-deterrnining role for the substantive predicates o f aesthetic discourse. That is, the 
distinctive predicates o f aestiietics are mind-dependent entities. I believe that this is manifest 
in at least two Itinds o f aesthetic language: art critical tlieory and the great share o f art 
criticism that is metaphorical.^ The mind-dependent status o f aesthetic qualities is explicit 
under cognitivist antkealism. Recall that modest aestlietic realism talres aesthetic qualities to 
be response-dependent. This alone is inadequate as a realist view, because it does not show 
how aesthetic judgments represent some mind-independent properties, or alternatively, how 
aesthetic judgments are true in virtue o f some mind-independent facts. The modest realist 
anchors aesthetic judgments and qualities by means o f supervenience, which claims a logical 
relation between the mind-dependent aesthetic domain and a distinct mind-independent one. 
I have argued that this account is not viable. Cognitivist antirealism differs importantly from 
modest aesthetic realism in that it holds that a great many aesthetic qualities are the result o f  
apt imaginings. These imaginings are apt in part because they are responses to presentational 
features o f artworks, but thek results— aesthetic qualities— are not “out tliere” simply to be 
detected by the right sort o f subject.
Art theoretical language makes the experiencing subject’s contribution explicit. Consider the 
function o f scientific theories. They have the function o f describkig, explaining, and 
predicting phenomena. Art theories seem to do nothing o f the sort. Jacques Rivière, 
endorsing the Cubist movement, writes in 1912 that painters must eliminate light and 
perspective from representation. “.. .the painter, instead o f showing the object as he sees it— 
that is to say, dismembered into bright and dark surfaces—wkl construct it as it is—that is to 
say, in the form o f a geometrical volume, set free from lighting effects.” ®^ Clearly Rivière is
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not giving a philosophical account o f the essential elements o f painting, but rather arguing 
that Cubism is the rewarding program in painting to pursue— and consequently, is telling us 
how we are to construe a cubist canvas as we stand before it. Much art theory plays just such 
an instructive role. It supplies guidance in identifying the features salient to a proper 
experience or understanding o f the artwork, tools for interpretation o f the presentational 
features, and very often these tools and indications supply a framework for evaluation o f the 
kinds o f artwork covered by the theory. In short, art theory might be seen as a set o f 
instructions for engaging with an artwork in a certain way. What does engaging with an 
artwork mean? In the case o f cubist paintings (Figure 24), en^ging with an artwork means 
seeing the marks on the canvas not merely as a jumble o f lines, and not as arcane runes, and 
not as a perspectival depiction or a collage or a puzzle. Rather, the theory tells us that we are 
to interpret the paint on the canvas as representing something like an exploded view o f a 
collection o f objects, thek various surfaces laid out flat on the picture plane. Engaging in 
this way means trying to see the painting in accordance with the theory, which is not 
something we accomplish merely by standing passively in front o f the canvas and taking in 
visual impressions. We see the painting in the prescribed way via an act o f imagination. An 
accepted theory supplies instructions for doing certain things with artworks in our 
imagination, and the language which we use to capture the resulting experience is, then, a 
description o f an artwork subject to a particular imaginative construal.
Take a second example: Malevich’s writing on suprematist painting. A sample firom his From
Cubism and Futurism to Sttprematism: The New Realism in Fainting is instructive.
Only with the disappearance o f a habit o f mind which sees in pictures little 
corners o f nature, madonnas and shameless Venuses, shall we witness a work of 
pure, living art. [...] The new realism in painting is very much a realism in 
painting, for it contains no realism o f mountains, sky, water... Until now  
there was a realism o f objects, but not o f painted units o f colour, which are 
constructed so that they depend neither on form, nor on colour, nor on thek 
position relative to each other.^ ^
The passage is highly polemical, and is incoherent in the way that it describes the saliencies 
o f suprematist paintings as units o f color constructed so that they do not depend on color or 
form. But it is possible to extract a coherent spirit o f the passage, which tells us just what it 
is we are to dkect our attention to when we stand in front o f a painting such as his 
Suprematist Painting, 1916 (Figure 25). Malevich’s remarks answer a crucial question that is
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lilcely to arise in a newcomer to such artworks: why did the artist offer this for our re^ d ?  
The question is most obviously manifest in encounters with novel artworks, and with 
abstract works, but a minimally sophisticated spectator reasonably entertains the question m 
the presence o f representational works o f art, realistic fiction or theater, and in general 
artworks that seem to resemble more closely the “everyday” world. It is a question about 
significance—what is the significance (to me, to my life or my experience right now, to the 
artist) o f a painted array o f squares and rectangles, or o f a painted arrangement o f pastries, or 
o f a 17*^ ' century Dutch still life (Figure 26)? For the suprematist composition, Malevich’s 
theoretical remarks supply that answer, or at least the beginnings o f one. We are told how to 
construe the artwork. In this case, we must avoid any temptation to see the canvas as 
representing a cluster o f buildings fi:om above, an assortment o f blocks moving through 
space, or indeed anything at all. If we are to take Malevich seriously, we might even try to 
see the painted forms as transcending their defining shapes and colors. Doing so involves 
an act o f imagination, one constrained by the theory. And it is only under that constrained 
imagining that the salient aesthetic features are manifest. The theory, then, gives a 
description o f the object imaginatively construed; it partially) describes the artwork qua 
artwork.
Many critical remarks work similarly. O f course, the line between art criticism and art theory 
is extremely vague, as is the lines between those two sub-discourses and that o f art history. 
Nothing here depends on being able to malce such a distinction— I use them as labels for 
varieties o f aesthetic discourse which can typically, or paradigmaticaky, be categorized as 
playing primarily evaluative, explanatory, or narrative roles. But many examples are 
multifunctional. Just as theory typically has the function o f telling us what the proper 
construal o f a certain collection o f artworks is, so can critical remarks tell us how to construe 
individual ones, or works by a particular artist, and so on. Nothing about the painted surface 
o f a DeKooning canvas signals the rich content ascribed to it in the remark above. If we 
missed the title as we passed the painting in a gallery, we could very well miss the fact that 
the painting depicts a woman. But even if we allow more time and attention to the canvas, 
our attention might focus largely on the formal qualities o f the painting, and our expressed 
judgments would reflect that. The critical/historical statement that the painting depicts a 
woman who is an instrument o f sex— “lustfully enticing, yielding yet demanding, and cruelly
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anxiety provoking”^^ provides both content and constraints to our experience o f the 
painting. Approaching the canvas with this critical judgment in mind will result in a very 
different experience o f the painting. Rather than marking out the frenetic and quasi-organic 
twisting o f color, the critic’s remark licenses a host o f narrative and psychological 
attributions— that we are seeing a woman—maybe an archetypal woman rather than a 
particular woman— about which something deeply ambivalent is expressed. These qualities 
are not supervenient on the presentational features o f the canvas, or on those plus facts 
about its hbtoiy and that o f the artist. To borrow Hume’s metaphor again, they are “raised 
up” by the imagination in possession o f those facts, in confrontation with the painting, and 
guided by the critic’s judgment. Judgments must be guided by ‘what is there’, what I have 
referred to as tlie presentational features o f the artwork, but these features typically 
underdetermine the aesthetic qualities as represented in aesthetic discourse. The artwork as 
described in critical language is a much richer object than the physical object or event with 
which we engage.
3. Metaphor and Expression
That much art theory and criticism plays an extension-determining role in aesthetic discourse 
is perhaps more obvious than in the special case o f metaphorical language. Irving Sandler 
writes this o f Jackson Pollock’s “drip” paintings (Figure 27): “Lashed together into an 
interlace, his lines constitute an expansive web o f forces, suspended in front o f the passive 
canvas plane. These overlapping skeins produce a sense o f space projecting out from the 
picture surface.. ..Because o f the energy with which Pollock’s field is charged, augmented by 
its large scale, it seems to expand, thereby suggesting extensions beyond the picture limits 
into infinity and evoking in the viewer a sensation o f boundlessness— and this even though 
the webs rarely touch the edges.”" Sandler’s remarks certainly have the form o f assertions '^*, 
and it seems that we can go to Pollock’s paintings ourselves and make a determination about 
the truth o f his claims. But note that much o f what he says cannot be true in any literal 
sense about Pollock’s canvases. The dripped and splattered lines aren’t forces, and nothing 
is suspended in front o f the picture plane. Characterizing the canvas as “passive” seems 
redundant— of course the canvas can’t in any way be active— until we see the point o f such 
talk as effecting a difference between the lines and splashes o f paint and the surface to which
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they ate applied. Sandler is offering a rich metaphor that implicates our imagination and 
structures our experience o f the painting.
One way to deny the metaphorical quality o f these sentences is to posit special art-critical 
senses for them. This is a suspicious move, though, especially in light o f tire fact that our 
experience o f die painting relies on the literal senses o f the concepts which have been 
assimilated to Sandler’s comments. His comments about Pollock’s drip paintings are 
characteristic o f a vast range o f critical, theoretical, and “pre-critical” talk about art generally. 
We routinely predicate movement, feeling and mass to music, rhythm and muscularity to 
literary prose, and energy and agency to paintings. These predications, though sometimes 
opaque, are often comprehensible by others and in general do not immediately draw 
attention as somehow defective. And yet, we know that without special art-critical senses 
for these attributions, they could not literally be true o f their objects. It is certainly true that 
some metaphors, in certain contexts, might well be true literally. After all, it is literally true 
that no man is an island. I do not want to suggest that the test for a sentence’s non- 
literalness is its falsity or meaninglessness when taken literally. But I do maintain that the 
falsity or meaninglessness o f a sentence when talcen literally signals the possibility tiiat it is 
metaphorical.
Wliy is this important? In the taxonomy o f theories o f aesthetic judgment, the status o f 
some attributions as literal or metaphorical marks the divide (once we have moved down the 
tree by elitninating non-contender theories higher up) between realism and anti-realism. 
Recall that the realist holds that aesthetic judgments are representational in the sense that 
predicates pick out properties o f objects independently o f our thoughts. Just as a true 
assertion corresponds to a state o f affairs that obtains independently, and in particular 
independently o f that very assertion, so too does a predicate correspond to a property. This 
is what is meant by saying tiiat judgments are extension-reflecting. If it turned out that a 
collection o f well-formed aesthetic assertions were metaphorical sentences, they would not 
refer in tiie right sort o f way to mind-independent states o f affairs, or their predicates would 
not correspond to properties realistically conceived. This would be damagmg to but not yet 
decisive against the realist. If, however it could be established additionally that metaphorical 
assertions were true only in virtue o f an imaginative construal o f theic (grammatical) subjects.
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the battle would be won for the antirealist, for a very large collection o f aesthetic judgments. 
In what follows I shall demonstrate that this is the case.
I shall focus on a special class o f metaphorical assertions: those which predicate expressive 
qualities to artworks. I do so because these assertions are easily identified and analyzed. I 
do not mean to suggest that the only instances o f metaphor in aesthetic discourse are 
predications o f expressive qualities. It is also important to keep in mind that, despite the 
presence o f innumerable dreary examples in the philosophical literature o f the form ‘X is F’, 
the variety o f metaphor, aesthetic and otherwise, is far richer than this. I return to this point 
later. For the present, I wish only to indicate that if even these simple predications turn out 
to be problematic for the realist, the more complex instances o f metaphorical assertions will 
be at least as troublesome.
Expressive qualities are by and large qualities o f human emotions and moods, such as 
sadness, melancholy, joyfulness, pensiveness, and so on. In the development o f 
philosopliical aesthetics, the idea that these qualities are ascribed metaphorically represents 
an attempt to improve on earlier expression theories, in particular the artistic expression 
theory and the arousal theory. The former makes what is expressed a function o f the artist’s 
feelings at the time o f artistic creation, while the latter makes it a function o f what feelings 
are properly elicited firom spectators. Both o f these ancestral views are deeply problematic, 
and I shall not consider them here". For the present discussion, we need only notice that 
these views are not true to the phenomenology o f art—when we call a melody triumphant, 
we do not take ourselves to be ascribing that quality to the artist or to ourselves, but rather 
to the music itself. So the debate between realism and antirealism over this issue turns on 
die sense in which such an ascription is properly understood.
N oel Carroll" outlines the argument for the theory that these qualities are “possessed” only 
metaphorically as follows:
1. If artworks (and part o f artworks) possess e3q>ressive properties, they do so either 
literally or metaphorically.
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2. If artworks (and parts o f artworks) possess expressive properties literally, they must 
be the lands o f things that can bear mental properties.
3. Artworks (and parts o f artworks) are not the kind o f things that can bear mental 
properties.
4. Therefore, artworks (and parts diereof) do not possess the properties literally.
5. But artworks (and parts o f artworks) do possess expressive properties.
6. Therefore, artworks (and parts thereof possess expressive properties metaphorically.
Premise (5) is one that nearly everyone accepts, at least for some artworks or parts thereof, 
regardless o f their stance on the argument as a whole. This is the phenomenology o f 
artworks that I cited earlier. This premise, it seems, can safely be fixed for the moment. (2) 
is the claim that mental properties require a mind to bear them, and (3) is the claim that 
artworks don’t have minds. (4) follows by modus toUens from (2) and (3), and the 
conclusion follows from (1), (5), and (4). Carroll denies the implication in premise (2), and 
wliüe not exactly denying (3), claims that the modus tokens fails because artworks also can 
bear mental properties literaUy both because some non-minded entities are suitable bearers 
o f mental properties and because many ostensible instances o f metaphorical possession are 
in fact literal ones.
Premise (3) seems difficult to deny. After all, neither paintings, sonatas, poems, nor films 
have minds, so it seems a near tautology to claim that they can’t bear mental properties. 
Carrok doesn’t think tliat these things do have minds, though he does think that some 
artworks or elements thereof do bear mental properties. In fact, o f artistic representations o f 
sentient beings he seems not only to hold that they can, but necessarky must, bear mental 
properties. For instance, he claims that fictional TV show and film characters represent 
sentient beings, and by virtue o f their being such representatives, they do bear mental 
properties. The same would apply to any artwork incorporating the representation o f a 
sentient being. He rejects the possible move o f denying mental property-fitness on the basis 
o f the characters’ fictionakty, since the class o f expressive artworks also includes nonfictional 
documentaries which concern real persons.
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It is not clear why Carroll thinks this is a good argument. He seems to rely on a notion o f 
representation that is much stronger than the idea o f one thing standing in for another. It is 
certainly not true that a representation o f some object must possess all the attributes o f the 
object to fulfill that role. A photograph can serve as a representation o f the Queen o f 
Denmark without possessing all her attributes. It can even serve as a representation o f 
certain attributes o f hers without possessing those specific attributes itself—by depicting her 
wearing a crown it can represent her queenship without itself being a queen. So a 
representation need not be a literal exemplification, not even in part. Those two concepts 
are independent o f one another. For purposes o f the fiction, or even o f experiencing the 
documentary as a factual report, it is enough that we take the right images as representing a 
person who is Buffy the Vampite Slayer or Adolf Hitler. It hardly ever is the case that we 
mistake a representation for the thing it represents. We don’t believe that Adolf Hitler is in 
our living room when we are in fact only watching a documentary o f the Nuremberg rallies. 
Neitlier do we recoil from Kendall Walton’s B-movie green slime", believing it to be an 
existent and irnrninent threat. And yet, there must be something about these images that make 
them appropriate as representations. I have argued that a representation qua representation 
need not literally possess any o f the relevant qualities o f its referent.
Premise (2) holds the following; If artworks (and parts o f artworks) possess expressive 
properties literaUy, they must be the kinds o f thin^ that can bear mental properties. What 
sets this claim apart from the one just examined is the literal possession. Carroll wants to 
object tliat it is not necessary for something to bear mental properties in order for it literaUy 
to possess expressive properties. This claim severs the link between the expression— some 
particular perceptible manifestation— and what it is understood to express, that is, a real 
mental state. CarroU says that in describing a person with head and shoulders drooped as 
sad-looking, “we are not speaking metaphoricaUy, but UteraUy. We are offering a literal 
description o f the way in which she looks to us.”" But what o f representations o f persons, 
or the innumerable non-sentient things which we also seem to characterize in this way? He 
goes on: “Similarly, when we caU the weeping wiUow tree sad (sad-looking)", we are offering 
a Uteral description o f its perceptible configuration. Somehow, probably by resemblance, the 
tree reminds us o f the characteristic appearance o f sad people.”^^ According to Carroll, the
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attiibutioa o f sadness to die willow is literal, insofar as it exhibits features that bring to mind 
certain human affective qualities.
Carroll’s calling the attribution o f sadness to the willow a literal one strains the meaning o f 
the word. It is correct to say that the widow looks sad, in the sense o f correct that ties to 
imagination. Now, though, we have moved into metaphorical language. In calling the tree 
sad we highlight certain features o f the willow which are amenable to descriptions Ulce the 
ones given o f characteristic expressions o f human sadness. Seeing a person with a drooping 
posture and downcast eyes, we malte a reliable judgment that this person is sad. But this 
judgment is only warranted because o f a large collection o f background beliefs about 
persons and the behavioral manifestation o f theie moods. Note tliat calling a wülow 
drooping is only licensed on the basis o f a comparison with trees with rigid branches. It is 
not as if the ‘droopiness’ o f a willow is anomalous (for willows) and in need o f some 
explanation in the way that a drooping human posture is. The route to calling a willow sad 
moves through an underlying imputation o f similarity, that o f physical disposition. So the 
attribution o f sadness is based on a claimed similarity which is itself a matter o f imputation. 
Carroll argues that metaphors lUce “The willow is sad-looking” are dead metaphors. It may 
have been the case that to say this about the willow was once a novel use o f language. But 
that novelty is long passed, and the word “sad” has acquired a fixed and literal use that 
means something other than a certain emotional state. This is more or less the view o f 
Donald Davidson, who offers a deflationary account o f metaphor in “What Metaphors 
Mean” *^ He advances two related claims relevant to the present discussion: first, that “a 
metaphor doesn’t say anything beyond its literal meaning,” explaining the metaphor’s 
peculiarities with a psychological-causal theory; second, that many ostensibly metaphorical 
terms are really dead metaphors, former metaphors that have acquired fixed and entirely 
literal meanings. The Davidsonian view is implicit in Carroll’s argument, so is worth 
refuting in detail.
Davidson agrees with many o f his opponents in accepting the commonplace that no 
metaphor can be paraphrased without remainder. Metaphors are open-textured entities, 
which means that a single paraphrase or even an indefinitely large set o f paraphrases wül not 
exhaust the meaning o f the metaphor. It is not the case that in understanding a metaphor
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we do so by constructing such a paraphrase set. In grasping a metaphorical statement, we
are pointed to certain features foregrounded or framed by the metaphor, while other features
are hidden from us. That very foregrounding opens up certain avenues o f cognitive
association, along which the relevant predications can be made with no determinate limit.
Richard Moran notes
the sense o f inadequacy, or worse, o f the pat paraphrases that are so often 
proposed in theories that take metaphor to be an indirect statement o f 
resemblance. To call someone a tail-wagging lapdog o f privilege is not 
simply to make an assertion o f his enthusiastic submissiveness. Even a pat 
metaphor deserves better than this, and such an analysis is not essentially 
improved by tacking on an open-ended list o f further dog-predicates that 
may possibly be part o f the metaphor’s meaning. Hence it becomes 
attractive at this point to insist that the comprehension o f the metaphor 
involves seeing this person as a lapdog, and in some detail, experiencing his 
dogginess. This is what a successful metaphor pulls off, and this image- 
making quality is what lies behind both the force and the unparaphrasability 
o f poetic metaphor.^
But it is the very notion o f the in-principle impossibility o f giving a set o f literal paraphrases 
for a metaphor that motivates Davidson’s claim that metaphors have no special meaning or 
specific cognitive content Davidson gives a brutely causal account o f how metaphor works. 
Scrupulously avoiding talk o f metaphor as “implying”, “saying”, “meaning”, or “asserting”, 
Davidson talks instead o f “working”, “effecting”, “provoking”, and “inviting”. Davidson, in 
opposing what he sees as the sole cognitivist view o f metaphor as some kind o f coded 
message, writes: “Joke or dream or metaphor can, like a picture or a bump on the head, 
make us appreciate some fact—but not by standing for, or expressing, the fact.”^^ So there is 
some non-cognitive psychological explanation for our apprehension o f metaphors. But this 
cannot be so, for if it were true, then there would be no constraints on the understanding o f 
metaphor. In moving metaphor out o f the space o f reasons and into the space o f causes, we 
become unable to say that if  “Juliet is the sun” makes me think that she is large, massive, and 
gaseous, that I am somehow wrong. Davidson can’t even say I’m wrong to think, in 
response to the metaphor, “Where’s my sunscreen,” particularly if  I regularly respond in this 
way to the sentence in question. Metaphors cannot, on the Davidsonian view, ever he 
misinterpreted. But though the open-endedness o f metaphor entails that two differing 
judgments about a metaphor need not demonstrate a failure o f cognitive command, it surely 
just isn’t correct to take Romeo’s metaphor in this way. The fact o f metaphor’s
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unpai'aphrasabiHty only threatens the cognitivist position if meaning or correctness are taken 
to apply only to a well-defined, closed content. But the cognitivist need not, and should not 
accept, that restriction. Content without closure is a perfecdy respectable and arguably a 
much more plausible notion. The claim about dead metaphor is also one we can resist. The 
Davidsonian maintains tliat there cannot be metaphorical truth——and o f course he holds that 
metaphorical sentences are literally false (though this is not correct, either—while many 
m et^phoïic^predicatiofts are false when taken literaUy, most metaphors are in fact nonsensical 
so taken). But if it is granted that metaphors die, when they die “the relevant expression 
acquires a new literal meaning and accordingly gets an additional dictionary entry. This 
would be inexplicable, or at least arbitrary and odd, if  the metaphor had previously had no 
sort o f meaning at all.” '^*
Davidson’s theory o f metaphor has been enormously influential in the philosophical 
literature, in and out o f aesthetics. It is also deeply flawed. A full survey is not possible here. 
It is enough that Davidsonian arguments fail to damage the argument for die metaphorical 
status o f predications o f expressive qualities to artworks. That the argument stands is a 
welcome result, as it preserves our common-sense intuitions about such qualities and their 
essential relation to minds, while also asserting the propriety o f our aesthetic ascriptions. I 
shall round out this discussion o f metaphor in aesthetic discourse with a very brief sketch o f 
a contemporary theory o f metaphor, Roger White’s^ ,^ which nicely shows the role o f the 
imagination in metaphor.
Nearly all influential theories o f metaphor treat it as an instance o f construing one thing in 
terms o f the properties o f anotlier. White’s theory is no exception. Where it differs is in a 
two-sentence analysis o f metaphorical sentences. This analysis avoids the problems that 
arise from either positing a special metaphorical sense, and with it a species o f metaphorical 
truth^ ,^ as well as the sheer implausibiUty o f denying that metaphorical sentences have any 
content or meaning, as Davidson holds. On White’s view, a metaphor is a sentence, one 
that can be analyzed as “the conflation o f two other, grammatically analogous 
sentences.. The two-sentence structure that underlies a metaphorical sentence makes 
clearer both how understanding a metaphorical utterance involves the imagination, and how  
that imagining is constrained. “One o f these sentences, the primary sentence for the
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metaphor, is a sentence that would give a literal description o f the actual situation. The
other sentence would g^ve a description o f a situation with which the metaphor invites us to
compare the actual situation. As a result o f such a conflation, we are invited to explore a
network o f similarities and dissimilarities between the two situations, and to see the one
situation in terms o f the other situation, to see it as if  it were the other situation.” ®^ The
business o f analyzing a particular metaphor is a complex and laborious one, and the results
o f such an analysis are open to interpretive dispute. For instance, it is often unclear whether
words in the metaphor belong to the primary sentence vocabulary, that o f the second, or to
both. One o f White’s simpler examples" comes from Othello'.
lago: Heere he comes.
As he shall smile, Othello shall go mad;
And his unbookish lelousie must construe 
Poor Cassio’s smiles, gestures and light behaviours 
Quite in the wrong.^ ®
White looks at the curious expression “his unbookish lelousie must construe.. .quite in the 
wrong.” Using underlining to mark words in the primary vocabulary, and italics to mark the 
secondary vocabulary, White construes the metaphor in the following way:
His unbookish lelousie must construe poore Cassio’s smiles, gestures and light 
behaviours quite in the wrong.
White thinks that one o f the interpretive questions posed by the metaphor is, “In what way 
is unbookish ‘connected with’ construeT’^  ^ The answer given by his analysis is that “the word 
‘construe’ is a word that describes both Othello interpreting Cassio’s behaviour, and the 
person translating a book with whom Othello is being compared.”^^ White’s analysis 
delivers the primary sentence “His uncultured jealousy must construe poor Cassio’s snules, 
gestures and light behaviours quite in the wrong”, which gives a literal description o f the 
situation. The secondary sentence, “The unbookish schoolboy must construe the Iliad quite 
in the wrong”, is formed by making appropriate substitutions into an open sentence formed 
from the secondary vocabulary, “Unbookish %must construej/ quite in the wrong.” lago’s 
sentence invites the comparison o f Othello’s situation with that o f a schoolboy who is 
unskilled in the reading o f books. This metaphor suggests the staggering number o f points 
o f comparison that can be packed into a short metaphorical sentence. The truth value o f the 
metaphor is partly a matter o f the truth value o f the primary sentence, but it is also a matter
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o f the appropriateness o f the secondary sentence to the situation. The same holds for art 
critical metaphors.
If we are to judge whether Sandler’s comments about Pollock’s drip paintings are 
responsible to the work, we must determine whether it maires the painting coherent and 
worthy o f our aesthetic regard by construing it as a endlessly expanding energy field. ‘Being 
an endlessly e^qpanding energy field is not supervenient on the presentational properties, but 
construing the painting as such is a response to and a structuring o f them. An alternative art 
critical metaphor might well capture die features o f the painting, but construe them in a 
different way, and so impute very different properties to it. The boundless energy o f 
Pollock’s paintings isn’t simply there to be detected, but is experienced by way o f an 
imaginative seeing-as. Though it is partly in virtue o f the properties o f the canvas that our 
imagining works, the qualities marked out by Sandler are largely imputed to the painting.
This imputation is not, however, a merely subjective report or recommendation. It is 
constrained by both die features o f the painting and the general norms that discipline art 
critical discourse. So art critical judgments can enjoy a certain land o f objectivity, such that 
judgments can be marked out as true or false, better or worse, and can be refined or rejected 
by the giving o f reasons.
N ote again that although my remarks here have focused on expressive qualities, the role o f 
metaphor in aesthetic judgment is much wider. We also encounter expressions like “a 
graceful line,”^^ “brash colors,” “elegant composition”, and “tighdy-knit interplay o f voices,” 
and we typically do not encounter these metaphors in isolation but rather within larger 
metaphorical structures that function to bring our experience at least partially into alignment 
with that o f the critic. And again, those metaphorical structures are not just collections o f 
metaphorical predications. White’s theory o f metaphor makes clear how non-predicative 
metaphors, such as Aiifam’s calling a Rothko painting a land o f oracle, involve an 
imaginative construal o f the painting. In imagining the painting in this way, certain aesthetic 
qualities are manifest. We are not detecting independent “oracle-qualities”, but talong the 
painting to have the same kind o f function in our imagination. And if  Anfam’s claims satisfy 
die norms that determine best judgment status, they mark out a way in which our imaginings 
contribute to the proper aesthetic features o f the artwork. Unlike other realms o f discourse.
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metaphor seems to be an ineliminable feature o f the aesthetic. Perhaps many apparently 
metaphorical sentences are instances o f catechresis—uses o f language that serve to fill lexical 
gaps. But it would be a mistake to think that all aesthetic metaphors were catachretic. The 
aptness o f so many art critical metaphors is striking precisely because the artworks seem so 
much more vivid when construed in the way the metaphor indicates.
ZangwiU believes that the pervasiveness o f ineliminable metaphor in aesthetic discourse and
experience is no evidence for antirealism. He writes that “it may be that our thought about
certain aesthetics properties, or our experience o f them, can only be linguistically
experienced by means o f metaphor. But it might be the properties which such metaphors
cause us to notice are real and that the noticing has realistic content.’"'* In other words,
metaphor serves to draw our attention to real properties in the mind-independent sense, but
which cannot be described given our linguistic resources. Such properties would be
ineffable.^ ^ ZangwiU’s reply on behalf o f the realist will not do. It relies on the Davidsonian
causal account o f metaphor which I have akeady argued against. But is it possible to make a
case for ineffable properties once that account is rejected? Zangwdl draws a comparison
with phenomenal experience: “in trying to describe the smell o f coffee, we run up against the
limits o f literal language. Thought, however, is not so bound. We can think o f the smell o f
coffee without difficulty.” '^’ This analogy shows that the argument for ineffabiUty misses the
point. It is true that if we are simply trying to represent the smell o f coffee, we might be able
to do no better that say “It has the smell o f coffee” before we run into metaphorical
language. If the role o f metaphor is not simply to make us notice something, but rather to
invite us to construe something in a particular way, then our experience o f the thing is not an
experience o f its mind-independent properties, but o f the thing filtered by our taking it to
have certain other properties. When I describe someone as a tail-wagging lapdog o f
privilege, we are not struggling against the limits o f language, but telling my interlocutor to
'“[see] this person as a lapdog, and in some detail, [experience] his dogginess.”^^  Glen MuUin
relays this anecdote about John Singer Sargent:
A story is current that a lady once asked him if  he really had the power to 
rend the veil that conceals the hidden deeps o f personality. Sargent is 
reported to have scoffed at the suggestion, replying that if  there was a veil to 
be removed all he could do was paint the veil. This, o f course, sums up the 
truth o f the matter. Sargent merely was a consummate and dispassionate 
reflector o f what he saw.^ ®
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Mullin does not describe Sargent as a mere reflector because a more precise literal expression 
is unavailable. He is imputing mirror-lilre qualities to Sacgent to say something about his art 
(Figure 28), different tilings altogether than he might say were he to call him a magnifying 
glass, an X-ray machine, or a clairvoyant. So too with the veil in the story cited. And the 
function is much the same in metaphorical sentences directly about art, as in “[Sargent] 
never achieved the vibrant color chords which knit all the elements o f a composition 
together in the painting o f the supreme colorists.’"^  This wonderful mixed metaphor, a^in, 
is not seizing on some aspect o f our experience o f Sargent’s paintings that eludes our 
description. Surely we could say that Sargent’s paintings do not use color in a way that 
articulates the formal features o f his compositions and unites them into a coherent whole.*'^  
Muhin, in asserting something about Sargent’s art and its unfavorable status ms a vis the 
colorists, makes his thought more vivid by construing colors as musical chords, which are 
arranged in a larger harmonic structure. Moreover, these chords themselves have some 
physical attributes, namely, being Imit together. ZangwiU greatly misrepresents the imagistic 
force o f these metaphors by putting them in the role o f pointing to ineffable properties. 
What makes them apt is that it strikes us as insightful or useful to construe Sairgent’s 
paintings as lacldng certain musical and physical qualities. The qualities indicated by a 
metaphor are not ineffable, but imputed, even if  there are standards o f aptness for such 
imputations. An apt metaphor is not a case o f language fumbling toward thought. It shows 
the mind spreading itself on the world.
A pressing question remains: just what is it that makes a particular metaphor apt? If the 
judgment sentence is metaphorical, then it does not represent properties o f the artwork in 
the way that a literal sentence is understood as doing. The question can be approached 
obliquely, by asldng why some metaphors seem so compelling while otliers are patently 
inapt? The e3q>lanation is surely a heterogeneous one. Some metaphors are highly 
conventional both in the sense that they are grounded in a set o f discourse-related practices 
and in the sense that they are arbitrary. Other metaphors seem to have a deeper relation to 
tlie things o f which they are predicated, as in the connection between colors and moods, or 
in the connection between visual shape and imagined motion.'** These may be rooted in 
facts about human experience, bodies, or shared ways o f processing information. The
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important point for our purposes is that whatever their origin, whatever the grounds for 
their appropriateness are, these seeming cross-domain construals are indeed metaphors and 
not descriptions o f properties as the realist conceives them.
4. The Logic of Aesthetic Judgment
In Chapter 3, Section 4 ,1 examined the phenomenon o f irresolvable critical disagreements. 
These present a dilemma for realism: accept no more than one judgment as true, without a 
defensible criterion for doing so, or accept more than one, and assert a contradiction. I 
discussed the various critical pluralist attempts to escape this dilemma, and found them all 
unsatisfactory. It is an advantage o f the cognitivist antirealist theory that while it preserves 
objectivity, it has a plausible story to tell about why we often accept as true multiple and 
conflicting judgments about artworks without thereby failing to be rational. This story 
requires a paraconsistent logic, which specifically allows the possibility o f true contradictions. 
That may seem a great price to pay, but it allows our theory to capture a greater share o f art 
critical practice compared to the alternatives. Other antirealist views explain away the 
appearance o f contradiction by revising the syntax o f aesthetic discourse, claiming that 
apparently assertoric sentences serve merely to express preference or are never true. Realist 
views either must dispel the appearance o f contradiction by holding at least some o f the 
disputants in error, even in the absence o f specific, theory-independent reasons, or must 
reconstrue the dispute as a collection o f relativized views. AH o f these solutions are 
unsatisfactory for reasons I discussed in Chapter 3, Section 4. Now I shall outHne an 
antirealist proposal for understanding these disputes.
The entire discussion o f critical pluralism has been grounded on a prima fade discomfort with 
bivalence. That principle would have us hold that in any o f the high-level critical disputes 
we’ve had in mind, at least one o f the disputants is wrong. Now, that explanation is certainly 
still available, but if we wanted to avail ourselves o f it across the board, we wouldn’t give 
critical pluralism a second look. That theoretical pull toward critical pluralism shows that we 
are not prepared to find error in every critical contradiction, but as I have shown, critical 
pluralism makes a false promise o f giving us our disagreement and robust truth as well. At 
least, that is true o f pluralism situated in a larger realist metaphysics. And as pluralism is
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theoretically redundant in an antirealist context, we avoid much confusion by doing away 
with it and trying better to understand what aesthetic antirealism involves. If we want to 
understand aesthetic judgments as assertoric, and lack a principled way o f disqualifying 
optimal critical disputants, we need a logic that accommodates them. The antirealist need 
not, but can, go further: some artworks— not aD, but some— seem correctly to admit 
contradictory predications.
I have argued that the descriptive character o f aesthetic discourse is to be preserved, and 
further, that we want to be allowed to call some judgments true— the ones wliich have the 
right syntax and are governed by the disciplining norms. But if we are not to disqualify any 
o f the claims in the examples, does that not force us to accept the truth o f any aesthetic 
judgment, and so a trivial conception o f truth? The answer is no. What drives the worry is 
the principle o f explosion: from a contradiction everything follows ( (p & ~p) —^  q ). In 
classical logic, this is a valid principle, and has been deployed within aestiietics to show that 
two contradictory critical judgments cannot both be true. Compatibilists like Stecker, who 
want to forge a reconciliation with monism, wield this to argue tliat necessarily ~(p & ~p). 
Conversely, it seems consistent with more radical forms o f postmodernism to argue that if  
we accept that there are some true contradictions, we must gleefully accept ait)/ truth claim 
for the same reason. The stereotypical “anything goes” conclusion follows as soon as the 
antecedent is granted, and it seems that a pet postmodernist project is to establish that 
antecedent.
A promising route for the antirealist who wants to let stand the intuition that some 
conflicting aesthetic judgments are individually true is to adopt a non-classical logic,
Margolis has moved the debate in this direction, though he deliberately avoids a logic with 
the value true apparently because he wants to avoid explosion. However, there are many 
logics tliat are paraconsistent— that is, they are not explosive. Dialetheism is the view that 
combines an endorsement o f some paraconsistent logic with the claim that there are some 
true contradictions.'*^ I suggest that this logical and metaphysical package is what we are after 
in aesthetics. We may well want to admit both Bataille’s and Fried’s claims about Manet’s 
Execution of Maximilian as true, even in the face o f obvious contradiction— one that we no 
longer need to explain away. We certainly want to disqualify critical verdicts Hire the Marxist
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interprétation o f Ught Red Over Black as false. A paraconsistent logic can allow both the 
admissibility o f some contradictory judgments and the rejection o f others. Apart from 
considerations specific to aesthetics, rejecting the principle o f explosion is less counter­
intuitive than one might suppose. Importantly, explosion makes relevance a hollow notion. 
Greg Restall points out that
circumstances in which contradictions are true seem to be necessary in the 
evaluation o f counterpossible conditionals (“If I squared the ciccle with ruler 
and compass then I would be famous” seems true while “If I squared the 
circle with ruler and compass then Queensland would win the Sheffield 
Shield.. .next year” seems false). Commitment to a contradiction does not 
seem to rationally compel (or even to make rationally more plausibly 
commitment to absolutely everything whatsoever.'*^
Indeed, it rather seems that were someone to accept the truth o f every proposition 
whatsoever given a discovery that she was committed to the truth o f a contradiction, we 
would likely pronounce her irrational. But one might still think that the domain o f 
circumstances in which contradictions are to be admitted as true is very limited, to special 
cases like counterpossible conditionals, or to set-theoretic and semantic paradoxes. The 
adoption o f paraconsistent logic for aesthetic discourse might seem opportunistic.
The proposal tliat a paraconsistent logic is the best one for capturing the logic o f aesthetic 
judgment is not a cavalier one. It is motivated by the account I have put forward for 
aesthetic qualities as essentially mind-dependent. If aesthetic qualities are those which are 
experienced when an artwork is subjected to a certain imaginative construal, then there 
should be little intuitive opposition to the idea that true judgments could reflect 
contradictory experiences. For it certainly does not strain conceivability to hold that we can 
imagine a thing in a variety o f incompatible ways. I have su^ested'*'* that Scruton’s theory in 
A ii and Imagination helpfully offers a similar way o f explaining critical disagreements by 
understanding aesthetic experience as a kind o f ‘seeing-as’. Recall, however, that it does so 
by revising the language o f the discourse in way that generates as many difficulties as it is 
meant to solve. Scruton holds that “it foUows from the fact that the condition for the 
sincere acceptance o f an aesthetic judgment is an experience that an aesthetic judgment can 
be sincerely made only by someone who experiences its object in the appropriate way.”**^ 
Broadly, I am in agreement with Scruton here, but I deny the conclusion that he draws from 
this, that “in this case it is perfectly acceptable to describe the judgment.. .as an expression
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o f the experience.”*'* In other words, at least many aesthetic judgments lack truth 
conditions— “to agree to an aesthetic description is to ‘see its point’.”" I have argued 
throughout that the better position is that to agree is to accept as true. If this is so then 
cognitivist antirealism requires a logic tliat accommodates jointly true and contradictory 
judguents. N ote that I am not proposing that aesthetic judgments should be understood as 
carrying an implicit “operator” clause in front o f them. One such proposal might be, for an 
aesthetic judgment ‘p’, that the implied sentence really is “It is appropriate to imagine ‘p’.” 
This move would obviate the need for a paraconsistent logic to describe conflicting true 
pairs o f judgments. The reason I resist this explanation is that I talce Hume’s gilding 
metaphor quite seriously. What a judgment is about, what it describes, is an object or event 
construed in a certain way. If the contrual is warranted (where warrant means satisfying 
enough norms o f the discourse), then the judgment describes a complex object: the canvas 
or sequence o f sounds or words, given coherence and interpretive significance via an act o f 
imagining. Just as no revision o f the syntax o f judgments is needed, no implicit operator 
clause is needed, because the judgment comprehends the imagining along with its object. So 
a paraconsistent logic is required after all.
It is true that we do not have adequate grasp o f the details o f the specific logic needed for 
aesthetics, but that is just an indication o f a needed research program. It is simply question- 
be^ing to assume tliat classical logic is the one “true” logic. In recommending a 
paraconsistent logic for aesthetic discourse, I am neutral about the status o f logics in other 
discourses. Wliich logic we choose to capture our reason-giving art critical practices is going 
to be, ultimately, determined by all the usual features o f theory choice. Two o f those are 
consistency and agreement with the data. If truth-apt contradictions are treated as real data, 
and not merely apparent data, we do well to reject classical logic for a paraconsistent one. If 
we wish to reject the data as false, we are owed a convincing relativism or error theory.
There is good reason to doubt we will get eitlier.
The most obvious objection to the dialetheic proposal is that holding contradictory beliefs is 
a failure o f rationality. One might accept that explosion should be rejected only 
conditionally, for example, as in “Were I to endorse a contradiction, I would reject explosion 
rather than accept all propositions as true. But lucidly I don’t endorse any contradictions.”
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Or one might, as I have suggested already, propose that the domain o f cases in which 
explosion is to be rejected is very small and composed only o f logically peculiar propositions. 
But there are two things to notice in response. The first is that rational people do knowingly 
hold contradictory beliefs, all o f which are not to be explained away or fenced into a bestiary 
o f arcane logical creatures. The mathematician holds, in finding the derivative o f a function, 
that the differential interval is both zero and infinitesimaUy small but non-zero. The theist 
believes that God is good but still utterly beyond our comprehension (that is, God has 
knowable attributes but is also unknowable). These beliefs might be challenged on other 
grounds, and the contradiction may even by itself flag a need for some further investigation, 
but it would be too quick merely on this basis to take the mathematician and the theist to be 
irrational. The second point to notice is that even if they do hold contradictory beliefs, they 
don’t thereby commit themselves to accepting the truth o f any other proposition. These are 
just tlie features we need in aesthetics if we want to allow some contradictory judgments to 
stand while also ruling out outré judgments. Stecker is quite right to say that the advocate o f 
a non-classical logic for aesthetics owes us two things; first, a particular logic must be 
proposed so it can be examined before we buy into it; and second, an argument must be 
given that this logic has a real application to critical practice.*® Certainly the details o f that 
dialetlieic logic that reflects our art critical practices have yet to be filled in. My argument 
here has, I believe, paid that second debt. The project now should then be to find the best 
logic for our purposes, and not to lie on the Procrustean bed o f classical logic.
Define quasi-validity as follows; “an inference is quasi-valid if it involves essentially only 
extensional connectives and quantifiers, and is classically valid but dialetheically invalid.”" 
Priest proposes the following Methodological Maxim (M): “Unless we have specific grounds 
for believing that the crucial contradictions in a piece o f quasi-valid reasoning are dialetheias 
[i.e., true contradictions], we may accept the reasoning.”®** It is part o f the function o f M to 
give some loose operating principle for determining just when we are to admit a 
contradiction as true. Since the admission o f a contradiction has to be based on content- 
specific reasons and not just logical form, and since the burden is on the advocate o f 
admission to show why a specific contradiction is true, the frequency o f such an admission 
should be relatively low. In terms o f aesthetic discourse, M tells us that we are only to 
accept contradictions when there are specific positive arguments in their favor. When we
157
6.4: The J^gic of Aesthetic Judgment
lack specific arguments to tliat effect, M tells us that classically valid inferences are 
acceptable—including reductio and disjunctive syllogism arguments. Contradictions are 
admitted as true only when the propositional conjuncts o f the contradiction satisfy many o f 
the norms tliat discipline assertions in the discourse generally.
But if we reject explosion as a valid rule o f inference, and we understand many aesthetic
properties to be the product o f imaginative imputation, can we rule out any judgments as
bad ones, even if  we maintain M? This objection is a specific version o f a general objection
to theories broadly labeled ‘projectivist’. If our judgments are not tlie detection o f mind-
independent properties, what stops us firom projecting qualities freely and arbitrarily? The
objection is not much more than a simple-rninded scare tactic. Consider the following two
sets o f critical remarks on Cezanne’s early painting entitled Sma/I House at Anvers (Figure 29):
Verdi: “The picture is characteristic o f Cezanne’s Auvers landscapes hi its 
spontaneous handling and varied brushworlc, as in the unassuming nature o f 
its motif. Out o f this, however, Cézanne wrests a unity and richness o f 
colouring, together with a sequence o f formal correspondences, which 
anticipate the achievement o f his Houses in Twvence a decade later.” “Its 
handling is also considerably bolder than [earlier works on the theme], 
particularly at the right, where Cézanne has worked the greens o f the hills 
into the tops o f the trees and introduced a sequence o f parallel strokes which 
serve further to Hnk foreground with distance. In their strength and regularity 
these add emphasis to this portion o f the picture, echoing the hues o f the 
rocky ridges at the left and counterbalancing the weight o f the buildings 
below them.”®*
Also taldng note o f the curious vertical strokes on the right side o f the canvas is Geist, who 
arguably gives a much more imaginative account o f the painting.
Geist: Especially ambiguous are the parallel vertical bands o f pink on the 
right. Only vaguely suggestive o f rows o f plantings, these striations seem to 
float above the field rather than describe something in them. Just below  
these regularly spaced brushstrokes is a clump o f greenish-white slirubbery 
that extends to tiie left, where it turns upward, almost touching tlie corner of 
the white house. When the pink striations are seen together with the 
shrubbery, they make the back o f a large right hand that seems to reach up 
over the field. This field has three large divisions: a broad expanse sloping up 
from the right to the left side; a triangular wedge which enters firom the right; 
and a narrow curving section between the wedge and the slty. These three 
areas adumbrate the pelvic region o f a recumbent woman: the lowest being 
the left thigh; the uppermost, the top o f the right thigh; and between tliem, 
the pubic triangle. At the sharp angle o f thé pubic region are two elliptical 
green shapes, one on the otlier, whose presence in the landscape is difficult
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to justify from a geological, botanical, or horticultural point o f view. But they 
make anatomical sense when seen as the labia o f the genitals. The 
cryptomorphic hand on the right seems to be reaching toward this 
configuration on its left, the canonical place o f Hortense [Cezanne’s wife]. 
The phallic tree athwart the expanse o f blue sky— most o f which is on the 
right—is a sign o f Cezanne’s continuing fixation on his mother, which is 
ineradicable and is manifested, as usual, in proximity to an image o f 
Hortense.”®^
N o doubt the latter commentary is one we should want to disqualify. But, the objection 
goes, without a basic logical law and the faith that our judgments represent mind- 
independent properties (and without supervenience), what tools do we have to disqualify 
Geist’s judgments? The answer is quite simple; the judgments can be rejected via the 
exercise o f the very norms that discipline aesthetic discourse. We do not stand in need o f 
additional metaphysical equipment to help us in that task. One way, then, would be to argue 
that Freudian analyses generally are to be rejected, because they have been scientifically 
rejected (and so would debar an interpretation invoking subconscious intentions), and 
because there is little reason to believe they were part o f Cezanne’s beliefs at any point in his 
life. Wliile Geist’s judgments do have a certain frisson and perhaps therefore heighten our 
interest in the painting (a minor Cézanne made more significant?), that norm must be 
balanced against more general ones about plausible beliefs. And while he is probably correct 
to say that the vertical strokes do not play any clear-cut representational role, given what we 
Imow about the development o f Cézanne as a painter, Verdi’s judgment that the ambiguous 
bands serve a formal, painterly purpose constitutes a better explanation. Geist also shows 
the psychoanalyst’s penchant for finding significance in the periphery, but such an approach 
ignores the interest o f the central compositional elements that Verdi’s more workmanlike 
and less salacious account acknowledges. So too with other conflicting judgments. The 
grounds for accepting and rejecting individual judgments are provided by the norms o f 
critical discourse. Those judgments satisfying enough o f them, and are expressed in the right 
grammatical form, can be classed as “best judgments” and so taken as true.
5. Chapter Summary
Aesthetic judgments are not true in virtue o f some mind-independent facts. But they are 
truth-apt. What confers truth-aptness on a particular judgment is that it is expressed in a
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grammatical form that allows for embedding in the antecedent o f a conditional, and in 
propositional attitude contexts, and so on. In other words, aesthetic judgments take the 
form o f indicative sentences, and I have argued in Chapter 2 that these sentences are 
properly indicative, not just apparently so, as tlie expressivist and subjectivist claim. Truth in 
aesthetics is not unconstrained; it is not a game o f “anything goes”. There are a host o f 
norms wliich discipline aesthetic thought and tallc. None o f the individual norms is timeless; 
the body o f norms is amorphous and shifting. Norms are modified, added, and removed 
over time, as a result o f new experiences, new developments in criticism, and new 
conceptions o f the role o f artworks in our lives.
Antirealism has been given a catchphrase characterization as a claim about mind- 
dependence. Specifically, aesthetic qualities are claimed to be mind-dependent. They are not 
“out there”, simply to be detected by the right sort o f persons. Rather, they are those 
saUencies that arise from imaginative construal o f the object presented to us. This claim 
gains support from an examination o f the role o f art theory and art criticism. Art theory and 
criticism very often plays an ontologically constitutive role for artworks. In a sense they 
provide instructions for the correct apprehension o f an artwork, and at the same time can 
provide a description o f the artwork when experienced according to those instructions. Tlie 
ineliminable presence o f metaphor in our characterizations o f artworks is telling. Metaphor 
is essentially a construal o f one thing in terms o f anotlier. The experience o f an artwork as 
exemplifying emotional qualities, other qualities o f persons, or more generally properties o f 
the sort that artworks could not conceivably possess, is a matter o f taldng the work to have 
them; we impute qualities marked out in metaphor rather than detect them.
The mind-dependence o f aesthetic qualities removes a significant barrier to a solution to the 
problem o f irresolvable critical disputes. Realism must hold that in such cases, at least one 
party to the dispute is mistalœn, or it must relativize their judgments. Other non-realist 
theories dissolve the contradiction by revising the grammar o f aesthetic judgments. 
Cognitivist antirealism, because it holds aesthetic qualities to be mind-dependent, can 
plausibly hold that contradictory judgments may be true as well. But taldng aesthetic 
judgments to be truth-apt requires the adoption o f a non-classical logic to capture the rules 
o f inference in aesthetics. Appropriate logics are available. Paraconsistent logics allow the
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assertion o f a contradiction without commitment to the truth o f every proposition. More 
work needs to be done here, o f course, but there is no argument on the basis o f logic for 
excluding the propriety o f true contradictory aesthetic judgments.
These claims are merely the core theses o f a metaphysics o f aesthetics. It is clear that if  
these claims can be maintained against the challenges I have considered, many consequences 
follow. The treatment o f metaphor here suggests a solution to the problem o f expression 
which must be more fully worked out. Adopting a paraconsistent logic has implications for 
the normative standards o f warrant The theory also has implications for the debates over 
intention in interpretation. And there are deep and interesting questions about the grounds 
for acceptable metaphors: why, for example, are certain colors or chord sequences typically 
construed in terms o f certain emotions? All o f these are questions generated by the 
theoretical core I have argued for here. In the following chapter, I will conclude with a 
recapitulation o f the arguments surrounding the realism/antirealism debate, and highlight 
some o f these less abstract issues that arise as a consequence. Two questions will be o f 
special interest: how does a resolution to the realism/antirealism debate bear on pre- 
philosophical beliefs about artworks— do any o f those beliefs need revision in light o f a 
particular metaphysical position? And what, if  any, are the practical consequences o f 
endorsing a metaphysical position for critical practice?
' Independent o f  actual thoughts for the modest realist, and independent o f  counterfactual thoughts for the 
robust reahst and the platonist.
2 Tliough perhaps they should, if  the error theorist is correct, be counted as meaningless.
3 David Hume, A n Enquity Concerning the Vmidples of Morals, Appendix 1,294.
Irving Sandler, The Triumph of American Tainting ^ e w  York: Harper and Row, 1970) 136-137 
5 The DeKooning passage, for instance, expresses no obvious preference.
 ^Crispin Wright, "Comrades Against Quietism: Reply to Simon Blackburn on Truth and 0!yectm^\M ind 107 
(1998) 185.
7
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imply a claim that metaphor is a feature exclusive to cnticism
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dAmérique, Paris, March 1912.
* * Kasimir Malevich, From Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism: The Nem Tealism in Painting (1916), in Charles 
Harrison and Paul Wood, Theoty 1900-1990 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992) 166-174.
*2 Irving Sandler, The Triunrph of American Painting 136-137.
13/W114-115.
161
6.5: Chapter Summaiy
14 Lest it be objected tliat metaphors cannot be used to assert, one should note tlie pervasiveness o f  metaphors 
with assertive functions in everyday contexts: "Early attempts to bury Arafat ended up resurrecting liim.”; 
"Clinton was a political cuckoo, adroit at stealing ideas from his opponents’ nests.”
15 There are more recent versions o f  tliese views that seem to avoid many o f  the obvious objections to tlieir 
simple ancestors. Guy SirceUo, in. A  Neir Theory ofBeatry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) updates 
the artistic expression tlieory, and Derek Matravers'm A rt and Emotion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001) 
provides a nuanced reworking o f  die arousal tlieory. SirceUo and Matravers may avoid many o f tlie objections 
I offer here, or gve  equally compelling alternative accounts. However, tlie point remains that their views 
explain only expressive qualities, wliile the metaphor interpretation I argxe for has much greater explanatory 
power, gving a miiform account o f  expressive quahties, qualities o f  human movement (e.g. gracefulness), and 
so on.
i<^ Noël CarroU, Philosophy of A it (London: Routledge, 1999) 95-96.
1'^  KendaU Walton, Mimeüs as Make-Believe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) 195-204.
Noël CarroU, Philosophy of A rt 100.
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Chicago Press, 1978), 29-45.
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25 Roger Wliite, The Structure of Metaphor BlackweU Publishers, 1996).
2^  The ^nesis o f  my commitments on the issues associated with metaphor in art is in Goodman’s discussion o f  
metaphorical exemplification in Hs Languages of Art. While it has many attractions, Goodman’s view suffers, as 
do so many tlieories o f  metaphor, fconi its taldng predications o f  tlie form *X is F’ to be the paradigm o f  
metaphors. Goodman also seems to require a distinction between literal truth and metaphorical trutli.
27 R o^ r White, The Structure of Metaphor
28
29 f W 62-80.
30 William Shakespeare, Othello IV, i, 117ff.
31 ibidll.
32 ibid.
33 It is frequently maintained, without argument, tiiat ‘gracefiil’ and ‘elegant’, to take two examples, are Uteral 
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34 Nick ZangwiU, "Metaphor and ReaUsm in Aestiietics”, of Aesthetics and A rt Criticism, 49 (1991) 61.
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7I have concluded my arguments for cognitivist antirealism as die dieory o f aesthetic 
judgment that best resolves the apparent tension between the two opening intuitions. In 
what remains, I shall survey the arguments given against alternative views, and in favor o f 
our view. In doing so, I now wish briefly to look at some consequences o f the various 
theories examined. It might be thought that as a tiieory taltes an existent set o f practices as 
both a subject for investigation and something to be held more or less fixed in that 
investigation, theories are practically inert. This seems to be the idea behind a common 
understanding o f Wittgenstein’s remark that philosophy “leaves everything as it is.”* But this 
thought is mistalcen. Tlie dual role o f facts about practices is a basic fact about any sort o f 
interpretive activity, and no more a call for humility on the part o f philosophy than for any 
other activity in which appearances are to be preserved and understood somehow.
Metaphysics has long been the object o f philosophers’ suspicion in that it has often seemed 
o f no import whatsoever to the way we conduct our quotidian lives. Contemporary meta­
ethics seems to have inherited the same questionable features, and if the parallel discussion 
in aesthetics were as well developed, no doubt it would also receive the same mistrustful 
regard. I believe that this is manifest in the willingness with which so many—including 
many who might even feel great urgency about problems in philosophical ethics—will avow 
a subjectivist stance in aesthetics. But the suspicion, actual or hypothetical, is unfounded. 
Reflection on our practices colors the conduct o f those same practices. This is no less true 
in our art-related practices than elsewhere. I contend, then, that the metaphysical account o f  
the status o f aestiietic judgments bears on our critical practices, on our considered responses 
to critical discourse, and ultimately to our experience o f art. I have structured the discussion 
o f aesthetic judgment around two questions: the status, objective or otherwise, o f aesthetic 
judgments, and the status, mind-independent or otherwise, o f the ground o f those 
judgments. The various ways o f answering those two questions resulted in seven distinct 
theoretical positions.^ So it should be no surprise that the adoption o f one o f these positions 
would deliver not just a theory o f aesthetic judgment, but some corollaries concerning the 
proper understanding o f art critical practice, and tlie nature o f the work o f art. In
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summarizing the arguments o f our enquiry, I offer some views on what those different 
corollaries might be.
The negative project o f this investigation comprised Chapters 2 through 4, and supported 
the case for cognitivist antirealism by elimination o f the alternative views. Among 
contemporary aestheticians, two views— modest aesthetic realism and robust aesthetic 
realism— exhaust what might be considered the current orthodoxy. The other views 
covered in these chapters do have their adherents, though most o f them have other issues in 
the center o f their sights. Usually these other issues are metaethical ones, and the argument 
for folding aesthetic issues into the position tends to be that aesthetics, like ethics, is 
concerned with value. It is true that there are gains to be made from exploiting this 
parallel—indeed, that has been one o f the approaches o f this project—but the lack o f 
engagement with art-specific concerns is evident in the clumsy way aesthetics is dealt with in 
these particular discussions. Chapter 2, then, is a ground-clearing project o f dealing with 
views that are not plausible contenders for a theory o f aesthetic judgment.
The first o f these non-contenders is, interestingly enough, the most commonly avowed pre- 
theoretical view; subjectivkm. This pre-theoretical de gustibus subjectivism is often betrayed, 
when its professor is confronted by an outrageous evaluative claim. But philosophical 
subjectivism might not fall in the same way. The label picks out two different views. One is 
a radical relativism, that appends ‘to me’ or another appropriate indexical to aesthetic 
judgments. So aesthetic judgments are not properly understood as “X is F” but rather, “X  is 
F to me” or “X is F to her”, and so on. The second subjectivist view takes aesthetic 
judgments to be merely expressions o f feelings or attitudes toward the artwork judged. On 
tills view, judgments are at best meaningful only in a thin sense, in which they report 
attitudes held. But the standard emotivist line is that aesthetic judgments are to be 
contrasted with, say, scientific sentences, in that they express rather than state. For the 
emotivist, aesthetic sentences are meaningless, and so neither true nor false. Under the 
radical relativist view, aesthetic judgments fail to be truth-apt because they do not satisfy the 
equivalence schema.
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It turns out, then, that subjectivism o f both varieties can be dismissed on the basis o f 
unsatisfactory answers to five questions:
i. Is feeling necessarily connected with evaluation?
ii. Can aesthetic feelings be distinguished from non-aesthetic feeling? 
in. How finely grained can non-aesthetic feelings be?
iv. Why does preference expression exhaust the use o f aesthetic judgments?
V. How are ostensibly assertoric aesthetic sentences distinguished from truly assertoric 
ones?
Answering these questions requires a level o f attention to actual art-related practices to 
which the subjectivist does not rise. Her view can be dismissed as a crude and prejudicial 
one. Many critical judgments simply do not have any evaluative content, and many 
evaluative judgments are opposed in valence to the actual preference held by the judge. So 
there is no direct connection between utterance and preference. The subjectivist’s answer to 
the second question relies on a neat separation o f affect and cognition, but such a separation 
is not in fact available for feelings outside the aesthetic domain. Feelings understood as 
occurrent emotional states are individuated in part by their intentional objects, and so there 
is a strong connection to cognitive states such as beliefs, which o f course are truth-apt when 
expressed as propositions. So the subjectivbt’s categorization o f aesthetic judgments as 
expressions o f feeling does not establish that they are thereby truth-inapt. The subjectivist’s 
theory also does not give a satisfactory answer to the third question. It is unclear how we are 
to distinguish, as preferences, between predicates such as “revelatory” and “profound”, or 
between “funereal” and “melancholy”. Moreover, predicates such as these are used with 
judgments to assert beliefs. Preference expression cannot exhaust the use o f judgments, for 
the reasons just given: even feeling terms can be used to assert, and many truly aesthetic 
sentences do not express any attitude. Finally, the distinction between non-assertoric 
aesthetic sentences and assertoric sentences elsewhere is a prejudicial one. Surely, aestlietic 
sentences in the indicative mood appear to have all the needed syntactical features to 
function as assertions. In particular, they can be embedded in propositional attitude 
ascriptions and can function as antecedents o f conditionals. When an aesthetic judgment 
functions this way in a modus ponens inference, the inference fails to be truth-preserving 
because the embedded aesthetic judgment merely expresses an attitude, according to the 
subjectivist. This means that subjectivism rules out simple deductive reasoning within
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aesthetics. This might not seem to be problematic, since aesthetics is purported to be a 
domain o f feelings and preferences, and not o f reasons and beliefs. According to the 
subjectivist, the person who fails to accept a modus ponens inference involving an aesthetic 
sentence is not guilty o f any rational failure at all. In addition, the subjectivist has no reason 
to accept the conclusion o f such an inference. It could be argued that it would be irrational 
for the subjectivist to do so.^
Subjectivism is plainly an untenable view. The subjectivist also places an incredibly 
burdensome project upon our shoulders. Our civilizations include a great many people who 
have all the appearances o f giving reasons for their judgments about artworks, and even 
indeed for the preferences they hold toward them. This fact lends support to the view that 
aesthetic judgments are in some sense objective. We often ^ve reasons to bring others to 
share our judgments, and are dismayed or incredulous if that does not happen. If 
subjectivism were true, our dismay and surprise would be the result o f a conhontation with 
our misunderstandings about our own practices with the fact that there are no aesthetic 
facts. Eventually, this continued confrontation should reach a critical threshold, beyond 
which we would come to our senses and give up the practice. N ot only would critics stop 
issuing judgments about artworks, art schools and conservatories would stop educating 
students in the way they now do. At the ridiculous extreme, everyone could be said to be an 
artist as long as he or she so declared, and anything they produced would be no better or 
worse an artwork than any other. Artworks could not be the kinds o f things that made 
assertions about morality or human nature. They would only be the occasion for sighs o f 
ineffable feeling. In short, were subjectivism true and we came to know that, we would have 
to concede that our lives had been deeply misunderstood, and we should have to begin 
making the necessary reconfigurations to our shared understanding.
Blackburn’s quasi-reaHsm and Mackie’s error theory force the same project o f revision upon 
us, if to a lesser degree. Quasi-reaHsm takes a metaphor from Hume, that o f taste as a 
productive faculty, which gilds and stains natural objects, and reshapes it into a 
semantic/metaphysical theory o f value. According to the theory, we project properties onto 
our representations o f the world on the basis o f its objective natural properties and our 
habits, emotions, sentiments, and attitudes. Just because we do so does not mean that
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practices o f valuing which thereby arise are in error. We are perfectly entitled to realist uses 
o f language regarding these practices. Blackburn’s theory suffers some o f the same 
shortcom ing as subjectivism. It just is wrong to say that all aesthetic judgments involve 
attitudes or the expression o f preferences. So the semantic theory Blackburn supplies to 
avoid objections to subjectivism is not appropriately applied to a great many aesthetic 
judgments. Blackburn holds tliat tallc o f truth, for tlie quasi-realist, is principled because 
there is some limiting set o f attitudes on which judgments converge given all possible 
opportunities for improvement. This premise, I have argued, is not one Blackburn can 
invoke given the tools available to him. The quasi-realist also fails to deal with the worry 
raised for all non-cognitivist theories by the Frege-Geach point. In the end, Blackburn’s 
view is unstable between subjectivism and some variety o f realism. And inasmuch as it tends 
to subjectivism, so do its corollary views on the nature o f aesthetic discourse and o f 
artworks.
Maclde’s error theory is easily dealt with. His arguments from relativity and hom  queerness 
both depend on implausibly strong requirements for objectivity. Mackie argues from the 
fact o f diversity in judgment to the conclusion tliat truth in aesthetics is relative. But what is 
needed is a domain-specific argument showing why mere diversity entails relativism. If 
asked, a large sample o f people would give a nearly equally large number o f different answers 
to the question, “Exactly how many stars are there?” Surely diversity among those answers 
does not warrant die conclusion that the truth about the number o f stars is relative. Maclde 
thinks that a relativist conclusion here does not malte sense, but then it seems blatantiy 
question-begging to state that it does in the aesthetic case. Objectivity does not require 
unanimity. Neither does it require radically mind-independent facts. The argument from 
queerness holds that only very queer metaphysical entities could constitute objective values. 
We would require some special faculty o f intuition in order to become aware o f them.
Maclde claims this because he also holds that only things which stand in causal relations can 
be admitted to a respectable ontology. If there are no entities o f the right sort, then aesthetic 
judgments can only be false. But diis argument, if  effective, involves great collateral damage, 
including mathematical, logical, and philosophical assertions. Tlds means that Mackie’s 
argument from queerness is self-refuting.
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It is difficult, then, to imagine a world in which Mackie’s error theory was true. It might also 
look quite a lot like the subjectivist’s world, with the difference that once people (no doubt 
through the counsel o f philosophers) came to see that their practices were in error, they 
should give them up. Mackie thinks that in spite o f the error in conception, we continue 
with moral practice because o f the survival-related benefits it confers. What is the benefit o f 
continuing witli a misconceived aesthetic practice? One might propose, for instance, that 
there was some benefit to our well-being conferred by deceiviag ourselves about the nature 
o f our art critical practices. But it is hard to see what this could be, especially in light o f the 
high value we place on the veridicality o f our representations o f the world in other domains.^
In Chapter 2 ,1 also discussed two realist non-contenders. One o f these, pktonic realism, 
shares Mackie’s view that if  aesthetic judgments are objective, they can only be so in virtue 
o f some strongly mind-independent facts. On this view, objects would have aesthetic 
qualities even if there were no one to experience them. But this view is really an implausible 
extreme. Aesthetic qualities are so often bound up in our particular valutngs and 
conventions. It seems nonsensical to claim that a melody pushes with insistent and 
impatient urgency if  there are no beings who can be insistent and impatient and would 
predicate such qualities to a non-minded thing. Platonic realism also renders our practice o f 
giving reasons in support o f our judgments gratuitous. If a poem is tender, is just is tender, 
and there is nothing more to be said. The platonic realist’s conception o f objectivity (which 
is also Mackie’s), is unnecessarily strong, and gives no regard to the way actual art-related 
discourse is conducted.
The second realist position I considered in Chapter 2 was reductionist realism. That view 
shares the same prejudice that motivates Mackie’s error theory, that any ontologicaUy 
admissible entity would have to play a role in causal explanations. Reductionism seeks to 
explain suspect aesthetic discourse in terms o f some other respectable domain, most 
typically, the empirical. If reductionism were true, there would be bridge laws connecting 
aesthetic properties to non-aesthetic ones. But while there do seem to be “rules o f craft” in 
the various artistic media, there seem to be no rules o f the sort the reductionkt needs. Also, 
if  reductionism were true, then aesthetic judgments need not be viewed suspiciously, for they 
would have the same meaning as a sentence or set o f sentences in a respectable domain.
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Artists would be in the business o f discovering the natural properties that would deliver the 
exact effects they desired to achieve in their works, and could reliably reproduce them just by 
making use o f thek discoveries. Indeed, it would seem possible to give context-free 
empirical-term descriptions o f artworks which would be translatable into an inventory o f 
their aesthetic qualities. Such a scenario would also provide a comfortable route to 
objectivity but seems wildly implausible.
All five o f the non-contender theories share the suspicion that aesthetic discourse must be 
made respectable by metaphysical grounding in some neutral, less controversial, domain. All 
five are greatly at odds with the way aesthetic discourse and artistic practice are conducted. 
The philosophical reasons for rejecting these views only gain strengtii firom considering how  
their truth would yield scenarios so misaligned with ours.
In Chapters 3 and 4 ,1 examined in detail two views that preserve the appearances to a much 
greater degree. Both modest aesthetic realism and robust aesthetic realism hold aesthetic 
judgments to be objective, but they handle the mind-dependence intuition differently. 
Modest realism takes aesthetic qualities to be independent only o f the judge’s actual mental 
states (but not counterfactual ones), while robust realism talces them to be independent even 
o f counterfactual mental states. To put it more carefiiUy, these two tlieories hold in 
particular that the trutli o f a judgment p is independent (in one or the other sense) o f the 
judging that p. Both theories claim that aesthetic properties supervene upon non-aesthetic 
properties, and so in Chapter 3 I presented a number o f arguments against supervenience. I 
showed that the supervenience thesis if  true is trivially so, and does not usefully explicate the 
practice o f giving and defending aesthetic judgments. For several reasons it seems most 
likely that the thesis is incoherent. Even if  it can be repaired, supervenience can only be 
asserted by realists a priori^  as an argument for its justification seems to require an antirealist 
notion o f truth. But supervenience is not a phenomenon with an independent claim o f 
factuahty. Asserting it a priori is not metaphysically innocent. Even allowing this (and note 
the generosity o f such a move, as it already requires us to grant that die basic notion can be 
fixed), it follows that there can be only one true comprehensive aestiietic judgment o f an 
artwork. This puts realism at odds with our common practice o f countenancing multiple and 
conflicting judgments about artworks.
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Chapter 4 took up the different conceptions o f mind-independence invoked by modest and 
robust realism. Robust realism, in taking aesthetic qualities to be strongly mind-independent, 
suggests a primary quality account o f them. However, I showed that the argument for the 
primary quality status o f aesthetic qualities involves a confusion between truth-conferring 
and warrant-conferring properties. So there is no convincing argument for robust realism, 
especially as other ‘robust’ views— platonic realism and reductionist realism—have already 
been rejected. Turning to modest aesthetic realism, the way mind-independence is specified 
there suggests an analogy between secondary qualities and aesthetic properties. The analogy 
is liighly strained. What can be preserved o f it comes in the response-dependence analysis o f 
aesthetic qualities. Response-dependence really is a claim that the response o f a class o f ideal 
judges is inextricable from the content o f the quality itself. As such it is not on its own 
sufficient to establish modest realism as a realist view. What is seems to require is, 
minimally, a necessary connection to a realm o f mind-independent properties. This is the 
function o f the supervenience claim, to connect aesthetic properties to empirical ones. But 
the arguments o f Chapter 3 showed that the notion o f supervenience was fatally flawed, and 
so the realist’s anchor to mind-independent properties is not available for her theory.
Realism in general seems well-equipped to explain why we think our judgments are 
objective. It is because there are aesthetic properties which are in some sense independent 
o f our thought and talk. These properties are represented in true aesthetic judgments. But 
realism cannot expkin why we countenance conflicting views about artworks.
Disagreements are always to be explained in terms o f ignorance or error—we can never 
allow that a judgment p and a judgment incorporating the claim -^ p both be admitted as true. 
On the realist account, what critics do is detect qualities o f artworks and map them out for 
us. The experience o f art, under this conception, is one o f detection, discovery, or 
investigation. We engage with an artwork, immedktely experiencing many o f its qualities as 
the artwork is presented to us, and strive to discern those features which are not immedktely 
apparent. The features immedktely avaikble include perceptual properties like color, shape, 
volume, pitch, and other low-level sensory properties which depend on the receptive 
capacities o f the experiencing subject and the background conditions. These rektional 
properties can be given a counterfactual analysis in terms o f ideal perceivers and conditions.
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and so a purely subjectivist view is avoided. Other properties, like the art historical context 
and the content o f representational works, might be immediately apparent features to 
experienced critics, but could be learned by the inexperienced. And still other features, Hke 
the form o f the final movement o f a symphony, might become apparent as the music 
unfolds, or might require successive hearings to make out. Similarly, the scansion o f a poem  
might be something that requires some trial and error experimentation. Different basic 
meters might be suggested throughout the poem, and we will have to try to harmonize those 
meters and their violations with the poetic meaning to arrive at the correct scansion. A 
novel might have a character who often speaks ironically, and we may have to read further 
before we can determine if  a stretch o f dialogue was literal or ironic. And the symbols used 
in an allegorical painting might require a good deal o f research before we can determine the 
proper interpretation o f the figures before us.
Once we have done these tilings with the artwork at hand, we have discovered the work’s 
properties. This process may take a long time—indeed, it may never be completed. There 
may, on the realist’s story, be properties o f artworks which we never come to know. The 
realist conception, then, takes artworks to be akin to the objects o f scientific investigation. 
An intuitive difficulty with this conception, though, is the much greater readiness with wliich 
we allow contradictory judgments o f artworks to stand, as compared with contradictory 
empirical statements. This readiness, if  taken at face value, should cause discomfort for the 
realist. If we are fervently beholden to the view that artworks are fully determinate things in 
all their aesthetic qualities, this discomfort will be rmld or non-existent, because we can 
always do^edly maintain that at least one party to a conflict is wrong— even if  we can never 
find out. If, on the other hand, we are more agnostic about the determinateness o f an 
artwork’s properties, or are reluctant always to find a single right verdict, the discomfort 
becomes great. I believe that agnosticism and not fervent belief is the stronger intuition.
Chapters 5 and 6 develop positive considerations for a theory o f aesthetic judgment. In 5 1 
examined Hume’s theory o f judgment, which might plausibly be updated and reconstructed 
to yield a cognitivist antirealist theory. Such a theory would, recall, accommodate both the 
intuition that judgments are objective and that aestlietic qualities are mind-dependent. 
Hume’s theory proved to be unsatisfactory in the end. It avoids many o f the problems
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mooted for the other theories examined, but relies on unsupportable premises. Hume’s 
thought shows the fashion o f his age in claiming a uniformity o f human nature. This 
uniformity, together with Hume’s view that certain qualities are fitted by nature to produce 
specific responses in us, explains the objectivity o f judgment. N o one now would accept 
such an explanation, I believe. So the task o f Chapter 6 was to explicate the core claims o f a 
contemporary theory which accommodated the starting intuitions without falling back on 
bad antliropolo^cal or psychological claims.
There I argued that truth is constituted by best judgments, where the notion o f best 
judgments was unpacked as their satisfying sufficiently many o f the norms disciplining 
aesthetic discourse. I provided some real-world examples o f aesthetic discourse which could 
not be comfortably explained along realist lines. Art theoretical discourse and art-related talk 
employing metaphor both show the essential involvement o f the imagination in the 
experience o f art. What the distinctive terms o f aesthetic discourse refer to, aesthetic 
qualities, are not “out there” to be detected, but rather are the result o f warranted 
imaginative construals o f painted canvases, sequences o f sounds, texts, and so on. Berys 
Gaut suggests that “criticism at its best.. .is a kind o f second-order art, an art comprised o f 
observations about otlier forms o f art. Like first-order art, it has constraints on success, and 
requirements to get it right, to imagine weU.”  ^ I would go further than this. On my theory, 
what the best criticism, that which we would count among best judgments, does for 
artworks is imbue them with aesthetic qualities. Part o f what it means to confer best 
judgment status on a critical remark is to grant that the metaphorical connections it forges 
and the saliencies it establishes are proper attributes o f the artwork. This is not to say that 
great criticism does not have independent literary value—very often it does. But when it 
satisfies the norms o f aesthetic discourse, it also has a very intimate relationship with its 
corresponding artwork, much more intimate than a bystander’s description would be.
The cognitivist antirealist conception takes artworks to be foci o f imaginative activity. The 
realist might ask, “Why do we need an external object at all”? Why not simply call our 
imaginings artworks? Saying that the set o f properties o f an artwork is partially constituted 
by the warranted imaginings o f the subject does not amount to effacing the artwork qua 
external object or event. A newcomer to Bach’s fugues is invariably awestruck by the
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complexity o f tlie counterpoint, o f the way Bach resolves harmonic and thematic problems 
simultaneously, and seemingly against incredible odds. But Bach famously said that working 
within the complex formal requirements o f the fugue was liberating—it provided the 
constraints that gave significance to his compositional choices. Indeed, the problems he 
solved were problems he set for himself, given the intricate rules o f the game. Without those 
rules, there would be no fugue, only amorphous groups o f sound.
The physical painting, tlie literary work tokened by a text, and the instantiation o f a musical 
work—the object or event corresponding to the artwork—serves simultaneously to invite 
and constrain imaginative activity. Some o f those imaginings can be properly said to be right, 
and some to be wrong. One revisionary aspect o f cognitivist antirealism is the ambiguity it 
introduces for the word ‘artwork’. One sense is the usual one meaning the paint on canvas, 
a piece o f cast bronze, and so on— the physical object before us in the gallery or event type 
instantiated in a performance. The additional sense introduced by our theory is o f the work 
in the first sense subjected to warrmted imaginative construal. The first sense is often used 
as a kind o f shorthand for tiie second sense. We talk about the aesthetic qualities o f a work, 
and point at the canvas, but the painting only has these qualities when we do something with 
it in our ima^nation. This ambiguity is not problematic, as long as we maintain an 
awareness o f it. To ignore it in philosophical contexts might push one toward realist 
theories, with all their attendant difficulties.
Any philosophical view with the slightest measure o f interest is not purely descriptive. That 
philosophers might attain an explanation o f “the way things nal^ are” is a misleading 
conceit. Karl Popper conceived o f philosophy as a mode o f inquiry that took some problem 
as a starting point, some apparent conflict in our experience or our conceptualizing that, for 
the moment at least, does not admit o f some empirical means o f resolution. How to 
understand what art is, and what we do with it, is this sort o f problem. The conflict that 
gives rise to it is between the experience o f an artwork as some kind o f external, independent 
object, and the role we standardly accord the imagination in the experience o f art. Any 
philosophical proposal for a solution involves malting choices: what data to fix, and treat 
descriptively, and what data to reject or modify as arising from some conceptual confusion. 
The realist conception— artworks as scientific objects— rejects the mind-dependence o f the
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aesthetic qualities and revises our thinking o f the role o f imagination. The antirealist 
conception, in taking artworks to be foci for imaginative activity, bolsters the starting 
intuition o f mind-dependence. The realist now owes us a convincing error theory—why do 
we take imagination to play a substantive role in the experience o f art when her conception 
tells us that it is wrong to think so? The realist might avoid shouldering that burden by 
giving the imagination a lesser role to play, a heuristic one that aids in revealing the artwork’s 
true features. But this is just turning a blind eye to the importance o f imagination in the 
experience o f art.
This is not to say that cognitivist antirealism has no promises to keep. As I stated in the 
previous chapter, the proposal that a paraconsistent logic is preferable to classical logic for 
capturing the way aesthetic discourse works is not a trivial one. We need to explore just 
what it means to accept a contradictory pair o f judgments as true, and when we can, if  ever, 
reject a judgment p on the basis that we have already accepted its negation. And if  we accept 
the judgments o f two critics, who independently judge p and ~p, and so implicitly accept (p 
& ~p) does this puU the im a^ation  in opposite directions at once? I believe these concerns 
can be addressed. The tallest hurdle is one that our practice shows us already to have 
cleared: that we do accept contradictory judgments o f artworks as true. I have argued that 
the only plausible explanation for this datum is that aesthetic properties are mind-dependent. 
Imagination, not taste, is the productive faculty that gilds and stains. Best judgments serve 
to direct the imagination in imbuing artworks with their distinctive aesthetic qualities. I 
opened this project with two intuitions that are almost always perceived as conjElicting: that 
artworks and their distinctive qualities are dependent on our thoughts, and that our aesthetic 
judgments are objective. The cognitivist antirealist conception o f artworks alone allows us 
to hold both.
* Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New Yoik; Macmillan, 1953) §124. Thete are other 
interpretations o f  §124 that do not take it to assert a strongly non-revisionist role for philosophy as an activity. 
2 There may weU be more possible views, though our taxonomy seems to exhaust the ran^ o f contemporary 
views that are or might be (with varying degrees o f  plausibility) held.
 ^See Cian Dorr, “Non-cognitivism and Wishful Thinkmg”, Noüs 36 (2002) 97-103 for such an argument.
This is part o f  the point o f  the experience machine objection to classical utilitarianism.
 ^ Berys Gaut, “Metaphor and the Understanding o f  Art”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1997) 241.
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Appendix 1: Color Plates
Figure 1: Thom as Kinkade, The Village Ughthouse  ^2001
Figure 2: Edward Hopper, Ughthouse a t T m  Lights^ 1929
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Figure 3: Barnett N ew m an, A dam , 1951-2
L
Figure 4: Paul Cézanne, The Pailway Cutting, 1869-1870
Figure 5: Pablo Picasso, T a reve, 1932
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Figure 6: Am adeo Modigliani, G irl 
with a Polka-Dot Blouse, 1919
Figure 7: Piet Mondrian, Composition 
with Blue, 1935
Figure 8: Henri Matisse, L£ bonheur de 
vivre, 1905-1906
Figure 9: Hans VanM eegeren, Christ at 
Emmaus
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Figure 10: Titian, Diana andActaeon, 1559
Figure 11: Velasquez, The Feast of 
Bacchus, 1629
f
Figure 12: Jean-Baptiste-Siméon Chardin, 
The Ray, 1728
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Figure 13: Thom as Gainsborough,
M n. Richard Brinsley Sheridan, 
1785-1786
Figure 14: Mark Rothko, Light 
Red Over Black, 1957
Figure 15: Mark Rothko, Untitled (Black on  
Gray), 1969-1970
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Figure 16: Edouard Manet, The Execution of M aximilian (Mannheim Version), 1867
Figure 17: N eri D i Bicci, Madonna and Child with Saints, 15* century
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Figure 18: Edward W eston, White Sands, 1946
Figure 19: Wayne Thiebaud, Pies, Pies, Pies, 
1961
r.
Figure 20: W illem D eK ooning, Women Singng 
II, 1966
Figure 21: Giambattista Tiepolo,
Immaculate Conception, 1769
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Figure 22: Francis Bacon, Three Studies for Figtres at the Base of an Execution, 1944
^  i t '  “ m
Figure 23: Andy W arhol, Marilyn (Three Times), 1962
/ %
Figure 24: G eorge Braque, Mandora, 1910 Figure 25: Kasimir Malevich, Suprematist 
Painting 1916
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Figure 26: Jan Jansz. Treck, Vanitas Still Life, 
1648
Figure 27: Jackson Pollock, 
Number /, 1948
Figure 28: John Singer Sargent, Madame 
Pierre Gautreau (Madame X) 1884
Figure 29: Paul Cézanne, Small House at 
Auvers, 1873-1874
184
Appendix 2: Proof of SI 82
VxVj^  ((ox A -aj?) ~{px A pj)) o  (3x (Px a  o x )  -> V> (py ay))
* (1) VxVy ((ca a ~ay) ~(Px a py)) premise* (2) ((aa A ~ab) -»• ~(Pa A pi)) (1),UI
(3) 3x (Px A ax) A '~Vy (Py ay) ass.
(4) Pa A aa (3), aE, El ‘a’
(5) ~(P6 ->• aft) (3), aE, El ‘b’
(6) P6 A ~ab (5),p.L
(7) aa  A ~aô (4),(6 ),aE,aI
(8) ~(Pa A pè) (7), (2), m.p.
(9) Pa A p6 (4 ),(6),aE ,aI$ (10) ~(3x (Px A ax) A ~Vy (py ay)) (8), (9), contr., ~(3)❖ (11) 3x (Px A ox) -> Vy (Py -4. ay) (lO).p.L
:K (1) 3x (Px A ox) Vy (Py ay) premise
(2) ~VxVy ((ax a --ay) -> -(Px A Py)) ass.$$ (3) -((aa  A ~ab) ~(Pa a pi)) (2), q.c., El, ‘a’ ‘b’ÎÎ!S{S (4) (aa A ~ab) a (Pa a pi) (3), p.l.
(5) Pa A aa (4), aE, aI
(6) 3x (Px A ax) (5), EG
(7) Vy (Py -> ay) (1), (6), m.p.
(8) p i -> a i (7),UI
(9) ~(Pi A - a i ) (8),p.L
(10) (p i A - a i ) (4), aE, aI❖ (11) VxVy ((ox A -ay) -> -(Px a Py)) (9), (10), contr,, ~(2)
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